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1 Introduction 
Promoting the private sector is considered to be of key importance by politicians 
and policy makers all over the world and has become a priority among the economic 
development goals of the donor community to foster growth, employment and 
poverty alleviation in developing and transition countries (World Bank (2002), 
UNIDO-OEDC (2004), IFC (2009)). The perception that micro, small and medium 
enterprises (MSMEs) play a significant role in most economies has attracted a wide 
range of activities to overcome the obstacles that impede MSMEs in their 
development. However, it is by no means clear which factors actually need to be 
addressed to successfully achieve the intended goals. One factor often stated to be 
crucial for MSMEs to prosper and grow is their access to (formal) external finance. 
In developed as well as in developing and transition countries small firms have been 
found to be more hampered in their access to external finance than large firms (e.g. 
Galindo and Schiantarelli (2003), Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006) and World Bank 
(2008)). Bank loans are the most essential form of external finance for MSMEs as 
their access to capital markets is limited (Titman and Wessels (1988)). Yet, MSMEs’ 
bank relationships are plagued by severe informational asymmetries since they 
regularly do not provide audited financial statements or, in the case of very small 
enterprises, do not clearly separate business from household funds.  
This thesis studies demand and supply determinants of loan terms in MSME 
lending. It largely focuses on MSME lending in transition countries where the 
problems arising from informational asymmetries are often aggravated because of 
the lack of adequate institutions and creditor protection rights. Consequently, these 
countries provide an ideal environment to study the impact of informational 
asymmetries and close bank-borrower relationships on requested and granted loan 
terms.  
Most of the literature on bank-borrower relationships is concerned with the  
ability of banks to deal with informational asymmetries. Banks may gather and 
process information by screening and monitoring borrowers (e.g. Diamond (1984) 
and Ramakrishan and Thakor (1984)). Moreover, they may apply relationship 
lending techniques which facilitate implicit long-term contracting and intertemporal 
smoothing of loan contract terms (Boot (2000)). Several theoretical and empirical 
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papers have established the valuable influence of long-term lending relationships 
between borrowers and banks as a means to overcome informational asymmetries 
(Boot and Thakor (1994), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and von Thadden (1995) 
as well as Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995) among others).1 
However, bank-borrower relationships may actually be characterized as mutual 
commitments (Boot and Marinc (2008)). Also, some papers have pointed out that 
credit availability and loan terms are determined by both demand and supply factors 
(Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Qian and Strahan (2007)). Nevertheless, there is 
surprisingly little research on borrowers’ demand for credit and how it interacts with 
banks’ supply of credit over multiple interactions. Most likely because of lacking 
data there has been little attempt to empirically disentangle both sides. Accordingly, 
the majority of empirical studies have relied on equilibrium outcome measures, i.e. 
granted loan terms, to analyze how they relate to relationship measures, firm and 
bank characteristics or the legal and macroeconomic environment. Only very 
recently, a few studies on demand and supply effects in bank lending have emerged 
(Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009), Cheng and Degryse (2010) and Jimenez, Ongena, 
Peydro and Saurina (2010)). 
Linking to this very literature, this thesis aims at broadening the understanding of 
small business loan contracting in general and the demand and supply processes 
behind observed loan terms in particular. Thereby, it offers new insights in the 
factors influencing MSMEs’ financing and banks’ lending decisions and provides 
various policy implications. In addition, previous research on the impact of 
informational asymmetries and close bank-borrower relationships on credit 
availability and loan contract terms has mainly focused on the US and Europe. Thus, 
this thesis also extends the literature by determining whether the former findings may 
be transferred to more information-intensive environments such as South-Eastern 
Europe or Central Asia.  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 deals with loan maturity, a so far 
under-researched topic. Although the dataset used for the analysis does not contain 
information from loan applications, the paper identifies two complementary 
situation-specific explanations for the observed positive relation between borrower 
                                                 
1
 There also is a strand of literature that establishes a negative impact of lending relationships on loan 
terms, since borrowers get captured in a hold-up situation when banks gain an informational 
monopoly (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (2004)). 
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risk and loan maturity. One of these explanations relates to the behavior of the 
demand side and the other to the supply side. Accordingly, the analysis is 
nevertheless able to shed some light on demand and supply effects in bank lending. 
Chapters 3 to 5 deal with loan currency and loan amount and are based on panel 
datasets consisting of matched loan application and loan contract information making 
it possible to directly disentangle demand from supply effects.  
 
Chapter 2: Loan maturity in small business lending – the role of borrower risk, 
asymmetric information and bargaining power2 
 
A loan term that has achieved less attention in the empirical literature despite its 
potential role as a monitoring device and in dealing with borrower risk is loan 
maturity. While the relation between borrower risk and credit availability, interest 
rates or collateral has been studied quite intensively (Petersen and Rajan (1995), 
Berger and Udell (1995), Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Machauer and Weber 
(1998), among others), evidence on the relation between borrower risk and loan 
maturity is not only scarce but also mixed. As theoretical models also make mixed 
predictions it becomes clear that there may not be a single explanation that fits all 
circumstances. This study therefore amends the literature by providing two 
complementary explanations that explicitly account for the extent of asymmetric 
information and for demand vs. supply side factors. Since informational asymmetries 
are particularly prevalent in lending to smaller firms, estimations use information on 
                                                 
2
 This chapter is based on the paper “The relation between borrower risk and loan maturity in small 
business lending” which is joint work with Lars Norden from Erasmus University Rotterdam. The 
paper was presented at the Midwest Finance Association Meeting 2008 in San Antonio, the 
Southwestern Finance Association Meeting 2008 in Houston, the European Banking Symposium 2008 
(ProBanker) in Milan, the 2008 Banking Workshop in Münster, the German Finance Association 
Meeting 2008 in Münster, the Swiss Conference on Banking and Financial Intermediation 2008 in 
Champéry, the Eastern Finance Association Meeting 2008 in St. Pete and the Washington Area 
Finance Association Meeting 2008 in Washington D.C. It has received a “revise and resubmit” by the 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. An older version of the paper was used by Lars Norden 
as part of his “Habilitationsschrift” (Norden, Lars (2009): Information and Risk in Bank Lending: 
Empirical Evidence, Habilitationsschrift, University of Mannheim). However, this chapter does not 
only differ substantially in its composition but also in the following ways: (i) the focus has been 
shifted to demand and supply factors that determine the relation between borrower risk and loan 
maturity, (ii) the literature overview is more comprehensive and additional testable predictions are 
derived, (iii) interaction terms are used to clearly and formally establish differences in the risk-
maturity relation between various subsamples and graphs are provided to visualize the results, (iv) a 
broader analysis of the varying levels of asymmetric information is offered, (v) dynamic aspects to 
test the signaling argument are included and (vi) a broader discussion and interpretation of the 
findings is offered. 
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all new and renewed loan contracts made between SME borrowers and a German 
bank in 2005.   
The main finding is a robust and significantly positive relation between borrower 
risk and loan maturity. For loans made under high informational asymmetries this 
may be explained by good borrowers aiming at signaling their good quality to the 
bank and therefore requesting short maturities (Flannery (1986)). However, if 
informational asymmetries are low, signaling does not provide a reasonable 
explanation for the observed positive risk-maturity relation because there is almost 
no risk of adverse selection any more. Rather can it be explained by the view that 
risky borrowers may benefit from renegotiations with relationship lenders (e.g. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). Relationship lenders seem to offer relaxed loan 
terms to those borrowers who need assistance in times of a temporary deterioration 
of their credit quality (see Elsas and Krahnen (1998)). They are able to do this 
because they have sufficient information to assess whether the borrower will recover 
and they may make use of intertemporal and / or cross-product income smoothing. 
Thus, although the dataset does not contain information from loan applications, the 
study offers insights in demand and supply factors driving the relation between 
borrower risk and loan maturity: while the signaling argument explains borrower 
behavior, the assistance-from-relationship-lenders argument explains bank behavior.    
In addition to asymmetric information, borrower bargaining power may influence 
the outcome of the loan negotiation process. The results reveal that high borrower 
bargaining power leads to longer maturities on average and weakens the risk-
maturity relation especially in the case of high informational asymmetries. This is 
consistent with findings that good borrowers have bigger bargaining power than 
risky borrowers (Uchida (2006)) and sheds further light on the demand and supply 
effects that may influence the risk-maturity relation. The findings imply that 
borrowers actually would like to borrow at longer maturities (if information 
asymmetries were absent) and do so when they have bargaining power. At the same 
time, especially the good borrowers may find it intertemporally optimal to choose 
short maturities if informational asymmetries are prevalent to convey their low risk 
to the bank and benefit from better loan terms in the future. Yet, risky borrowers 
benefit from their lenders’ willingness to provide long maturities in the case of low 
asymmetric information, whether they have bargaining power or not.  
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Chapter 3: Foreign currency loans –demand or supply driven?3 
 
Foreign currency borrowing by the private sector is a widely observed 
phenomenon in emerging markets. It is, for instance, seen as a major cause of the 
financial crises in East Asia in the 1990’s (Goldstein and Turner (2002)). Since the 
aggravation of the current financial crisis there have been strong fears that foreign 
currency borrowing could jeopardize financial stability in Emerging Europe because 
overall credit growth, and especially the increase in foreign currency loan volumes, 
was substantial in these countries during the years up to the crisis. Borrowers had an 
incentive to request loans in euros, US dollars or Swiss franks because of their lower 
interest rates compared to local currency loans. At the same time, many banks in 
these countries are foreign owned and therefore to a large extent refinanced in 
foreign currency providing the lenders with an incentive to grant foreign currency 
loans to avoid currency mismatches on their balance sheets.  
When most currencies in Emerging Europe depreciated considerably during the 
financial crisis, repayment difficulties and defaults arose especially in the segment of 
loans to private households and micro and small businesses. Obviously, many of 
these loans had not been hedged, for instance by borrowers’ income in foreign 
currency. Several countries reacted quickly to discourage foreign currency loans 
(Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008)). The effectiveness of such measures, however, 
depends on whether these loans are primarily demand or supply driven. Knowing the 
critical risk determinants is indispensable, especially in a globally connected banking 
system, to find adequate policy measures to deal with the potential problems arising 
from foreign currency risks. This study therefore makes an important contribution to 
the literature by examining to what extent the currency denomination of loans is 
determined by demand and / or supply side factors and which are the driving factors 
on either side. 
To this end, the chapter analyzes a unique dataset of more than one hundred 
thousand MSME loans granted by one Bulgarian bank between 2003 and 2007. The 
                                                 
3
 This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Brown from the Swiss National Bank and Steven 
Ongena from Tilburg University. The corresponding paper was presented at Tilburg University, the 
Swiss National Bank, KfW, the Sveriges Riksbank, the Bulgarian National Bank, the 2009 Banking 
Workshop in Münster, the conference “The Changing Geography of Money, Banking and Finance in a 
Post-Crisis World” in Ancona, the 6th Annual Conference of the Research Committee Development 
Economics of the German Economic Association in Hannover and the 2010 Annual Meeting of the 
Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics in Fribourg. 
 6 
dataset comprises information on requested and granted loan terms as well as 
information on borrower characteristics and the bank’s refinancing composition and 
currency at the time of loan disbursement. The results show that the lower interest 
rates on foreign currency (euro) vs. local currency (leva) loans play a role in the 
firms’ decision to request foreign currency loans. Also, the more transparent firms, 
i.e. the older and larger firms and those with longer bank relationships, are more 
likely to request foreign currency. At the same time, firms seem to learn over time 
that the bank is reluctant to grant large and long-term loans in local currency and 
therefore request euro if they need such loans.  
In contrast to previous empirical studies based on aggregate data (Basso, Calvo-
Gonzales and Jurgilas (2007) and Luca and Petrova (2008)), this thesis analyses the 
determinants of the supply side, e.g. the type and currency of the bank’s refinancing, 
on the loan level. The results suggest that the bank is more likely to grant foreign 
currency loans to borrowers who are of lower observable credit risk and less opaque 
to the bank. However, the bank is also more likely to turn a borrower’s request for 
local currency into foreign currency if the loan is large or long-term and if the bank 
itself has more foreign currency funding. Interestingly, it turns out that foreign 
currency customer deposits have a stronger impact on the bank’s foreign currency 
lending than foreign currency wholesale funding.  
For the policy makers in Emerging Europe these results imply that measures 
aiming solely at the demand side (e.g. increased transparency by new requirements to 
disclose foreign currency risks to customers in Hungary and Poland) may not be 
enough if foreign currency lending is at least partly supply side driven. Apart from 
that, recent attempts by development practitioners, who aim at fostering credit access 
for MSMEs in developing and transition countries, to implement adequate wholesale 
refinancing mechanisms in local currency may not be sufficient to reduce foreign 
currency lending. It seems rather most important to establish a credible 
macroeconomic environment to encourage borrowers to save in local currency and to 
make banks less hesitant to make large and long-term loans in local currency. 
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Chapter 4: The dynamics in requested and granted loan terms when bank and 
borrower interact repeatedly4 
 
Bank-borrower relationships and their impact on credit availability have been 
lively discussed in the theoretical and empirical literature. Yet, previous studies have 
mainly focused on banks’ ability to collect and process information and how this 
may benefit borrowers by reduced credit constraints. The question how borrowers’ 
demand for credit evolves over bank relationships and how this demand interacts 
with banks’ supply of credit when borrowers repeatedly contract with the same 
lender has achieved surprisingly little attention. This thesis is the first to provide 
empirical evidence on the dynamic patterns that arise when bank and borrower 
interact repeatedly by disentangling demand and supply effects behind observed 
credit constraints and therefore extends the existing literature in an important way. 
In contrast to previous studies that use either indirect (e.g. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994)) or equilibrium outcome measures (e.g. Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)) of 
credit availability, this study provides a more comprehensive measure by 
incorporating the demand side to identify credit constraints. Using the same 
Bulgarian dataset as in Chapter 3 it measures credit constraints as the ratio of 
requested to granted loan amounts and examines not only how this ratio relates to 
firm characteristics but also how it evolves over bank-borrower relationships. The 
results show that the extent of asymmetric information measured by firm age and 
size at the beginning of a bank relationship is the most important determinant of 
credit constraints. At the same time, credit constraints decrease significantly over 
loan sequences with this effect being most pronounced for the first few interactions 
and the initially young and small firms.  
Taking the analysis one step further to separate demand from supply side 
processes reveals that the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases 
over loan sequences due to a convergence of both sides. Borrowers who experienced 
relatively high credit constraints at their previous loan increase their demand more 
moderately than the previously unconstrained borrowers. At the same time, the bank 
grants disproportionately larger loan amounts to those borrowers that were highly 
                                                 
4
 The paper on which this chapter is based was presented at the University of Mannheim, the 6th 
Annual Conference of the Research Committee Development Economics of the German Economic 
Association in Hannover and the 2010 Banking Workshop in Münster and has been accepted for 
presentation at the 37th Annual Meeting of the European Finance Association in Frankfurt. 
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constrained at their previous loan in comparison to the previously unconstrained 
borrowers. The results suggest that the bank makes use of dynamic incentives to deal 
with problems arising from informational asymmetries rewarding borrowers’ due 
repayment with increasing loan amounts. This is in line with arguments that bank 
relationships are valuable because banks are able to collect and assess information in 
due course and may therefore reward borrowers by better loan terms over time. The 
results further imply that borrowers learn from the negative feedback they receive 
from being credit constrained and adjust their requested amounts to avoid being 
highly constrained again.   
While this is first evidence for the dynamic patterns that arise both on the demand 
and the supply side when borrowers interact repeatedly with the same lender, 
focusing the analysis on only one bank makes it difficult to disentangle possible 
further impacts stemming from borrower bargaining power or multiple sourcing, for 
instance. Therefore, the study sets the stage for further research on the processes 
behind observed credit constraints and contracted loan terms with more 
comprehensive datasets. 
 
Chapter 5: The impact of the US financial crisis on credit availability for small firms 
in Central Asia5 
 
This chapter further extends the empirical evidence on credit availability for 
MSMEs in transition countries focusing on the impact of the 2007-2008 global 
financial and economic crisis which had its roots in the US subprime mortgage 
market and peaked in September 2008 with the failure of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Inc. It analyzes loan application and loan contract data from Azerbaijan, a country 
that is vulnerable to external shocks due to its highly oil dependent economy. The 
bank providing the data, namely AccessBank, remained financially strong during the 
crisis, but it was confronted with unexpected refinancing delays in the second and 
third quarters of 2008 because the international capital markets were not able to 
provide the necessary liquidity in the prevailing situation. The chapter aims at 
distinguishing between increased borrower risk and the bank’s refinancing delays as 
                                                 
5
 This chapter is based on the same-named paper with Gunhild Berg from KfW. It has been accepted 
for presentation at the PEGNet Conference 2010 in South Africa. 
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the two possible causes for reduced credit availability that arise from the effects of 
the financial and economic crisis.  
While it seems that Eastern Europe and Central Asia are hit hardest among the 
emerging countries (CGAP (2009)), there is so far only anecdotal evidence on how 
MSME borrowers are affected by the crisis. This study is the first to provide micro-
level evidence on the impact of the financial crisis on credit availability for MSMEs 
in an emerging market economy. Thereby it does not only offer new insights in the 
various channels of credit availability but it also sheds light on an important question 
that remains to be answered empirically: whether the risks from lending to small and 
medium borrowers or those arising from microenterprise loans are more worrisome 
to lenders during the crisis. On the one hand, microenterprises may be hit less 
because they often produce essential goods for the local market so that demand for 
their products is relatively stable even in times of crises (Littlefield and Kneiding 
(2009)). On the other hand, many micro entrepreneurs have accumulated debt from 
multiple lenders because especially in the well developed microfinance markets like 
Eastern Europe the boundaries between microfinance and consumer finance have 
become blurred (Littlefield and Rosenberg (2004)). These high debt levels may make 
micro clients even vulnerable to small changes in their incomes. 
The study measures credit availability in two ways, first by the firms’ probability 
to receive a loan after having applied for one and second by the share of the 
requested loan amount that is finally granted by the bank if the loan application was 
successful. The results show that credit availability for agro loans is merely affected 
by the crisis. Apart from that, micro compared to SME borrowers face only a 
moderate reduction in approval rates due to the crisis which may be explained by 
their lower risk. While agro and micro businesses mainly produce subsistence goods 
for the local market, SME borrowers’ business activities may be more severely hit by 
the crisis so that they have to face the greatest cuts to their credit availability. A 
further explanation may be that it is easier and cheaper for the bank to “save” scarce 
refinancing funds by denying some SME in contrast to many micro loans. Finally, 
bank relationships are found to be valuable in times of crises because they mitigate 
the negative effects which the crisis has on credit availability. 
Analyzing aggregate statistics allows identifying a third channel of credit 
availability. It turns out that the refinancing delays together with the bank’s strong 
portfolio growth forced the bank to introduce limits on lending so that not all demand 
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could be met. However, the restrictions on business lending were implemented in 
line with a conscious tighter risk management, i.e. that in the business loan portfolio 
mainly SME and high-risk micro lending was limited. The results suggest that the 
bank discourages such (potential) borrowers from requesting new or additional loans 
during the period of refinancing difficulties in the second and third quarters of 2008. 
Thus, both the refinancing delays as well as borrowers’ increased credit risk during 
the crisis seem to matter for the observed reduction in the availability of SME and 
high-risk micro loans.  
The results in this chapter contrast with anecdotal evidence from Eastern Europe 
which suggests that banks mainly worry about their lending to high-risk micro clients 
and have limited their exposure in that segment because many of these clients carry 
high levels of (consumer) debt. Whether there are fundamental regional differences 
or whether the analysis in this chapter underestimates the negative impact of the 
crisis on micro lending because it can only partially account for the number of 
potential borrowers that is deterred from requesting a loan during the times of 
refinancing difficulties and after the Lehman failure remains to be investigated by 
future research. 
The results have implications for development practitioners aiming at sustainably 
fostering credit access for micro, small and medium businesses in developing and 
transition countries. First, supporting MFIs in building up diversified credit 
portfolios that include various loan categories with respect to size and industry may 
increase banks’ stability in times of a global financial and economic crisis as the 
current one. While the strong performance of AccessBank and the low default rates 
of its borrowers during the crisis provide some support for this argument, of course, 
further research on how different banks’ portfolio quality is affected by such a crisis 
would be needed to verify this aspect. Second, broadening MFIs’ refinancing basis to 
achieve greater resilience against external shocks remains an important topic. Recent 
attempts to create adequate refinancing instruments in local currency therefore seem 
to be a crucial step to help MFIs to overcome refinancing problems. This bends a 
bow to Chapter 3 in which a bank’s refinancing composition and currency were 
found to determine its foreign currency lending. 
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2 Loan Maturity in Small Business Lending - The Role of 
Borrower Risk, Asymmetric Information and Bargaining 
Power 
2.1 Introduction 
In financial contracting, lenders face potential problems arising from an 
asymmetric distribution of information. Banks can overcome these problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard by collecting private information through 
screening and monitoring and by using debt contract terms (e.g. maturity, collateral, 
covenants). Loan maturity may play an especially important role in small business 
lending where the enforcement of covenants is difficult because firms regularly do 
not provide audited financial statements. While theory predicts covenants to be 
strictest for high-risk borrowers (e.g. Berlin and Mester (1992)), banks may similarly 
use short maturities to assert regular renegotiations with risky borrowers when 
lending to small firms. This so-called debt contracting view (Ortiz-Molina and Penas 
(2008)) suggests a negative relation between borrower risk and loan maturity.  
Yet, there are several demand and supply factors that interfere with this intuitive 
hypothesis on the nature of the risk-maturity relation. For instance, if the interest rate 
curve is steep, borrowers have a cost incentive to request short maturities. At the 
same time, they may favor borrowing at longer maturities because this reduces the 
need to frequently roll over short-term debt so that borrowers are expected to trade-
off these aspects. In addition, relationship lenders’ willingness to assist risky 
borrowers, borrower bargaining power as well as the need for good borrowers to 
signal their low risk to the bank by choosing short maturities in the presence of 
asymmetric information may influence the risk-maturity relation. Models that are 
based on signaling to overcome the adverse selection problem arising from 
asymmetric information suggest a positive and monotonic relation (Flannery (1986)) 
or a non-monotonic relation (Diamond (1991)).  
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the relation between borrower 
risk and loan maturity in small business lending taking into account the various 
demand and supply side factors that may influence this relation. For this purpose, we 
employ detailed data on all loans made to SMEs by a German universal bank in 
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2005. Germany represents a particularly interesting case because it is a bank-based 
financial system, small firms heavily rely on borrowing from relationship lenders 
and, most importantly, German banks typically do not use covenants in small 
business lending (Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Machauer and Weber (1998)). 
Therefore, loan maturity may be particularly important because the debt contracting 
literature suggests that it can be used as a (restrictive) substitute for covenants. 
Our results, however, do not confirm this conjecture. We rather find a robust, 
significantly positive and monotonic risk-maturity relation in the full sample. Our 
findings thus provide evidence in favor of two complementary explanations, one 
relating to the behavior of the demand side and one to that of the supply side. 
The signaling argument implies that low-risk firms choose shorter maturities. This 
seems to be reasonable in the case of small informationally opaque firms because the 
risk of adverse selection is relatively high (García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano 
(2008)). At the same time, relationship lending may provide a very different 
explanation for a positive risk-maturity relation. Theory suggests that risky 
borrowers can particularly benefit from borrowing from informed relationship 
lenders (e.g. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). It is noteworthy that we observe 
particularly long maturities in the case of loans made to risky borrowers under 
relatively low asymmetric information. This result indicates that the bank has 
intensified its monitoring efforts which, in turn, can be beneficial for the borrowers, 
resulting in relatively long loan maturities. In other words, relationship lenders offer 
relaxed loan terms to those borrowers that are most likely to need assistance. 
Conditioning our analysis on the impact of borrower bargaining power in addition 
to the extent of asymmetric information enables us to gain further insights in demand 
and supply effects that may influence the risk-maturity relation. Our results reveal 
that the risk-maturity relation is weakened in the presence of borrower bargaining 
power with this effect being especially pronounced when asymmetric information is 
high. Overall, these findings imply that borrowers would actually like to borrow at 
longer maturities (if informational asymmetries were absent) and do so when they 
have bargaining power. Yet, if informational asymmetries are prevalent the good 
borrowers resort to choosing (cheaper) short-term loans to convey their good quality 
to the bank. If informational asymmetries are low, risky borrowers benefit from their 
lenders’ willingness to provide long maturities whether they have bargaining power 
 13 
or not. Finally, our results are also consistent with findings that good borrowers have 
bigger bargaining power than risky borrowers (Uchida (2006)). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
related literature while Section 2.3 provides institutional details on the loan granting 
process and describes the data. Section 2.4 reports the findings from the empirical 
analyses. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 The risk-maturity relation in the literature 
In this section, we briefly outline theoretical models on borrowers’ and lenders’ 
maturity choices to establish the relation between borrower risk and debt maturity 
under high vs. low levels of asymmetric information.6 Then we present empirical 
studies on the risk-maturity relation that focus on small business lending before 
turning to the role of borrower bargaining power in bank lending. 
 
2.2.1 The borrower’s maturity request and the lender’s maturity offer 
Flannery (1986) considers a situation in which firm insiders are better informed 
about the project they want to carry out than the market. If short-term debt is cheaper 
than long-term debt and if transactions costs to roll over debt are high enough to 
prevent bad firms (those with unfavorable private information) from imitating good 
firms (those with favorable private information), a separating equilibrium may occur 
with good firms borrowing short-term and rolling over debt at a relatively low 
interest rate and bad firms borrowing long-term at a higher rate. Flannery (1986) thus 
predicts a positive and monotonic relation between borrower risk and debt maturity 
based on borrowers’ maturity choices. Bad firms choose to borrow long-term to 
avoid transactions costs and a presumably high interest rate when having to roll over 
short-term debt. Good firms, in contrast, benefit from transactions costs because they 
may signal their low risk to the market by choosing short debt maturity.  
                                                 
6
 We concentrate on potential problems due to adverse selection since these are relatively more 
important in comparison to moral hazard in small business lending. If the risk of moral hazard is 
prevalent, the debt contracting view predicts a negative relation between borrower risk and loan 
maturity (Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008)) with short maturities serving as a substitute for strict 
covenants. Interestingly, there is evidence for a negative relation between borrower risk and loan 
maturity in lending to big firms (e.g. Guedes and Opler (1996)) where the scale and scope of moral 
hazard can be substantial. However, Strahan (1999), pp. 20-21, also finds that non-investment grade 
and unrated firms “borrow on a longer term basis than investment grade firms”, which is explained 
with demand-side factors and consistent with our results. 
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 In the model of Diamond (1991), the firms’ debt maturity choice is based on a 
trade-off between the preference for short-term debt due to an expected better credit 
rating in the future and the risk of liquidation, i. e. the inability to roll over short-term 
debt. In this model, lenders may distinguish firms in the beginning by their credit 
ratings but they do not know whether firms have positive or negative NPV projects. 
As a result, low-risk borrowers choose short-term debt because their probability of a 
downgrade is low and they thus can refinance at favorable terms when good news 
arrives. At the same time, medium-risk borrowers prefer long-term debt at a higher 
interest rate as they must fear liquidation when rolling over short-term debt. 
However, high-risk borrowers may have no choice but only get short-term debt by 
the lender. Consequently, Diamond (1991) predicts a nonmonotonic, inversely U-
shaped relation between borrower risk and debt maturity based on demand-side 
choices in case of the low- and medium-risk borrowers and supply-side choices in 
case of the high-risk borrowers.  
In contrast, close bank-firm relationships lead to the prediction that relationship 
lenders are more willing to provide long-term funding to risky borrowers than arm’s 
length lenders to help these borrowers through times of economic problems. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) model a situation in which firms face liquidity risk 
arising from financial distress. Firms have private information about their probability 
of financial distress and can choose between bank and publicly traded debt. If 
financial distress occurs, the lender has to decide whether to liquidate or renegotiate 
its debt. Since banks strive for a reputation as good decision makers that provide 
financial flexibility, they have an endogenous incentive to devote more resources 
than bondholders to evaluate borrowers and come to an adequate decision about 
liquidation vs. renegotiation. Thus, this model provides an argument why relatively 
risky firms benefit most from financing relationships with banks.7 This benefit may 
come in the form of extended maturities for risky borrowers as a renegotiation 
outcome or a preemptive device to avoid financial distress. It remains, however, an 
empirical question whether this means that risky borrowers actually receive longer 
maturities than low-risk borrowers.   
 
                                                 
7
 For instance, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) provide evidence for implicit liquidity insurance for 
relationship borrowers whose credit quality has temporarily deteriorated. Coleman, Esho and Sharpe 
(2006) report a direct relation between banks’ monitoring ability and loan maturity. 
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2.2.2 Empirical evidence on the risk-maturity relation in small business lending 
Related empirical studies on the relation between borrower risk and the maturity 
of new loans8 does not provide a clear picture, one reason being that the studies are 
based on different data sets and different methodologies. Berger, Espinosa-Vega, 
Frame and Miller (2005) test the implications of the above described signaling 
models with data from commercial and industrial loans granted to small US firms in 
1997. They consider bank risk ratings to proxy for borrower risk, which allows a 
joint test of the positive and monotonic versus the nonmonotonic relation in one 
empirical model. They find evidence in favor of a positive relation between risk and 
loan maturity, which is in line with Flannery (1986) and partially consistent with 
Diamond (1991) for low and medium-risk borrowers. In contrast, in their sample of 
new credit lines to small US firms Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) find a negative 
and monotonic relation between borrower risk and loan maturity relying on an 
accounting measure (firm and owner delinquency) to proxy for firm risk. Their 
finding is in line with the view that short maturities serve as a substitute for debt 
covenants in small business lending. 
To account for the influence of the degree of asymmetric information between 
borrower and lender on loan maturity, Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) control for 
firm age and firm size and detect a positive relation between these inverse proxies for 
asymmetric information and loan maturity. They also investigate the impact of the 
duration of the bank-firm relationship on loan maturity but cannot find a statistically 
significant effect. Using survey data from several European countries, Hernández-
Cánovas and Koëter-Kant (2008) examine the number of bank relationships and the 
provision of soft information to proxy for asymmetric information. They find that the 
number of bank relationships influences loan maturity negatively on average but the 
results heavily depend on country characteristics.  
Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) take a different approach and 
test how the risk-maturity relation is influenced by different levels of asymmetric 
information. They use the fact whether a bank utilizes Small Business Credit Scoring 
(SBCS) as part of its lending technology as a proxy for asymmetric information. It is 
                                                 
8
 Consistent with the theory we focus on incremental financing decisions and do not follow the 
literature on debt maturity structure (e.g. Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Heyman, Deloof and Ooghe 
(2008)). This approach has the advantage that contract terms are more easily identified and the 
problem of averaging all outstanding debt financing decisions over time and across contract types is 
avoided (Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe (2000)). 
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assumed that banks which do not use SBCS face higher informational asymmetries 
in comparison to banks that use SBCS. It turns out that low-risk borrowers have 
significantly longer maturities when informational asymmetries are smaller, which is 
consistent with the implications of Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991).  
 
2.2.3 The impact of borrower bargaining power 
 The respective bargaining power of the bank and the borrower is an important 
factor influencing the outcome of the loan contracting process. In the model of Rajan 
(1992) firms may finance their investment projects with short-term or long-term debt 
from informed banks or with bonds from arm’s-length lenders. It predicts a negative 
relation between a firm’s bargaining power and its desire for long-term debt. The 
reason for this is that under long-term debt the bank may only renegotiate the loan 
when it gives up some of its control rents so that long-term debt constrains the bank’s 
bargaining power.  
Studies examining the impact of bargaining power on loan contract terms have 
focused on credit availability and loan rates. Petersen and Rajan (1995) measure the 
market power of banks by way of market concentration. They find empirical 
confirmation for their model’s prediction that more firms of lower credit quality 
receive financing if the bank has market power because this enables the bank to 
extract future rents. Wu and Wu (2007) find that the changes in price premiums over 
the course of bank-borrower relationships vary with relative borrower bargaining 
power. Finally, Santos and Winton (2009) use a borrower’s level of cash flows to 
proxy for borrower bargaining power and find that bargaining power (i.e. high cash 
flows) helps borrowers to mitigate the tendency of low capital banks to charge higher 
rates to their borrowers.   
 A few studies have provided evidence on the determinants of borrower 
bargaining power. Analyzing survey data from Japanese SMEs, Uchida (2006) finds 
that extensive lender competition and good borrower performance increase borrower 
bargaining power while the length of the bank relationship has a negative impact on 
borrower bargaining power. The latter may imply that the bank can accumulate 
proprietary information over time obtaining an informational monopoly and 
capturing the borrower. Otherwise, the influence of asymmetric information is found 
to be very weak. Only the frequent flow of hard information decreases borrower 
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bargaining power somewhat. This is in contrast to the results of Grunert and Norden 
(2010), who find that soft information represents an important determinant of 
borrower bargaining power. 
In this study, we are concerned with the impact of borrower bargaining power on 
the risk-maturity relation in addition to asymmetric information, i.e. the effects from 
the interplay between asymmetric information and borrower bargaining power. 
Based on the signaling literature outlined in section 2.2.1, we can derive the 
following implications for the impact of borrower bargaining power on the risk-
maturity relation. First, when informational asymmetries are high the signaling 
literature predicts that good borrowers request short maturities to relay their low risk 
to the bank and benefit from better loan terms such as longer maturities in the future. 
We hypothesize that low-risk firms with bargaining power (which would like to 
borrow long-term in a world without asymmetric information and the need for 
signaling) are more likely to increase their loan maturities than high-risk firms with 
bargaining power (who have already long maturities without bargaining power). This 
implies that the risk-maturity relation should be weaker if borrower bargaining power 
is high. 
Second, in case of low asymmetric information signaling does not play a role so 
that we expect to find low-risk as well as high-risk borrowers with bargaining power 
to have longer maturities compared to borrowers without bargaining power because 
all borrowers would like to have longer maturities (in a world without asymmetric 
information).9  
Finally, we should find good borrowers to be able to negotiate a relatively larger 
increase in loan maturities than riskier borrowers independent of the extent of 
asymmetric information because Uchida (2006) concludes that “creditworthy 
borrowers have bigger bargaining power” (p. 9).  
 
2.3 Data and methodology 
2.3.1 The dataset 
Our data set consists of all commercial and industrial loans made to SME 
borrowers by a German universal bank during 2005. The total volume of these loans 
                                                 
9
 Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel and Mittoo (2004) provide survey evidence that managers of 
large firms in Europe and the US indeed prefer longer maturities because of their fear of having to 
refinance in bad times.  
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amounts to 86.1 million EUR which corresponds to approximately 10% of the bank’s 
entire commercial lending portfolio. The data set includes information on the 
borrower risk, further borrower characteristics, and loan contract terms. Definitions 
of all variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
  
Dependent variable   
Maturity Loan maturity (Log months)  
  
Borrower characteristics   
Rating Bank internal credit rating ranging from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) 
Young Age of borrower or firm is below respective median age (1=yes, 0=no) 
Bank relationship Duration of the bank-borrower relationship (Log years) 
Short bank relationship 
Duration of the bank-borrower relationship is shorter than median 
duration in the sample (1=yes, 0=no) 
Checking account Borrower has a checking account at time of loan disbursement (1=yes, 0=no) 
Unlimited liability Borrower has unlimited liability (1=yes, 0=no) 
Bargaining power_Spread Loan spread is below mean loan spread in the same rating category (1=yes, 0=no) 
Bargaining power_Collateral 
Collateral is below mean collateral in the same rating category (1=yes, 
0=no) 
Bargaining power_Spread 
and collateral 
Loan spread is below mean loan spread and Collateral is below mean 
collateral in the same rating category (1=yes, 0=no) 
  
Loan characteristics   
New loan Loan is a new loan vs. renewal (1=yes, 0=no) 
Amount Loan amount (Log EUR) 
Collateral Value of collateral relative to loan amount (%) 
Secured Loan is secured by collateral (1=yes, 0=no) 
Spread Maturity-adjusted loan spread (percentage points) 
Fixed interest Loan rate is fixed vs. floating (1=yes, 0=no) 
Bullet loan Loan for which the entire principal is due in one balloon payment at the 
end of the loan term (1=yes, 0=no) 
Transferred loan Loan is a start-up, development or special purpose loan initiated under 
a federal development bank program (1=yes, 0=no) 
Building loan Loan is for building or construction purposes (1=yes, 0=no) 
Info asymmetry 
Indicator of extent of asymmetric information at loan disbursement 
calculated as [Short duration + (1-Checking account)] (2= very high, 
1=medium, 0=low) 
High info asymmetry 
Loan was made under high asymmetric information, i.e. Info 
asymmetry > 1 (1=yes, 0=no) 
 
We exclude all consumer loans and all observations with missing data. This 
procedure leads to a final sample of 668 loans, hereof 297 new and 139 renewed 
loans to small businesses with unlimited liability as well as 180 new and 52 renewed 
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loans to SMEs with limited liability. Our sample is representative for all firms in the 
German economy with respect to firm size and ownership (see Federal Statistical 
Office (2006)). For instance, 94.9% of firms in Germany have annual sales below 
two million Euros, while this statistic is 91.6% in our subsample of firms for which 
we have this information. In addition, 64.8% of all German firms are sole 
proprietorships, whereas 65.3% of firms in our sample have unlimited liability with 
most of these firms being sole proprietorships. Furthermore, our sample is 
comparable in terms of size to Brick and Palia (2007) who analyze data on 766 credit 
lines from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF). However, 
we do not analyze credit lines and loan commitments because their nominal maturity 
is typically either short term (e.g. 6 or 12 months) or not specified whereas the 
effective maturity may be relatively long since credit lines are frequently rolled over. 
Concentrating the analysis on one bank has the advantage that the lending behavior is 
relatively homogeneous so that we do not need to control for bank characteristics. 
This is a standard problem when using the NSSBF data because neither the identity 
nor the characteristics of the lending institutions are included. 
 
2.3.2 The bank’s loan granting process 
When a borrower approaches the bank, having in mind the purpose of the loan, 
she may ask for a specific loan amount and maturity. The loan officer, first of all, 
assigns an internal credit rating to the borrower. These credit ratings, which are 
updated every year and not subject to negotiations, are based on hard and, if 
available, private and soft information (see Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Treacy and 
Carey (2000), Grunert, Norden and Weber (2005) and Grunert and Norden (2010)). 
Hard information includes measures of profitability, leverage and liquidity. Soft 
information comprises an assessment of the firm’s product market position and the 
skills of its management such as competence, education, leadership and credibility. 
Internal credit ratings do not include potential information from the requested loan 
terms. They also do not include checking account information, but loan officers 
make discretionary use of this information in negotiations on loan terms and loan 
monitoring. To account for the bank’s usage of checking account information, we 
include the fact whether a borrower has a checking account with the bank or not in 
our proxy of asymmetric information.  
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The loan officer then may compare the risk assessment reflected by the internal 
credit rating with the borrower’s demanded maturity. Consequently, the requested 
maturity can be seen as an external signal in this stage of the negotiations and may 
allow the loan officer to update the decisions about the other loan contract terms. 
Importantly, loan officers at this bank do have the discretionary power to exploit the 
signal from the borrower’s maturity request. Such bank behavior is consistent with 
Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2007) who find that loan officers have more 
discretion in the loan-pricing process if firms are small, risky and difficult to 
monitor. Finally, the loan officer negotiates with the borrower on collateral and both 
parties agree on the loan rate.  
In addition, the bargaining power of the borrower is an important factor that may 
influence the outcomes for the various loan contract terms. Directly measuring 
bargaining power is difficult but we believe that the price of a loan (the loan spread) 
represents a potential indirect ex-post indicator of a borrower’s bargaining power for 
the following reasons. First, the spread usually represents the last contract feature to 
be determined in loan negotiations. The main reason for this is that the loan spread is 
initially based on the borrower risk reflected by the internal credit rating only and 
then adjusted conditional on the amount of collateral that is pledged by the borrower. 
Second, the loan spread allows for negotiation in both directions and borrowers are 
less constrained in bargaining on interest rates than in bargaining on collateral. 
Frequently, there is little or no room for small businesses to pledge additional 
collateral to obtain a lower interest rate simply because all available collateral has 
already been pledged to banks. Third, competition in bank lending is typically based 
on loan rates and volumes but not on other lending terms like maturity and collateral. 
Fourth, interest payments affect the financial statements of firms and, for example, 
the interest coverage represents an important financial ratio that affects the bank’s 
loan approval decision. Consequently, borrowers with a relatively high bargaining 
power are expected to get relatively low loan spreads (and/or to pledge little 
collateral). We will condition our empirical analysis of the relation between borrower 
risk and loan maturity on three measures of borrower bargaining power that are 
based on the above reasoning. 
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2.3.3 The relation between borrower risk and loan maturity 
To analyze the relation between borrower risk and loan maturity, we estimate an 
OLS model with Maturityi, k (measured in log months) of loan k that firm i takes out 
as the dependent variable: 
 
Maturityi, k = α + β1Ri + β2Fi +β3Lk + εi, k           (1)   
 
In this model Ri is a measure of the borrower’s credit risk and Fi and Lk are 
vectors of further borrower and loan characteristics respectively. The relative costs of 
short-term vs. long-term debt should also be an important determinant of borrowers’ 
loan maturity requests as there may be a trade-off between the desire for longer 
maturities and their higher costs in the case of a steep interest rate curve. 
Nevertheless, we do not include a proxy for the structure of the interest rate curve in 
our regressions because we only observe loans made within one year. In 2005, the 
term structure of interest rates in Germany was relatively flat (estimated yields for 1 
year: 2.27%, 5 years: 2.91%, 10 years: 3.47%, source: Deutsche Bundesbank) 
rendering cost aspects less important. In addition, the interest rate curve changed 
only slightly towards an even flatter structure so that there is not much variation 
which we could exploit in our analysis. 
 
Borrowers’ credit risk and further borrower characteristics 
We measure borrower risk by the bank’s internal credit Rating. The bank’s 
internal credit rating system consists of 5 rating categories which range from 
category 1 indicating the highest creditworthiness to category 5 including borrowers 
in financial distress (the borrower is 90 days past due on any of her obligations, the 
bank has established a specific loan loss provision or the borrower has filed for 
bankruptcy). We consider category 5 borrowers in our analysis because the fact that 
these firms have been granted new loans or renewals indicates that the bank is 
engaged in a restructuring process and that it expects recovery from distress in the 
medium-term. To allow for non-linear effects, we derive the dummy variables 
Rating_2, ..., Rating_5 and use Rating_1 as the baseline category. Taking the internal 
credit rating as a measure of borrower risk has the advantage that the rating can be 
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seen as exogenous to loan maturity because it is assigned before the bank negotiates 
the loan contract terms with the customer.10 
 Our additional borrower characteristics control for the extent of asymmetric 
information between borrowers and the bank. A widely-used measure for firm 
opaqueness is firm age since there may be more information publicly available on 
older borrowers (e.g. Blackwell and Winters (1997) and Berger, Klapper and Udell 
(2001)). As our dataset reports firm age if the borrower is a firm but the age of the 
individual if the borrower is a craftsman or pursues a liberal profession, we use 
Young. It is a dummy variable indicating whether the age of the firm or the age of the 
borrower is below the respective median age in the two subsamples of firms and 
individuals. As the bank may gain private information about borrowers over the 
course of bank-borrower relationships (see Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith 
(2000)), we include the variable Bank relationship which indicates the length of the 
bank-borrower relationship in log years. Observing checking account activity has 
been found to provide banks with useful information to monitor their borrowers 
(Mester, Nakamura and Renault (2007), Norden and Weber (2010b)). The dummy 
variable Checking account is therefore one if the borrower has a checking account 
with the bank and zero otherwise. As a decrease in informational asymmetries 
reduces agency problems and thus the need for signaling, we expect maturities to be 
longer if the extent of asymmetric information is smaller (given that borrowers 
would like to have longer maturities in a world without asymmetric information). 
Finally, to capture remaining differences in borrower characteristics, the regressions 
contain a dummy variable indicating whether the borrower has Unlimited liability in 
contrast to limited liability.   
 
Loan characteristics 
A loan-level indicator of the extent of asymmetric information is the dummy 
variable New loan which is one if the loan is new and zero for renewals. Since for 
new loans there has not been any interaction between the bank and the borrower on 
the financing of this specific project, asymmetric information is likely to be higher 
for these loans.  
                                                 
10
 Similarly, Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe (2000) use Altman’s Z-score as a predetermined variable. 
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We include several loan contract terms in some of our analyses as they may 
influence the choice of loan maturity. However, it is possible that these additional 
contract terms are determined simultaneously with loan maturity and we will 
consider possible endogeneity problems in the empirical analysis. Amount is the size 
of the loan in log euro and Collateral is the value of the collateral relative to the loan 
amount (the secured percentage of the loan). If a borrower pledges more collateral, 
the credit risk of the loan may be reduced considerably. Consequently, the bank does 
no longer need to consider loan maturity as a contracting device to discriminate 
between high-risk and low-risk borrowers. This mechanism can also be derived from 
the agency literature (e.g. Myers (1977), Smith and Warner (1979)). Either a short 
maturity or collateral pledges help to mitigate agency problems between equity 
holders and debtors. Therefore, collateral and maturity should be positively related. 
Finally, we consider the following additional contract terms to account for 
remaining differences in loan characteristics. Spread is the maturity adjusted credit 
spread for each loan while Fixed interest is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
loan’s interest rate is fixed and zero if it is floating. Bullet loan captures the 
repayment schedule of the loan and is one if the entire principal is due at the end of 
the loan term and zero otherwise. Transferred loan is a dummy variable which 
indicates whether the loan is a start up, development or special purpose loan initiated 
under a federal development bank program and Building loan is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the loan is used for building and construction purposes.  
  
Indicators of asymmetric information and borrower bargaining power 
To shed some light on the demand and supply side effects influencing the risk-
maturity relation, we differentiate our analysis by varying levels of asymmetric 
information and borrower bargaining power. For this purpose, we derive indicators 
of the extent of asymmetric information and borrower bargaining power from our 
explanatory variables. 
First, to capture the various dimensions of asymmetric information, we construct 
an additive indicator from the variables Bank relationship (the duration of the bank-
borrower relationship) and Checking account. The usefulness of a long bank-
borrower relationship for the bank to gather information on the borrower may be 
considerably increased if the borrower has a checking account with the bank since 
this information has been found to be particularly valuable for monitoring existing 
 24 
borrowers (Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010)). The main advantage of this approach 
is that we can condition our analysis on a compact measure that is based on two input 
factors instead of reporting univariate relationships.  
Specifically, we calculate Info asymmetry as the sum of an indicator variable for 
Short bank relationship (a dummy variable which is one if the duration of the bank-
borrower relationship is shorter than the median duration in our sample) and an 
indicator for no checking accounts: 
 
Info asymmetry = Short bank relationship + (1 – Checking account)11    (2) 
 
Info asymmetry can take values of 0, 1, and 2, and higher values indicate a higher 
extent of asymmetric information. The rank correlation between the input variables is 
0.37 indicating a positive but not a perfect correlation. Lacking quantitative 
information on the relative importance of these factors, we apply equal weights. 
Second, the general or deal-specific bargaining power of the borrower may be a 
further factor influencing the strength of the risk-maturity relation. We believe the 
loan spread to be an indirect ex-post measure of borrower bargaining power that at 
least captures partial effects from bargaining in loan contracting. We therefore 
construct the dummy variable Bargaining power_Spread that is one if the (maturity 
adjusted) credit spread of a certain loan is below the mean loan spread of all loans in 
the same rating category, and zero otherwise. In addition, we calculate Bargaining 
power_Collateral which is one if the value of Collateral of a certain loan is below 
the mean of Collateral of all loans in the same rating category. Finally, we study the 
extreme case by combining these two measures to derive Bargaining power_Spread 
and collateral. This variable differentiates between loans with below-mean spreads 
and below-mean collateral in the same rating category (very high bargaining power) 
vs. loans with above-mean spreads and above-mean collateral in the same rating 
category (very low bargaining power). 
 
                                                 
11
 Note that Info asymmetry is based on variables that are not (directly) included in the bank’s internal 
credit ratings so that we can assess the impact of the bank’s information over and above the public and 
private information that enters into the credit ratings. We have also defined more complex additive 
and multi-attributive indices that contain the loan-level variable New loan. Conditioning the risk-
maturity relation on these indices leads to similar results and does not change our conclusions. 
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2.3.4 Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for our borrower and loan characteristics.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table displays summary statistics for the borrower and loan characteristics. See Table 1 for 
definitions of all variables. Note that for all otherwise log-transformed variables the statistics are 
calculated by using the original values. 
 
            
  
Mean SD Min Median Max N 
Borrower characteristics             
Rating 2.58 1.02 1 3 5 668 
Young 0.49 0.5 0 0 1 668 
Bank relationship 5.43 7.36 0 2.16 57.42 668 
Checking account 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 668 
Unlimited liability 0.65 0.48 0 1 1 668 
 
      
Loan characteristics             
Maturity 82.84 83.71 3 55 396 668 
New loan 0.71 0.45 0 1 1 668 
Amount 129,044 290,948 508 30,187 3,137,496 668 
Collateral 45.71 45.20 0 42.68 100.80 668 
Spread 2.48 2.08 -3.26 2.25 16.76 668 
Fixed interest 0.78 0.41 0 1 1 668 
Bullet loan 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 668 
Transferred loan 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 668 
Building loan 0.06 0.23 0 0 1 668 
 
It shows that the firms in our sample receive a mean internal credit rating of 2.58 
from the bank. The average duration of the Bank relationship at loan disbursement is 
5.4 years. More than half of the loans are granted to borrowers having a Checking 
account with the bank and 65% of the loans in our sample are granted to small firms 
with Unlimited liability. The mean loan Maturity amounts to 83 months (6.9 years) 
while the maximum maturity is more than 30 years. The average loan Amount is 
129,044 EUR (maximum of 3.1 million EUR) which is comparable to the mean loan 
size of 43,580 USD (for loans < 100,000 USD) and 183,720 USD (for loans < 
250,000 USD) in the US data set analyzed by Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and 
Miller (2005). On average, 46% of a loan amount is secured with collateral (the 
maximum is slightly above 100% because in some cases the bank has collateral that 
exceeds the loan amount). Finally, the mean loan spread is 2.48 percentage points 
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above the bank’s same-maturity refinancing costs (while there are a few loans that 
actually exhibit negative spreads).12  
Asymmetric information has been shown in the literature to be an important 
determinant of loan maturity and the relation between loan maturity and borrower 
risk. As argued before, reduced informational asymmetries should lead to longer 
maturities on average because the need for signaling has vanished. Borrower 
bargaining power may be prevalent in high and low states of asymmetric information 
and should increase average maturities if (low-risk) borrowers actually prefer longer 
maturities. The question then is how exactly loan maturity, borrower risk and their 
relation vary between the four possible combinations of the extent of asymmetric 
information and borrower bargaining power. 
We use difference-in-difference estimates to study how borrower bargaining 
power influences loan maturity and borrower risk in states of high vs. low 
asymmetric information. Panel A of Table 3 reveals that observed loan maturities 
and, to a lesser extent, borrower risk are considerably influenced by both asymmetric 
information and borrower bargaining power.  
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the average loan Maturity is significantly longer if 
informational asymmetries are low which is consistent with the implications of the 
signaling models. The difference-in-difference estimate (in bold) indicates that this 
difference in loan maturities between states of high and low asymmetric information 
is significantly higher by around 31 months in case of high borrower bargaining 
power. Taking a closer look at the impact of borrower bargaining power in the last 
column of the table shows that high bargaining power increases average loan 
maturities significantly. If informational asymmetries are low, this increase is nearly 
63 months and with that twice as large as in the case of high informational 
asymmetries. It seems that in case of low asymmetric information the two effects 
from a reduced need for signaling and from borrowers successfully realizing their 
preferences for longer maturities intensify each other. In contrast, signaling might 
still play some role when informational asymmetries are high even if the borrower 
has the power to negotiate for longer maturities.  
                                                 
12
 Micro and small businesses are usually considered as non-investment grade borrowers. The 
corresponding average credit spreads on loans granted to borrowers with a S&P credit rating of BB 
(B) in 2005 are 1.84 (2.60) percentage points over Libor which is relatively close to the spreads we 
observe in our data set. 
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Turning to the risk ratings, we observe that borrowers are, on average, 
significantly more risky if informational asymmetries are low compared to high. This 
difference is with 83 percentage points especially pronounced in the case of low 
borrower bargaining power and significantly larger than in the case of high 
bargaining power as indicated by the difference-in-difference estimate (in bold). 
Interestingly, there is no difference in the average risk Rating for borrowers with low 
vs. high bargaining power if informational asymmetries are low. 
 
Table 3. Asymmetric information and borrower bargaining power 
Panel A. Impact on loan maturity and borrower risk 
    
This table reports average Maturity and Rating for states of low (Bargaining power_Spread = 0) and 
high (Bargaining power_Spread = 1) bargaining power, for the two subsamples of loans made under 
high (Info asymmetry > 0) and low asymmetric information (Info asymmetry = 0). The table also 
provides t-tests for differences between groups (difference) and F-tests for differences between pairs 
of groups (difference-in-difference). ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1.  
        
  Maturity 
 High bargaining power Low bargaining power 
Diff / Diff-in-
Diff 
  N = 354 N = 314 
  
Low info asymmetry, N = 232 138.31 75.63  62.69*** 
High info asymmetry, N = 436 83.14 51.67  31.48*** 
Diff / Diff-in-Diff  55.17***  23.96*** 31.21** 
   
 
      
  
  Rating 
Low info asymmetry, N = 232 2.90 2.92 -0.02 
High info asymmetry, N = 436 2.71 2.09 0.62*** 
Diff / Diff-in-Diff  0.19*  0.83*** 
 -0.64*** 
    
   
Panel B. Impact on the risk-maturity relation 
   
This table displays Spearman rank correlation coefficients between Maturity and Rating for states of 
low (Bargaining power_Spread = 0) and high (Bargaining power_Spread = 1) bargaining power, for 
the two subsamples of loans made under high (Info asymmetry > 0) and low asymmetric information 
(Info asymmetry = 0). ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 1.  
      
  
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between Maturity and 
Rating 
 Low bargaining power High bargaining power 
  N = 314 N = 354 
High info asymmetry, N = 436 0.70*** 0.05 
Low info asymmetry, N = 232 0.41*** 0.29** 
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In Panel B of Table 3 we analyze the risk-maturity relation by assessing the 
Spearman rank correlation between Maturity and Rating. It turns out that high 
borrower bargaining power weakens the risk-maturity relation more when the extent 
of asymmetric information is high than when it is low.13  This confirms our reasoning 
that in the case of high asymmetric information the good borrowers are more likely 
to increase their loan maturities than the risky borrowers who already receive long 
maturities without having bargaining power. Together with the previous finding that 
average maturities are longer if bargaining power is high, this is consistent with the 
results in Uchida (2006) that good borrowers have bigger bargaining power than 
risky borrowers. In the case of high informational asymmetries and high borrower 
bargaining power, the risk-maturity relation even vanishes implying that all 
borrowers manage to receive similar maturities.  
Summarizing, the findings in Table 3 establish several interesting insights. First, 
they show that the risk-maturity relation is strongest if informational asymmetries are 
high and borrower bargaining power is low which is consistent with the signaling 
literature. Second, on average borrowers are more risky and obtain longer maturities 
if informational asymmetries are low which confirms the argument that especially 
risky borrowers can benefit from borrowing from relationship lenders. And third, 
borrower bargaining power weakens the risk-maturity relation implying that the good 
borrowers with bargaining power are able to increase maturities more than the risky 
borrowers with bargaining power.  
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Basic results on the risk-maturity relation 
Table 4 displays OLS regression results for the relation between borrower risk and 
loan maturity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for 
clustering at the borrower level.  
 Column (1) indicates that there is a significantly positive and monotonic relation 
between borrower risk, measured by the Rating dummies, and loan Maturity with the 
increase in loan maturity being most pronounced between rating categories 1 and 2. 
                                                 
13
 In the case of high informational asymmetries and high borrower bargaining power, the risk-
maturity relation even vanishes implying that all borrowers manage to receive similar maturities. 
However, this finding may also be driven by the fact that most observations are in rating categories 2 
or 3, while there are few observations with rating 1, 4 or 5. 
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Column (2) which additionally includes our borrower characteristics as control 
variables confirms these findings. The borrower characteristics reveal that our 
measure for the extent of publicly available information, Young, does not influence 
loan maturity. In contrast, our measures for the bank’s possibility to gather private 
information show that a longer Bank relationship and the fact that the borrower has a 
Checking account lead to longer loan maturities. This result is consistent with the 
signaling literature because the need for good firms to relay their low risk by 
choosing short maturities decreases when the bank’s knowledge about the firms 
increases. Finally, borrowers with Unlimited liability have longer maturity loans 
because they may be considered safer by the bank than borrowers of limited liability.  
In column (3) we extend the analysis by including further loan characteristics that 
may influence loan maturity. While the regressions in columns (1) and (2) may thus 
suffer from an omitted variable bias, including further loan characteristics may 
introduce endogeneity problems due to the simultaneous negotiation of various loan 
contract terms. The estimates in column (3) should therefore be seen as a robustness 
check of our main results established in column (2). This strategy has been adopted 
by previous papers on loan contracting (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995), Berger, 
Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008)). Apart 
from that, for the loan amount it seems plausible to assume that it is already defined 
at the beginning of the negotiations, which makes it a predetermined variable that 
may be treated exogenously. We refrain from estimating a simultaneous equation 
model because in the case of loan contracting it is very difficult to find adequate and 
reliable instrumental variables in cross-sectional studies.  
 The estimates in column (3) reveal that our main findings are robust to the 
inclusion of further loan contract terms with the exception of Bank relationship 
which loses its impact due to the correlation with further loan contract terms. Most 
importantly, we observe that the significantly positive risk-maturity relation persists. 
The additional loan characteristics show that New loans have shorter maturities than 
renewals. One possible explanation may be that informational asymmetries are 
higher for new loans because the bank has not had the possibility to gather 
information on the specific project so far. While larger loans (Amount) carry longer 
maturities, Collateral and Spread do not influence loan maturity. This may be 
explained by a prevalent order in the negotiation of contract terms and implies that 
loan maturity is negotiated before collateral and spread. 
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Table 4. The risk-maturity relation 
This table reports results from OLS regression models for the entire sample of loans. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the loan Maturity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
account for clustering at the borrower level. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, 
* denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
        
  (1) (2) (3) 
Rating_2 1.115*** 1.117*** 0.864*** 
 (0.155) (0.164) (0.211) 
Rating_3 1.223*** 1.188*** 0.963*** 
 (0.182) (0.170) (0.214) 
Rating_4 1.669*** 1.458*** 1.030*** 
 (0.200) (0.236) (0.286) 
Rating_5 2.056*** 1.829*** 1.364*** 
  (0.169) (0.226) (0.279) 
Young  0.021 0.057 
  (0.078) (0.061) 
Bank relationship  0.144*** 0.037 
  (0.051) (0.047) 
Checking account 
 0.311*** 0.157** 
 
 (0.090) (0.073) 
Unlimited liability 
 0.399*** 0.414*** 
    (0.092) (0.066) 
New loan   -0.277** 
   (0.110) 
Amount   0.116*** 
   (0.029) 
Collateral   0.000 
   (0.001) 
Spread 
  -0.020 
 
  (0.016) 
Fixed interest   -0.093 
   (0.110) 
Bullet loan 
  -0.799*** 
 
  (0.160) 
Transferred loan 
  0.553*** 
 
  (0.108) 
Building loan 
  0.257 
  
    (0.169) 
Constant 2.886*** 2.293*** 1.825*** 
  (0.116) (0.146) (0.330) 
Observations 668 668 668 
Adjusted R² 0.280 0.379 0.528 
 
Finally, to examine the signaling hypothesis from a different perspective, we 
analyze whether the maturity of new loans granted in 2005 relates to the future credit 
quality of the borrowers. Since loan maturity is not an input factor of the bank’s 
credit ratings, including an indicator variable for future rating upgrades should not 
lead to endogeneity problems. Instead, the signaling models are based on the 
conjecture that borrowers have private information about their credit quality and that 
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the borrowers’ maturity choice reveals this private information. Borrowers who have 
favorable private information choose short maturities to signal this to the bank.  
 
Table 5. Intertemporal test of signaling 
This table reports results from OLS regression models for the subsample of loans for which we have 
information on subsequent ratings. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the loan 
Maturity. Upgrade is a dummy variable which is one if the borrower received a rating upgrade within 
the subsequent year, and zero otherwise. P-values are reported in brackets. All explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 1. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level.  
      
  (1) (2) 
Rating_2 0.348 0.629*** 
 [0.107] [0.002] 
Rating_3 0.508** 0.732*** 
 [0.020] [0.000] 
Rating_4 0.831*** 0.937*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] 
Rating_5 1.099*** 0.967*** 
 [0.001] [0.004] 
Upgrade  -0.417***  -0.171** 
  [0.001] [0.056] 
Young 0.095 0.054 
 [0.417] [0.579] 
Bank relationship 0.090* 0.037 
 [0.058] [0.401] 
Checking account 0.295*** 0.083 
 [0.010] [0.349] 
Unlimited liability 0.312** 0.367*** 
  [0.013] [0.000] 
New loan   -0.331** 
  [0.030] 
Amount  0.172*** 
  [0.000] 
Collateral  0 
  [0.992] 
Spread  0.003 
  [0.850] 
Fixed interest  -0.066 
  [0.661] 
Bullet loan   -1.03*** 
  [0.000] 
Transferred loan  0.588*** 
  [0.000] 
Building loan  0.177 
    [0.384] 
Constant 3.111*** 1.554*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 437 437 
Adjusted R² 0.237 0.438 
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We expect to find that borrowers who take out a short-term loan in 2005 have a 
higher probability to experience a rating upgrade in the subsequent year. We can 
only conduct this analysis for a restricted sample in which we have information on 
subsequent credit ratings (n=437 borrowers). It turns out that firms borrowing at 
relatively short maturities (below the median maturity of 55 months) exhibit, on 
average, a significantly higher probability of experiencing an upgrade of their initial 
credit rating within one year (20%) than firms borrowing long-term (2%). To test for 
this intertemporal aspect of signaling, we include a “look-ahead” indicator variable 
for future rating upgrades (Upgrade) which captures borrowers’ private knowledge 
about their credit quality in our baseline regression model. Table 5 reports the 
regression results. We find a highly significant and negative effect of Upgrade on 
maturity which confirms that those borrowers with future rating upgrades borrow 
short-term in 2005. Besides, the positive and monotonic risk-maturity relation 
remains unchanged. This analysis provides evidence for the signaling argument and 
shows that loan maturity is not only related to borrower risk in the cross-section but 
also over time. 
 
2.4.2 The impact of asymmetric information on the risk-maturity relation  
In a next step, we extend the analysis and investigate the risk-maturity relation 
under varying levels of asymmetric information to disentangle the effects on maturity 
due to borrower risk (internal credit rating) and asymmetric information. The main 
goal here is to distinguish between situations in which the loan maturity choice is 
demand-driven (high asymmetric information, signaling) and situations in which it is 
supply-driven (low asymmetric information, assistance from relationship lenders). 
Unlike Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller (2005) who measure differences in 
asymmetric information between banks we investigate how varying informational 
asymmetries between different borrowers of the same bank influence the risk-
maturity relation.  
In Table 6 we present the regression results for varying levels of the extent of 
publicly available as well as private information. We re-estimate the basic 
regressions from Table 4 and examine whether there are significant differences in the 
risk-maturity relation dependent on the extent of asymmetric information.  
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Panel A contains the results from our analysis of the impact of the extent of 
publicly available information, measured by Young, on the risk-maturity relation. We 
assess whether there are significant differences in the Rating coefficients by 
introducing the interaction terms Rating_2*Young, ..., Rating_5*Young. Columns (1-
2) and (3-4) present estimates from single OLS regressions, with the main effects of 
the Rating dummies reported in columns (1) and (3) and interaction terms with 
Young reported in columns (2) and (4). 
The estimates for the Rating dummies in column (1) show that there is a 
significantly positive and monotonic (except for Rating_3) relation between 
borrower risk and loan maturity for the relatively older borrowers for whom more 
information should be available. Both the variable Young and its interaction terms 
with the Rating dummies are insignificant which means that there is no significant 
difference in the risk-maturity relation for older vs. younger borrowers. This is also 
illustrated in Figure 1. Controlling for the additional loan contract terms in columns 
(3-4) confirms these findings. Thus, asymmetric information measured by the 
borrower’s age merely seems to influence the risk-maturity relation. 
 
Figure 1. The impact of borrower age on the risk-maturity relation 
This figure displays the effect of high vs. low asymmetric information measured by borrower age 
(Young) on the relation between Maturity and the Rating dummies. See Table 1 for definitions of all 
variables. 
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Table 6. The impact of asymmetric information 
This table reports results from OLS regression models for the entire sample of loans. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the loan Maturity. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and account for clustering at the borrower level. ***, **, * 
denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
 
   
 
Panel A. The extent of publicly available information 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coefficients Main effects 
Interactions  
with Young Main effects Interactions 
Rating_2 1.279*** -0.321 1.001*** -0.263 
 (0.238) (0.279) (0.315) (0.289) 
Rating_3 1.270*** -0.152 1.101*** -0.259 
 (0.251) (0.290) (0.318) (0.287) 
Rating_4 1.519*** -0.096 1.118*** -0.143 
 (0.310) (0.395) (0.378) (0.363) 
Rating_5 1.893*** -0.040 1.426*** 0.031 
 (0.293) (0.359) (0.372) (0.330) 
Young 0.197   0.258  
  (0.248)   (0.249)   
Bank relationship 0.144***   0.034  
 (0.050)   (0.048)  
Checking account 0.320***   0.165**  
 (0.088)   (0.070)  
Unlimited liability 0.388***   0.410***  
  (0.092)   (0.066)   
New loan    -0.280***  
    (0.108)  
Amount    0.115***  
    (0.030)  
Collateral    0.000  
    (0.001)  
Spread    -0.021  
    (0.016)  
Fixed interest    -0.086  
    (0.109)  
Bullet loan    -0.805***  
    (0.157)  
Transferred loan    0.550***  
    (0.109)  
Building loan    0.267  
      (0.167)   
Constant 2.201***   1.731***  
  (0.201)   (0.332)   
Observations 668   668  
Adjusted R² 0.378   0.529   
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Panel B. The extent of private information 
            
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    
Info 
asymmetry = 2 
Info 
asymmetry = 1 
Info 
asymmetry = 0 
Coefficients Main effects 
Interactions with 
 Relatively high 
 info asymmetry Main effects Main effects Main effects 
Rating_2 1.051** 0.204 1.340*** 0.343 0.976** 
 (0.533) (0.553) (0.135) (0.273) (0.472) 
Rating_3 1.013* 0.384 1.283*** 0.679*** 1.039** 
 (0.534) (0.556) (0.145) (0.254) (0.477) 
Rating_4 1.369** 0.366  0.630* 1.294*** 
 (0.554) (0.614)  (0.350) (0.493) 
Rating_5 1.606*** 0.740  1.232*** 1.582*** 
 (0.544) (0.583)  (0.311) (0.487) 
Relatively high  
info asymmetry -0.627      
  (0.539)         
Young -0.016   -0.007 -0.231* 0.238* 
 (0.094)   (0.063) (0.123) (0.121) 
Unlimited liability 0.459***   0.457*** 0.303* 0.122 
  (0.113)   (0.128) (0.172) (0.135) 
Constant 2.984***   2.109*** 3.645*** 3.138*** 
  (0.525)   (0.146) (0.341) (0.455) 
Observations 668   226 210 232 
Adjusted R² 0.357   0.445 0.153 0.155 
 
Turning to the influence of the extent of private information gathered by the bank 
over time and / or from the usage of checking accounts, we first calculate some 
descriptive statistics conditional on our indicator for this kind of asymmetric 
information, Info asymmetry. We find that the loan maturity is shorter in case of 
loans made under relatively high (Info asymmetry > 0) asymmetric information 
(means: 68 vs. 111 months, medians: 47 vs. 64 months) and that this result is highly 
significant (p<0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum test). In addition, the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between the internal credit rating and loan maturity amounts 
to 0.30 for Info asymmetry = 0 and 0.44 for Info asymmetry > 0, indicating a stronger 
association for loans made under relatively high asymmetric information. Panel B of 
Table 6 reports regression results for the effect of Info asymmetry on the risk-
maturity relation.  
Columns (1) and (2) present estimates from a single OLS estimation of the full 
sample, with the main effects of the Rating dummies reported in column (1) and 
interaction terms with Relatively high info asymmetry (a dummy variable that equals 
1 if Info asymmetry > 0 and zero otherwise) reported in column (2). Again, we find a 
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significantly positive risk-maturity relation for loans made under low asymmetric 
information as well as for loans made under high asymmetric information. Although 
the interaction terms are not statistically significant, looking at their economic 
relevance in column (2) and the illustration of the results in Figure 2 suggests that the 
impact of our additive indicator of asymmetric information on the risk-maturity 
relation is stronger than that of borrower age.  
 
Figure 2. The impact of the bank’s private information on the risk-maturity 
relation 
 
This figure displays the effect of high (Info asymmetry > 0) vs. low (Info asymmetry = 0) asymmetric 
information measured by the bank’s possibility to gather private information from its borrowers on the 
relation between Maturity and the Rating dummies. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables.  
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Figure 2 further displays that the risk-maturity relation is stronger in the case of 
high asymmetric information which confirms that loan maturity is an important 
contracting device if the risk of adverse selection is prevalent. In case of high 
asymmetric information, our results are therefore in line with the predictions of 
Flannery (1986) suggesting that the fear of low-risk borrowers to be pooled together 
with high-risk borrowers provides them with an incentive to choose short maturities 
to signal their good quality to the bank. 
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Moreover, Figure 2 shows that loan maturities are longer if the asymmetric 
information is low and that the difference in loan maturities between states of high 
and low asymmetric information decreases with borrower risk. This is in line with 
the implications of the signaling literature that good borrowers benefit from a 
reduction in informational asymmetries by longer loan maturities because they need 
no longer signal their good quality to the bank by choosing short maturities.  
Nevertheless, we still observe a significantly positive and monotonic risk-maturity 
relation under low asymmetric information. This finding can be explained by the 
assistance-by-relationship-lenders argument implying that relationship lenders may 
be willing to provide more favorable loan terms to risky borrowers to help them 
through times of economic problems (e.g. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). The 
long maturities which we observe for borrowers that are at the edge of financial 
distress (rating category 4) or already in default (rating category 5) can be interpreted 
as preemptive actions or restructuring efforts in that longer maturities eases the 
repayment pressure for these firms. In that sense, our result for loan maturities is 
similar to Elsas and Krahnen (1998) who find that borrowers whose credit quality 
has deteriorated temporarily get more financing (an increase of credit lines) from 
Hausbanks which is interpreted as evidence for an implicit liquidity insurance. There 
are at least three main reasons why relationship lenders, as opposed to arm’s-length 
lenders, are able to provide these favorable lending terms to risky borrowers: (i) as 
informational asymmetries are low banks are better able to assess the success of their 
restructuring efforts, (ii) banks have tighter control rights such as extraordinary 
cancellation rights, and (iii) intertemporal and cross-product income smoothing make 
it possible for banks to help borrowers through difficult times because they may be 
compensated with future earnings. Finally, this bank behavior implies that loan 
maturity is not used as a (restrictive) covenant to reduce the risk of moral hazard 
because the latter would result in a negative risk-maturity relation. 
To gain deeper insights in the effects of information asymmetries, we extend our 
analysis and study the risk-maturity relation separately in the three states of very 
high, medium and low asymmetric information which our additive indicator Info 
asymmetry can take on. The results are reported in columns (3) to (5) in Panel B of 
Table 6.  
Column (3) displays regression results for the case of very high asymmetric 
information (Info asymmetry = 2), i.e. that the borrower has a relatively short Bank 
 38 
relationship and no Checking account. There are no loans made to risky borrowers in 
rating categories 4 and 5 if the extent of asymmetric information is very high. Most 
borrowers in this group are very likely to be first time borrowers and thus can by 
definition not be of rating 5.14 We find that borrowers with rating 2 and 3 have 
significantly longer maturities than borrowers with rating 1, however, borrowers with 
Rating_3 have, on average, shorter maturities than Rating_2 borrowers but a t-test 
shows that this difference is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, our findings 
provide further evidence for the signaling argument with the very good borrowers 
choosing the shortest maturities. 
Turning to the results for the medium state of informational asymmetries (Info 
asymmetry = 1) in column (4), we find a significantly positive, yet not fully 
monotonic, relation between risk and maturity. The constant which captures the 
average maturity for the borrowers with rating 1 is substantially larger than in 
column (3). Taking both findings together implies that signaling plays a less 
important but still crucial role under medium informational asymmetries. At the 
same time, the relationship effect is already prevalent with riskier borrowers having 
longer maturities. Finally, column (5) reveals that there is a positive and monotonic 
risk-maturity relation under low asymmetric information confirming our previous 
findings and the conjecture that risky borrowers benefit from relationship lending. 
Summarizing, we find evidence for two complementary rationales that both imply 
a positive risk-maturity relation but in different stages of the bank-borrower 
relationship. In case of high informational asymmetries, demand-side factors provide 
an explanation with good borrowers choosing short maturities while supply-side 
considerations explain the long maturities for risky borrowers in case of low 
informational asymmetries. To shed more light on the issue of demand vs. supply 
factors driving the risk-maturity relation we study the impact of borrower bargaining 
power in the next section.  
 
2.4.3 The impact of borrower bargaining power on the risk-maturity relation 
We analyze the influence of borrower bargaining power on the risk-maturity 
relation in addition to effects arising from asymmetric information. For that purpose 
we rely on three empirical ex post measures of borrower bargaining power that are 
                                                 
14
 Only 4% of borrowers in the whole sample are in rating category 4 so that it might be just by 
chance that we do not observe borrowers of rating category 4 in this case. 
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based on outcomes of the loan contracting process. Analyzing data from one single 
bank has the advantage that we do not need to deal with heterogeneity in the 
bargaining behavior between banks. 
Our first indicator, Bargaining power_Spread, proxies borrower bargaining power 
by a relatively low loan spread compared to the mean spread in the respective rating 
category and equals one for 354 loans. Interestingly, the average maturity is 104 
months for borrowers with high bargaining power and 59 months for borrowers with 
low bargaining power. This difference is highly significant (p-val. < 0.01-level, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test) and rules out that high bargaining power borrowers get 
lower loan spreads because they demand shorter maturities15 – on the contrary, we 
observe longer maturities for these borrowers. Furthermore, the rank correlation 
between borrower risk and loan maturity is 0.65 for Bargaining power_Spread = 0 
and 0.18 for Bargaining power_Spread = 1, indicating that the positive risk-maturity 
relation is substantially reduced if borrowers have high bargaining power. We now 
turn to the multivariate analysis of the impact of bargaining power on the risk-
maturity relation. Table 7 summarizes the regression results. 
Columns (1) to (4) proxy for borrower bargaining power by a relatively low loan 
spread compared to the mean spread in the respective rating category (Bargaining 
power_Spread). Columns (1-2) report estimates from a single OLS regression for 
those loans made under relatively high asymmetric information (Info asymmetry > 0) 
with main effects reported in column (1) and interaction effects with Bargaining 
power_Spread displayed in column (2). The main effects show that there is a 
significantly positive and monotonic relation between borrower risk and loan 
maturity when borrower bargaining power is low. The significant effect of 
Bargaining power_Spread indicates that loan maturity is longer for borrowers of 
rating 1 if borrower bargaining power is high than when it is low. Moreover, we find 
that the risk-maturity relation is weaker if borrower bargaining power is high because 
the interaction coefficients in column (2) are significantly negative.  
                                                 
15
 Since the term structure of interest rates in Germany was normal (but relatively flat) in the year 
2005, loans with a longer maturity exhibit higher loan rates (risk-free rate plus loan spread) than short-
term loans on average. 
Table 7. The impact of borrower bargaining power 
This table reports results from OLS regression models for subsamples of loans differentiated by borrower bargaining power and the extent of asymmetric information. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the loan Maturity. Columns (2) and (4) contain coefficients from interactions of the rating dummies with Bargaining 
power_Spread and columns (6) and (8) from interactions of the rating dummies with Bargaining power_Spread and collateral. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
account for clustering at the borrower level. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Bargaining power_Spread Bargaining power_Spread and collateral 
 High asymmetric information Low asymmetric information High asymmetric information Low asymmetric information 
Coefficients Main effects Interactions Main effects Interactions Main effects Interactions Main effects Interactions 
Rating_2 1.380*** -1.125*** 1.500*** -0.578 1.446*** -1.622*** 1.999*** -1.540*** 
 (0.143) (0.388) (0.459) (0.460) (0.155) (0.323) (0.276) (0.456) 
Rating_3 1.504*** -1.100*** 1.687*** -0.792* 1.850*** -2.069*** 2.113*** -1.904*** 
 (0.128) (0.393) (0.462) (0.453) (0.215) (0.332) (0.257) (0.353) 
Rating_4 2.163*** -1.861*** 1.355*** -0.115 2.622***  1.743*** -0.808** 
 (0.270) (0.556) (0.466) (0.476) (0.193)  (0.266) (0.392) 
Rating_5 2.341*** -1.150** 2.321*** -0.960* 2.742*** -2.002*** 2.654*** -0.912** 
 (0.273) (0.503) (0.479) (0.505) (0.046) (0.411) (0.350) (0.435) 
Bargaining power_Spread 1.329***  1.228***       
 
(0.367)  (0.426)       
Bargaining power_Spread and collateral      1.855***  1.925***  
          (0.259)   (0.293)   
Young -0.082  0.272**   -0.070  0.390***  
 (0.105)  (0.107)   (0.074)  (0.145)  
Unlimited liability 0.719***  0.207*   0.709***  0.133  
  (0.113)   (0.118)   (0.117)   (0.160)   
Constant 2.009***  2.185***   1.876***  1.884***  
  (0.182)   (0.453)   (0.137)   (0.262)   
Observations 436  232   236  93  
Adjusted R² 0.449   0.257   0.646   0.472   
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Figure 3A illustrates these findings and provides clear support for a mitigating 
role of borrower bargaining power on the risk-maturity relation. This confirms the 
evidence in Uchida (2006) that good borrowers have relatively bigger bargaining 
power so that they manage to increase their loan maturities more than the riskier 
borrowers in the case of high borrower bargaining power. Interestingly, these 
findings also reveal that the good borrowers actually would like to borrow at longer 
maturities (in a world without asymmetric information) and do so once they have 
bargaining power. 
 
Figure 3. The impact of borrower bargaining power on the risk-maturity 
relation 
This figure displays the effect of high (Bargaining power_Spread = 1) vs. low (Bargaining 
power_Spread = 0) borrower bargaining power on the relation between Maturity and the Rating 
dummies for state of high (Figure 3A) vs. low asymmetric information (Figure 3B). See Table 1 for 
definitions of all variables.  
 
Figure 3A. High asymmetric information 
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Figure 3B. Low asymmetric information 
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Columns (3-4) in Table 7 report estimates from a single OLS regression for those 
loans made under low asymmetric information (Info asymmetry = 0) with main 
effects reported in column (3) and interaction effects with Bargaining power_Spread 
displayed in column (4). In contrast to the case of relatively high asymmetric 
information we find that all borrowers display an increase in loan maturities leading 
to an upward shift of the regression line which is illustrated in Figure 3B. However, 
again the very good borrowers with bargaining power achieve a larger increase in 
their average loan maturities than the riskiest borrowers with bargaining power.  
We conclude that for the case of high information asymmetries we mainly observe 
a demand-side effect with good borrowers with bargaining power achieving longer 
maturities because their need for signaling is reduced by their bargaining power. In 
the case of low asymmetric information, we seem to observe a combination of a 
demand-side effect with all borrowers with bargaining power achieving longer 
maturities and a supply-side effect with relationship lenders being actually willing to 
provide the longest maturities to risky borrowers (with and without bargaining 
power). Finally, the fact that we still observe good borrowers having shorter 
maturities than the very risky borrowers even if they have bargaining power may be 
explained by good borrowers trading-off their wish for longer maturities against the 
lower costs of shorter-term loans while risky borrowers may not have equivalent 
room for such choices. 
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In columns (5) to (8) of Table 7 we use a combined measure of borrower 
bargaining power (Bargaining power_Spread and collateral) to study an extreme 
case: borrowers with a very strong bargaining power (relatively low loan spread and 
low collateral, n = 178) versus borrowers with a very weak bargaining power 
(relatively high loan spreads and high collateral, n = 151), controlling for credit 
ratings. When studying the two underlying indicators of borrower bargaining power 
which are based on spread and collateral respectively, we find that the rank 
correlation between Bargaining power_Spread and Bargaining power_Collateral is -
0.02 which is statistically not different from zero (p-val. = 0.67), i.e. the proxies can 
be seen as independent (both variables exhibit the same value for 329 loans but 
opposite values for 339 loans). This finding also sheds light on the discussion 
whether loan spreads and collateral are substitutes or complementary contract terms 
(see Brick and Palia (2007)). Our data provides evidence that, conditional on the 
borrower’s credit rating, loan spread and collateral are in roughly 50% of all cases 
substitutes (loans with low spreads display high collateral and vice versa) and in the 
other 50% complementary, mutually reinforcing contract terms (loans with low 
spreads display low collateral and loans with high spreads display high collateral). 
Thus, to proxy borrower bargaining power by the variable Bargaining power_Spread 
and collateral has the advantage that it rules out the possibility that the loan contract 
terms collateral and spread have been traded-off (i.e. are used as substitutes).  
The regression analysis in columns (5-6) and (7-8) leads to qualitatively similar 
results and confirms the above conclusions.16  
Summarizing, our analysis of borrower bargaining power in addition to the extent 
of asymmetric information provides support for the argument that good borrowers 
have bigger bargaining power than risky borrowers (Uchida (2006); however, 
bargaining power is measured differently in our study). In addition, our findings 
imply that borrowers actually would like to borrow at longer maturities and do so 
when they have the bargaining power but that especially the good borrowers resort to 
choosing short maturities to convey their good quality to the bank if informational 
asymmetries are prevalent. Finally, under low asymmetric information risky 
borrowers benefit from long maturities whether they have bargaining power or not. 
                                                 
16
 Results are somewhat less reliable due to the small number of observations in each single rating 
category. Furthermore, in the case of high borrower bargaining power and high information 
asymmetry there are no observations at all with rating 4. 
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2.4.4 Robustness test 
In this section, we briefly summarize results (without tables, detailed results are 
available from the authors upon request) from (i) an analysis carried out at the 
borrower level (instead of at the loan level), (ii) the influence of extreme rating 
categories and (iii) from using a different dependent variable (duration instead of the 
nominal loan maturity). 
First, in all previous regression analyses at the loan level we have controlled for 
clustering at the borrower level (668 loans from 471 borrowers). We now study the 
sensitivity of our results by repeating all steps with aggregate variables at the 
borrower level. The latter are calculated as means and loan amount-weighted means 
for all variables that refer to the loan level (loan contract terms like maturity, amount, 
collateral, spread). Essentially, we obtain results that are highly similar to Sections 
2.4.1 – 2.4.3 indicating that the correction of standard errors for the clustering of 
observations on borrowers in the loan-level analysis was adequate. 
Second, we test whether our basic results are driven by the extreme rating 
categories 1 and 5. We start with using rating category 3 (intermediate credit quality) 
as a reference category for the rating dummy variables and still find a significantly 
positive and monotonic relation between borrower risk and loan maturity. The only 
noteworthy difference is that we obtain a non-significant coefficient for rating 2, 
indicating that loan maturities are not significantly different in rating categories 2 
and 3, which is consistent with Section 2.4.1. Then we exclude all observations with 
rating 1 or 5 and re-estimate our basic regressions on the risk-maturity relation. 
Again, we find a significantly positive and monotonic risk-maturity relation with 
rating categories 2 and 3 not being significantly different and rating category 4 
showing a significantly longer maturity.   
Finally, we consider a different dependent variable. Instead of the nominal loan 
maturity, we now include a Macaulay-style duration (in months) for each loan, 
explicitly considering the type of loan and its specific repayment schedule (bullet or 
amortizing loans, effective interest rate, amount of installments, etc.). As expected, 
duration (mean of 47 months, median of 35 months) is considerably shorter than the 
nominal loan maturity (mean of 83 months, median of 55 months), positively skewed 
and highly correlated with maturity. Given these statistical properties, it is 
unsurprising that all of our previous results are confirmed when we use duration as a 
dependent variable. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
The maturity of corporate debt represents an important contractual element for 
borrowers and lenders. In this paper, we employ a dataset comprising all loans made 
to SMEs by a German bank in 2005 and empirically analyze the relation between 
borrower risk and loan maturity in small business lending. Small business lending 
provides an especially interesting case compared to lending to large firms because 
theoretical models on adverse selection are more applicable and borrowing from 
relationship lenders is more common for SMEs in most countries around the world.  
Our analyses reveal a robust, significantly positive and monotonic relation 
between borrower risk and loan maturity. This positive risk-maturity relation is 
prevalent in the case of high and in the case of low asymmetric information. 
Furthermore, we find that loans made under low asymmetric information exhibit 
longer maturities and the positive risk-maturity relation is weaker for these loans. 
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence in favor of 
two complementary explanations for the positive risk-maturity relation that explicitly 
account for the environment in which the loan is made. Thereby, we are also able to 
shed some light on the demand and supply-side factors that drive the loan maturity 
choice. If informational asymmetries are high, the signaling literature explains 
borrowers’ maturity choices while the view that relationship lenders are willing to 
provide assistance to their risky borrowers explain the positive risk-maturity relation 
if informational asymmetries are low. 
Furthermore, conditioning our analysis on the impact of borrower bargaining 
power in addition to the extent of asymmetric information allows us gaining further 
insights in demand and supply effects that may influence loan contracting and thus 
the risk-maturity relation. Our results reveal that borrower bargaining power leads to 
longer average maturities and that the risk-maturity relation is weakened in the 
presence of borrower bargaining power. The latter effect is especially strong if the 
extent of asymmetric information is high. These findings provide support for the 
argument that good borrowers have bigger bargaining power than risky borrowers.  
Bringing the various arguments eventually together, our findings imply that 
borrowers would like to borrow long-term (in a world without asymmetric 
information) and actually do so if they have bargaining power but that especially the 
good borrowers resort to (cheaper) short-term loans to convey their good quality to 
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the bank if informational asymmetries are prevalent. Yet, risky borrowers benefit 
from their lender’s willingness to provide long maturities in the case of low 
asymmetric information, whether they have bargaining power or not. Consequently, 
in contrast to arm’s-length lending close ties with relationship lenders seem 
particularly valuable for relatively risky borrowers because the need for favorable 
lending terms is most urgent for these firms. 
On the one hand, our study confirms previous findings of a positive risk-maturity 
relation and an increase in loan maturities, especially for the good borrowers, when 
informational asymmetries are reduced (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller 
(2005)). It is also in line with the strand of the literature showing that borrowers may 
benefit from close bank relationships (see Boot (2000) and Degryse, Kim and 
Ongena (2009) for thorough overviews). On the other hand, it goes beyond previous 
studies by adding to the question how demand and supply factors drive loan 
contracting outcomes. Since we do not directly observe demand and supply, this 
opens up room for future research with more comprehensive datasets that include 
information on requested and granted loan terms to gain a better understanding of the 
interaction between the two sides and the role of close bank relationships. 
 47 
3 Foreign Currency Loans - Demand or Supply Driven? 
3.1 Introduction 
Firms in emerging markets often borrow in a foreign rather than the domestic 
currency. Unhedged foreign currency borrowing by the private sector is seen as a 
major cause of the financial crisis in East Asia in the 1990’s (Goldstein and Turner 
(2002)). Since the outbreak of the current financial crisis there have been strong fears 
that foreign currency borrowing again jeopardizes financial stability, this time in 
Emerging Europe. And indeed, financial stability has suffered and has led to 
repercussions for several Western European banks which dominate lending in many 
of these countries.  
The risks arising from foreign currency borrowing in countries like Poland, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are particularly worrying, as these loans are 
predominantly held by retail clients, i.e. households and small firms. “The point to 
grasp about Eastern Europe is that … the debt is plagued by currency mismatches 
because in recent years households (and to a lesser extent, corporates) have 
increasingly chosen to borrow in low-interest currencies …it has shades of the Asian 
tigers back in 1997.” (Financial Times, 29/9/2007). 
Existing evidence for the region examines the motivation for firms (Brown, 
Ongena and Yesin (2009)) and households (Beer, Ongena and Peter (2010)) to 
choose a loan in a foreign rather than the local currency. However, the currency 
denomination of loans depends not only on the firms’ preferred currency, but also on 
the loan menu which banks offer to them. For example if the future value of the 
domestic currency is unpredictable and banks are risk-averse they may be wary of 
extending credit, in particular long-term credit, in the local currency (Luca and 
Petrova (2008)). Banks’ supply of foreign currency loans may also depend on their 
own access to foreign currency refinancing (Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas 
(2007)). Due to their foreign ownership many banks in Emerging Europe have 
substantial liabilities in euro. Limited by prudential regulations in their currency 
exposure, and limited by weakly developed forward markets in instruments to hedge 
foreign currency positions, banks may lend in foreign currencies to prevent currency 
mismatches on their own balance sheets (Luca and Petrova (2008), Sorsa, Bakker, 
Duenwald, Machler and Tiffin (2007)). So far, there exists no empirical evidence that 
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establishes whether it is the demand or the supply side that actually drives foreign 
currency lending. Disentangling demand from supply side factors would, however, 
be crucial to find adequate mechanisms to deal with the risks arising from foreign 
currency lending.  
In this paper we therefore examine how the currency denomination of loans is 
determined in the negotiation process that takes place between small firms and one 
retail bank in Bulgaria. Our analysis is based on information for 105,589 business 
loans granted to over sixty-thousand firms during the period 2003-2007. In contrast 
to previous studies, we observe not only the currency as stated in the loan contract 
but also the borrower’s requested currency. Thus, we are able to examine to what 
extent the currency denomination of loans is determined by the demand and / or 
supply side and which are the driving factors on either side.  
In Bulgaria, as in other Eastern European countries, foreign currencies and 
especially the euro play an important role for domestic financial transactions. On 
average, in the region 40% of customer deposits are held in foreign currency and 
52% of loans are made in foreign currencies with the euro being by far the most 
important currency (see e.g. European Central Bank (2007)). Bulgaria is 
representative of this “eurization” of the banking sector with 40% of deposits and 
47% of loans denominated in euro.  
The bank at the heart of our analysis is focused on retail lending making it an 
interesting object of study, since especially retail clients seem to have been most 
involved in foreign currency transactions throughout Eastern Europe. As with the 
majority of banks in the region, the bank is mainly foreign owned and has substantial 
wholesale funding in foreign currency. Similar to other retail banks in Bulgaria and 
the Eastern European region as a whole, loans in foreign currency make up a 
substantial share (27%) of the bank’s portfolio. 
In line with theoretical predictions (see e.g. Cowan (2006)), our results show that 
a firm in our sample is more likely to request a loan in foreign currency (euro) 
compared to the local currency (Bulgarian lev) if interest rates on foreign currency 
loans are lower, if the firm has foreign currency income, and if it faces lower distress 
costs in case of default. We also find that larger firms, older firms and less opaque 
firms, i.e. those with a longer relationship with the bank are more likely to request a 
euro loan. We, however, also find that firms which need larger loans, long-term loans 
and mortgage loans are more likely to request a foreign currency loan. This result 
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seems to be partly driven by firms anticipating the reluctance of the bank to extend 
large or long-term loans in local currency. Indeed, an analysis of panel data for 
repeat clients of the bank suggests that firms learn over time that long-term and 
mortgage loans are more likely to be granted in foreign currency. 
Comparing the requested and granted currencies of loans in our sample we find 
that almost one-third of the loans disbursed by the bank in foreign currency were 
initially requested by the firm in local currency. We find that the bank is more likely 
to grant euro if the firm is of lower observable credit risk and less opaque to the 
bank. However, we also find that the bank is hesitant to offer large and long-term 
loans in local currency and is more likely to lend in euro when it has more funding in 
euro. 
In sum, our results show that foreign currency lending is not only driven by 
borrowers who try to benefit from lower interest rates. We find that a substantial 
share of foreign currency retail loans in Eastern Europe is supply-driven, with banks 
hesitant to lend long-term in local currency and eager to match the currency structure 
of their assets and liabilities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3.3 describes our data while section 3.4 
reports results from univariate and multivariate analyses. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Currency Denomination of Firm Debt: Theory and Evidence 
In this section we review existing theoretical and empirical studies on the 
currency denomination of firm debt, establishing the hypotheses for our empirical 
analysis and clarifying our contribution to the literature. 
 
3.2.1 Theory 
Looking at firms’ demand for foreign currency loans, Goswami and Shrikhande 
(2001) show that firms may use foreign currency debt as a hedging instrument for the 
exchange rate exposure of their revenues.17 Goswami and Shrikhande (2001) assume 
                                                 
17
 Economic exposure to foreign currency can also be managed with foreign exchange derivatives. See 
Brown (2001) and Mian (1996) for a broad discussion of the corporate hedging instruments. 
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that the uncovered interest rate parity holds,18 and therefore interest rate differentials 
do not motivate foreign currency borrowing in their model. However, a wide body of 
evidence suggests that this parity does not hold for many currencies (see e.g. Froot 
and Thaler (1990) or Isard (2006)). Cowan (2006) and Brown, Ongena and Yesin 
(2009) consider firms’ choices of loan currency in models where the cost of foreign 
currency debt is lower than the cost of local currency debt. Cowan (2006) shows that 
firms will be more likely to choose foreign currency debt the higher the interest rate 
differential, the larger their share of income in foreign currency and the lower their 
distress costs in case of default. The incentive to take foreign currency loans is 
weaker when the volatility of the exchange rate is higher, as this increases the default 
risk on unhedged loans. 
Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) show that not only firms with foreign currency 
income, but also firms with high income in local currency (compared to their debt 
service burden) will be more likely to choose cheaper foreign currency loans, 
because they are better able to cushion exchange rate movements. Brown, Ongena 
and Yesin (2009) also examine the impact of bank-firm information asymmetries on 
loan currency choice.19 They show that when lenders are imperfectly informed about 
the currency or level of firm revenue, local currency earners may be more likely to 
choose foreign currency loans. The reason is that in a pooling “equilibrium” these 
borrowers are not fully charged for the credit risk involved in taking these unhedged 
loans. 
The supply of foreign currency loans should be higher for firms with lower 
corresponding credit risk such as firms with income in foreign currency or high 
income to debt ratios. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) banks may ration foreign 
currency lending in the face of adverse selection. This could imply that banks supply 
foreign currency only to clients who are financially transparent and who they know 
have foreign currency income. 
In countries, where forward markets for foreign exchange are not complete, banks 
may behave averse towards exchange rate exposure on their balance sheet. Luca and 
                                                 
18
 This means that the differences in the nominal interest rates between currencies are cancelled out by 
the changes in their exchange rate so that the costs of foreign and local currency borrowing are 
identical. 
19
 Banks may not be able to verify the income sources of small, non-incorporated firms which do not 
keep detailed and audited financial records (Berger and Udell (1998)). This information asymmetry 
may be particularly pressing in countries with weak corporate governance (Brown, Jappelli and 
Pagano (2009)) and for foreign banks which have less knowledge about local firms (Detragiache, 
Tressel and Gupta (2008)). 
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Petrova (2008) examine a model of credit dollarization in which risk-averse banks 
and firms choose an optimal portfolio of foreign currency and local currency loans. 
In line with other portfolio-choice models of foreign currency debt (Ize and Levy-
Yeyati (2003)) they predict that banks will offer more foreign currency loans when 
the volatility of domestic inflation is high and the volatility of the real exchange rate 
is low. Thus, in countries where the monetary authority has not established a credible 
reputation for pursuing price stability this could imply that banks prefer to make 
loans in foreign currency. This tendency may be stronger for long-term loans than for 
short-term loans as long-term monetary policy may be particularly unpredictable.20 
Banks are typically limited by prudential regulation in the foreign currency 
exposure they can take. In a country with underdeveloped derivative markets for 
foreign currency exchange, as in Bulgaria, this regulation implies that banks’ supply 
of loans in foreign currency will be partly determined by their liabilities in these 
currencies. Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2007) suggest that banks’ supply of 
foreign currency loans will depend on their access to foreign currency debt through 
financial markets or from parent-banks abroad. Similarly, Luca and Petrova (2008) 
suggest that increases in banks’ access to foreign currency deposits will lead them to 
offer more foreign currency loans.21 
Summarizing the theoretical predictions regarding the supply and demand of 
foreign currency loans, we expect both demand and supply to be higher for firms 
with foreign currency income and high income in local currency (compared to their 
debt service burden). Information asymmetries about a firm’s income structure may 
increase foreign currency loan demand but could also reduce its supply. Demand for 
foreign currency loans should be higher for firms with lower distress costs in case of 
default. Lenders should be more willing to offer foreign currency loans when they 
have increased access to foreign currency liabilities in the form of wholesale funds or 
customer deposits. At the macroeconomic level, firms will be more likely to request 
foreign currency loans if the interest rate differential between local currency and 
foreign currency credit is high and the volatility of the exchange rate is low. Low 
                                                 
20
 Note that this argument is not identical to that in the “original sin” literature (Eichengreen and 
Hausman (1999), Hausmann and Panizza (2003)), where it is argued that countries cannot finance 
themselves long-term in local currency because of moral hazard, i.e. they have the possibility to affect 
the value of their own currency. 
21
 For a discussion of deposit dollarization see De Nicoló, Honohan and Ize (2005). 
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credibility of domestic monetary policy may make banks reluctant to lend in local 
currency, especially at longer maturities. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical evidence 
Several recent studies examine aggregate dollarization of credit in developing 
and transition countries. Most recently, Luca and Petrova (2008) analyze the 
aggregate share of foreign currency loans for 21 transition countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 2003. They find that the 
aggregate share of foreign currency loans is positively related to aggregate export 
activity, interest rate differentials, domestic monetary volatility and deposit 
dollarization, while it is negatively related to the volatility of the exchange rate. They 
also find that dollarization is lower in countries with more developed foreign 
exchange markets, and that credit dollarization is affected by prudential regulations 
which stipulate tighter open position limits. 
Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2007) examine aggregate credit dollarization 
for 24 transition countries for the period 2000 – 2006. They find that countries in 
which banks have a higher share of foreign funding display a higher share of loans in 
foreign currency. Earlier work by Arteta (2005) on a broad sample of low-income 
countries as well as Barajas and Morales (2003) on Latin America confirm the 
hypothesis that higher exchange rate volatility reduces aggregate credit dollarization. 
Most firm-level studies focus on the currency denomination of debt for large 
firms, using financial statement data. Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) find that large US 
corporations match loan currencies to those of their sales confirming the results in 
Keloharju and Niskanen (2001) for large Finnish corporations. Martínez and Werner 
(2002) and Gelos (2003) show that large Mexican firms which export, and thus earn 
foreign currency income, use foreign currency loans as a natural hedge to economic 
exposure. Benavente, Johnson and Morande (2003) as well as Cowan, Hansen and 
Herrera (2005) find a similar result for Chilean firms. Interest rate differentials as 
well as asset type are found to explain the use of foreign currency debt in East-Asian 
corporations (Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003)) as well as in large Latin 
American firms (Cowan (2006)). 
To our knowledge there is only one paper to date which studies loan currency 
denomination using loan-level data. Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) examine the 
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currency denomination of the most recent loan received by 3,105 small firms in 24 
transition countries based on responses to the 2005 EBRD Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey. At the firm level they find strong evidence that the 
choice of a foreign currency loan is related to foreign currency cash flow. In contrast, 
they find only weak evidence that foreign currency borrowing is affected by the 
distress costs firms face in case of default or by their financial opaqueness. At the 
macroeconomic level the authors find no evidence that interest rate differentials and 
exchange rate volatility explain differences in foreign currency borrowing in their 
sample. 
In contrast to existing studies, our data allows us to examine to what extent the 
currency denomination of a loan is determined by the clients and / or the bank. As we 
observe not only the currency denomination of the actual loan extended, but also the 
firms’ currency requests, we are able to identify how clients’ demand for foreign 
currency loans and the bank’s supply of such loans are related to firm characteristics, 
other loan characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and the bank’s liability 
structure. Finally, our dataset allows us to examine the factors that influence the 
bank’s decision to alter a borrower’s currency request gaining insights into the 
bank’s weighing of taking on currency vs. credit risks. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 The dataset 
Our dataset covers all annuity loans, credit lines and overdrafts extended to firms 
by one Bulgarian bank (henceforth called “the Bank”) between April 2003 and 
September 2007. 
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Table 8. Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variables 
    
EUR requested Firm requested EUR loan (1=yes, 0=no) Bank 
EUR granted Bank granted EUR loan (1=yes, 0=no) Bank 
Firm characteristics (at loan disbursement date) 
 
EUR  account Firm holds EUR savings or term account (1=yes, 0=no) Bank 
Disposable income Total disposable income per month (log EUR) Bank 
Leverage Total debt as share of total assets of firm (%) Bank 
Sole proprietorship Firm is sole proprietorship  (1=yes, 0=no) Bank 
Bank relationship Time since first contact between bank and client (log months)  
Assets Total assets of firm (log EUR) Bank 
Age Firm age (log years) Bank 
Industry 
Industry dummies which are one if firm belongs to one of the 
following sectors:  Construction, Manufacturing, Trade, Transport, 
Tourism, Other services. Baseline industry is Agriculture Bank 
Loan characteristics 
  
Requested amount Requested loan amount (log EUR) Bank 
Requested maturity Requested loan maturity (log months) Bank 
Mortgage loan Loan is a mortgage loan (1=yes, 0=no) Bank 
Amount Granted loan amount (log EUR) Bank 
Maturity Granted loan maturity (log months) Bank 
Annuity loan Loan is an annuity loan vs. credit line or overdraft (1=annuity, 
0=credit line or overdraft) Bank 
Interest rate Interest rate per annum (%) Bank 
Later loan Loan is non-initial loan for repeat clients (1=yes, 0=no) Bank 
Branch Branch dummies which equal 1 for the branch that granted the loan Bank 
Macroeconomic conditions ( in month of loan disbursement) 
 
Interest differential Household deposit rate (12-24 months) in BGN minus rate in EUR (%) BNB 
Spread differential 
Intermeditaion spread (short-term lending rate minus household 
deposit rate) in EUR minus spread in BGN (%) BNB 
EU announcement 
Loan was extended after the official announcement (26 September 
2006) that Bulgaria would definitively join the EU in January 2007 
(1=yes, 0=no) Bank 
Inflation volatility 
Variance of monthly changes in the consumer price index over 12 
months prior to beginning of the quarter in which loan is disbursed 
(%) IFS  
Aggregate FX loans Share of foreign currency loans to corporations in total banking 
system BNB 
Bank funding (at end of month prior to loan disbursement) 
 
EUR wholesale funding EUR non-customer funding as share of bank's total liabilities Bank 
EUR customer funding EUR customer funding (deposits) as share of bank's total liabilities Bank 
   
Sources: IFS: International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. BNB: 
Bulgarian National Bank. 
 
 
In total the Bank extended 106,091 loans during this period. For each disbursed 
loan we have information on the loan conditions requested by the firm, the actual 
loan conditions granted, as well as firm characteristics at the time of the loan 
disbursement. Crucially for our analysis we know whether the loan was requested 
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and/or granted in Bulgarian lev (henceforth we use the currency’s ISO 4217 
alphabetic code, i.e. BGN) or euro (henceforth EUR). We exclude all observations 
with missing loan-level or firm-level data leaving us with 105,589 loans to 61,494 
different firms. Our dataset also includes monthly indicators of the Bank’s liability 
structure as well as indicators of macroeconomic conditions obtained from the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Definitions and sources of all variables are provided in Table 8. 
The Bank is a nationwide bank which focuses on lending to small and medium 
enterprises. Compared to the aggregate banking system, where only 41% of assets 
are loans to enterprises, 70% of the assets at the Bank are enterprise loans. The 
volume of outstanding enterprise loans in foreign currency at the Bank equals 
approximately 40% and hence is similar to that of many retail banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe. As with the majority of banks in Bulgaria and the rest of the region, 
foreign strategic investors hold a controlling share in the Bank.22 
 
3.3.2 The Bank’s lending technology and loan portfolio 
At the heart of the Bank’s lending technology is a personnel-intensive analysis of 
the borrower’s debt capacity.23 A prospective borrower first meets a client advisor 
who assesses whether the borrower meets the Bank’s basic requirements. If this is 
the case, the client fills in a loan application form. On this form the client indicates 
her preferred loan amount, maturity and currency as well as the purpose of the loan. 
The client also has to provide information about the firm ownership, other bank 
relations and the free cash flow available for the repayment of the loan. 
In a next step, the Bank’s credit administration prepares information on the 
borrower’s credit history with this Bank and other banks.24 At the same time, the 
loan officer conducts a financial analysis of the firm including a personal visit to the 
firm to confirm its financial situation. The loan officer presents the customer’s 
demand and the suggested loan terms together with the information gathered during 
the financial analysis to the Bank’s credit committee, which then makes the final 
                                                 
22
 In 2007 82% of bank assets in Bulgaria were in the hands of institutions with majority foreign 
ownership. In Central and Eastern Europe the average share of foreign bank assets in 2007 was 80%. 
23
 To gain insights into the usual loan granting process, we have conducted informal interviews with 
loan officers and training staff from the Bank’s head office. 
24
 Enterprise loans in Bulgaria are covered both by the public credit registry and a private credit 
bureau (see www.doingbusiness.org). 
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decision on the loan terms granted. Since the borrower’s repayment capacity is the 
core figure in the analysis, loan size (amount and currency) and maturity are 
determined first. 
The setting of interest rates and collateral requirements depends on the loan size. 
For small loans (up to 50,000 EUR) collateral requirements and interest rates are 
standardized, i.e. not negotiated on an individual basis. For medium-sized loans 
(above 50,000 EUR) interest rates and collateral requirements are negotiated 
individually. Given the different lending technologies applied to small versus 
medium loans we treat these two loan types separately throughout our analysis. 
 
Table 9. Loan disbursements 
This table displays statistics on the bank’s loan portfolio. Results are provided for the full sample and 
the following subsamples: Small loans: Loans with an amount up to 50,000 EUR. Medium loans: 
Loans with an amount over 50,000 EUR. Repeat clients: Loans disbursed to firms that take out more 
than one loan from the bank during the observation period. 
     
Panel A. Number of loans disbursed 
          
  Full sample Small loans Medium loans Repeat clients 
2003 10,780 10,564 216 7,571 
2004 18,643 18,261 373 14,296 
2005 23,243 22,706 537 17,759 
2006 28,269 27,670 599 18,642 
2007 24,663 24,160 503 11,025 
Total 105,589 103,361 2,228 69,293 
     
     
Panel B. Volume of loans disbursed (in million EUR) 
          
  Full sample Small loans Medium loans Repeat clients 
2003 69 43 26 49 
2004 123 78 46 96 
2005 189 121 67 145 
2006 222 153 69 161 
2007 213 153 60 118 
Total 816 547 269 569 
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Table 9. cont. 
Panel C. Share of loan volume disbursed in EUR (%) 
          
  Full sample Small loans Medium loans Repeat clients 
2003 44.0 23.8 76.9 44.7 
2004 42.2 21.1 78.3 42.0 
2005 37.6 16.3 76.0 36.9 
2006 34.3 15.4 75.8 37.4 
2007 33.6 19.0 70.7 42.4 
Total 36.9 18.1 75.2 39.7 
 
Table 9 provides an overview of the Bank’s lending activities during our 
observation period. Panel A and B display the number and volume of disbursed loans 
by year. The overwhelming number of loans in our sample (98%) are small loans, i.e. 
loans with an amount less than 50,000 EUR. However, considering the volume of 
lending, medium loans (33%) are of sizeable importance in the Bank’s loan portfolio. 
Panel A shows that almost two-thirds of the Bank’s loans are disbursed to repeat 
clients, i.e. borrowers who take out more than one loan during our observation 
period. The subsample of loans to repeat clients will be important throughout our 
empirical exercise as it allows us to control for unobserved (time-invariant) firm-
level characteristics. 
Panel C of Table 9 shows that a substantial share of the Bank’s lending is in 
foreign currency rather than in BGN. Loans denominated in EUR account for 37% of 
the loan volume disbursed during our observation period.25 This share decreased 
considerably between 2003 and 2007, but even at the end of our observation period 
one-third of the disbursed loan volume was in EUR. Panel C further reveals that the 
share of EUR loans varies substantially by loan size. EUR loans make up a moderate 
share of small loans, whereas they dominate medium-sized loans. 
As we have information on the firms’ requested currency as well as the actual 
currency of the loan granted, we are able to establish if the requested currency 
coincides with the granted currency, and how often the Bank changes the loan 
currency. Figure 4 shows that overall 32% of the loans (23% of the loan volume) 
disbursed in EUR were loans initially requested in BGN by the borrower. Looking at 
it from the borrowers’ side, 12% of the loan volume which was requested in local 
currency (69 Mio EUR out of 578 Mio EUR) was actually disbursed in foreign 
                                                 
25
 We focus our analysis on foreign currency loans denominated EUR, since they account for 97.5% 
of the bank’s total foreign currency lending. 
 58 
currency. This finding already suggests that a substantial share of foreign currency 
lending by the Bank is not demand, but supply driven. By contrast, we find that a 
negligible share of the number and volume of loans disbursed in local currency were 
requested in foreign currency. 
 
Figure 4. Requested vs. granted loan currency 
This figure displays share of requested and granted loan currencies in number of loans and volume of 
loans disbursed. 
  
Number of loans disbursed (Total= 105,589) 
 
         
 
Granted currency 
 
99,776
 
BGN   
 
 
 
EUR 5,813  
  
  
  
  
 
 
         
 
Requested currency BGN  EUR  BGN  EUR  
  99,480  296  1,870  3,943 
 
  (99.7%)  (0.3%)  (32.2%)  (67.8%) 
 
          
          
  
Volume of loans disbursed in Mio EUR (Total= 
816) 
 
         
 
Granted currency 
 
515
 
BGN   
 
 
 
EUR 301  
  
  
  
  
 
 
         
 
Requested currency BGN  EUR  BGN  EUR  
  509  5  69  232 
 
  (98.8%)  (1.0%)  (22.9%)  (77.1%) 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that the propensity of firms to request and of the Bank to grant 
EUR loans is strongly related to requested loan size and maturity. The analysis by 
requested amount in Figure 5A reveals that the share of loans which is requested and 
granted in EUR actually increases steadily with requested loan size. As this share is 
very low for loans with requested amounts of up to 5,000 EUR but more than half of 
the loans fall within this category, we will conduct all our regression analyses not 
only for the full sample but also for the subsample of loans with requested amounts 
of more than 5,000 EUR to make sure that our results are not mainly driven by these 
very small loans. Interestingly, the share of loans requested and granted in EUR is 
very low for loans with requested maturities of up to 60 months and then increases 
rapidly. This may be explained by the fact that the housing market in Bulgaria and 
therefore mortgage loans are predominantly denominated in EUR. We will consider 
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this in our regression analysis and separately study the subsample of non-mortgage 
loans. 
 
Figure 5. Requested and granted currency by loan size and maturity 
 
Figure 5A. Share of loans requested and granted in EUR 
 
 
Figure 5B. Probability of being granted EUR  
 
 
Figure 5B displays the probability of a firm receiving a loan in EUR conditional 
on its requested currency, loan size and maturity. The figure shows that the 
probability to receive a EUR loan after requesting a BGN loan increases steadily 
with the requested loan size and sharply when the requested maturity exceeds 60 
months. By contrast, independent of their requested loan size or maturity, loans 
requested in EUR are almost exclusively granted in EUR. Only for the very small 
loans this share is below 90%. The supply analysis will therefore mainly deal with 
the factors that affect the Bank’s decision to switch a request for local currency into 
EUR. 
 
 60 
3.3.3 The firms’ choice of loan currency 
We first examine a model in which the dependent variable Pr(EUR requested)i,k,t 
is the probability that a firm i that is taking out a loan k in period t requests a EUR 
loan: 
 
Pr(EUR requested)i,k,t = α + β1Fi,t + β2Lk + β3Mt + εi,k,t       (3) 
 
In this model Fi,t and Lk are vectors of firm characteristics and other requested 
loan characteristics while Mt is a vector of the macroeconomic conditions at the time 
of loan disbursement. 
 
Firm characteristics 
Based on the theory reviewed in section 3.2.1 we expect that firms with revenue 
in foreign currency, higher income levels (and thus ceteris paribus higher income to 
debt service ratios), low distress costs as well as financially opaque firms will be 
more likely to demand foreign currency loans. As we lack information on the 
currency of firms’ income, our proxy for foreign currency revenue is the dummy 
variable EUR account which equals one if the firm has a savings or term account in 
EUR at the disbursement date of the loan, and equals zero otherwise. Our proxy for 
the firm’s income level is the variable Disposable income which measures the firm’s 
monthly free cash flow (in log EUR) at loan disbursement. We include two indictors 
of firm-level distress costs. Our first indicator is Leverage, which measures the 
firm’s total liabilities as a share of its total assets. Being highly levered increases the 
likelihood to default which, in turn, leads to higher costs since it is very costly for 
firms to obtain emergency financing when facing default. Our second indicator of a 
firm’s distress costs is Sole proprietorship, which equals one if the firm is a sole 
proprietorship and zero otherwise, because firms in which the owners have higher 
private values of continuing their business face higher distress costs in the case of 
default (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993)). 
We include one indicator for the degree of information asymmetry between the 
firm and the Bank. The variable Bank relationship measures the length of the bank-
borrower relationship in months since their first contact. We expect that the Bank can 
gain private information about the firm’s revenue potential by observing the firm’s 
past repayment behavior or it’s usage of other bank products. 
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As larger and older firms are more likely to have export income, less likely to 
default due to a given foreign currency loan and more likely to be financially 
transparent than smaller and younger firms, we include the log of total firm Assets 
(measured in EUR) as well as firm Age (log of age in years) as firm-level control 
variables. 
To capture remaining differences in firm characteristics our regressions contain 
seven Industry dummies, which indicate the industry of the firms’ main activity, and 
33 Branch dummies which capture the location of the branch where the firm applied 
for the loan. In particular, the industry and branch dummies control for potential 
foreign currency earnings since foreign currency income is more likely in certain 
industries (e. g. trade, tourism or transport) and locations26 (trade and tourist centers 
such as Sofia or Varna). 
 
Other loan terms 
Other requested loan terms, such as loan size and loan maturity may affect the 
firms’ currency request in both directions. As argued by Brown, Ongena and Yesin 
(2009) firms with higher income-to-debt ratios are less likely to risk default due to 
exchange rate changes. Thus firms with larger loans and shorter maturities (and 
therefore ceteris paribus higher installments and lower income-to-debt ratios) may be 
less likely to borrow in foreign currency. However, firms with larger loans might 
also be more likely to borrow in foreign currency since the absolute interest rate 
advantage of borrowing in foreign currency is higher for larger loans. Similarly, the 
risk of experiencing sharp exchange rate fluctuations may be lower for shorter loans, 
suggesting that firms with shorter loans might as well be more likely to borrow in 
foreign currency. To control for these effects we include Requested amount and 
Requested maturity which measure the log of the requested loan amount (measured 
in EUR) and the log of the requested loan maturity (in months) respectively. 
The dummy variable Mortgage loan equals one if the loan is collateralized by a 
mortgage, and equals zero otherwise. Since the underlying property may be 
liquidated in case of default, distress costs for firms (e.g. the volume of required 
emergency funding) may be lower for these loans. Moreover, as the Bulgarian real 
                                                 
26
 As we do not have information on the location of the firm we use the available information on 
branch location. Since decision rules and loan procedures as well as the applied credit technology are 
the same in all branches and all bank staff is trained accordingly, we do not expect these factors to 
vary considerably across branches.  
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estate market is mainly denominated in EUR, firms should be more likely to request 
loans that finance real estate in EUR. 
 
Macroeconomic conditions 
Based on existing theory we expect that firms are more likely to request foreign 
currency loans if the interest rate differential on foreign currency loans is high and 
the expected exchange rate volatility is low. In our analysis of firms’ currency 
choices we control for the prevailing monetary conditions at the time of loan 
disbursement27 with three indicators based on data obtained from the Bulgarian 
National Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
For each month during our observation period we calculate the Interest 
differential by subtracting the (12-24 month) household deposit rate in EUR from the 
deposit rate in BGN. We use this deposit based measure of interest rate differentials 
rather than a measure based on interbank rates because the interbank market plays a 
minor role in funding banks in Bulgaria.28 Our measure of expected exchange rate 
volatility is the dummy variable EU announcement which is one for all loans 
disbursed after the announcement (on 26 September 2006) that Bulgaria would 
definitely join the EU in January 2007. As a new accession country to the EU, 
Bulgaria was from that date on committed to joining the euro zone at some future 
date, which may have lowered expected exchange rate volatility.29  
Furthermore, we expect that (risk-averse) firms are more likely to request foreign 
currency loans if domestic inflation volatility is high (see Ize and Levy-Yeyati 
(2003)).We measure Inflation volatility as the variance of monthly changes in the 
consumer price index over the twelve months prior to the month in which the loan 
was disbursed. Finally, we expect that the demand for foreign currency loans at the 
                                                 
27
 The firm’s request for a loan and thus the currency choice is naturally prior to the date of loan 
disbursement. Since the Bank’s loan granting procedure is well established and clear-cut, the time 
span between loan application and disbursement is normally short and macroeconomic conditions 
should not have changed considerably in the meantime.  
28
 Note that this measure of the interest differential captures the interest advantage over time to 
account for the fact that not only its magnitude at the time of loan disbursement is important but also 
its development over time.  
29
 Bulgaria introduced a currency board in July 1997 which fixed the exchange rate towards the EUR. 
This currency board held throughout our observation period, so that there was almost no actual 
exchange rate volatility. However, this by no means implies that firms or banks in Bulgaria were 
confident that a depreciation of the BGN would not happen. Indeed, Carlson and Valev (2008) report 
survey evidence suggesting that in 2004 14% of the Bulgarians believed the currency board might 
collapse with a sharp devaluation within the next twelve months. Considering a period of five years 
more than 25% of respondents expected the currency board to collapse with a sharp devaluation. 
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Bank may depend on the possibilities of firms getting similar loans at other banks. 
We control for the firms’ possibilities to obtain foreign currency loans from 
alternative providers with the variable Aggregate FX loans which measures in each 
month the share of corporate loans in the entire Bulgarian banking system which are 
denominated in foreign currency. 
 
3.3.4 The Bank’s choice of loan currency 
Our dependent variable Pr(EUR granted)i,k,t is the probability that the Bank grants 
a loan k to firm i in period t in EUR rather than BGN. In our empirical model the 
vectors Lk, Fi,t and Mt again include firm and loan characteristics as well as indicators 
of macroeconomic conditions, while the vector Bt captures indicators of the Bank’s 
funding structure at the time when a loan is disbursed. 
 
Pr(EUR granted)i,k,t = α + β1Fi,t + β2Lk + β3Mt + β4Bt + εi,k,t      (4) 
 
As discussed in section 3.2.1, the Bank’s decision to grant a loan in local or 
foreign currency will depend on the expected credit risk for either type of loan. We 
use our above mentioned indicators EUR account, Disposable income, Leverage, 
Sole proprietorship, Bank relationship, Assets, Age, Mortgage loan as well as the 
Industry dummies and Branch dummies to control for observable firm-level credit 
risk.  
Existing theory predicts that banks will offer more foreign currency loans when 
the volatility of the real exchange rate is low and the volatility of domestic inflation 
is high. To capture this we include the variables EU announcement and Inflation 
volatility. If banks do mistrust domestic monetary policy they will be more hesitant 
to grant large and especially long-term loans in local currency. We therefore include 
the requested loan terms (Requested amount, Requested maturity) as explanatory 
variables in our supply regression.30 
We expect increased access to foreign currency funding to lead to more foreign 
currency loans. To control for the level and the potential composition effect of the 
Bank’s foreign currency liabilities, we introduce two bank funding variables. EUR 
                                                 
30
 As described in section 3.3.2, the Bank’s currency decision is jointly determined with the loan 
amount and loan maturity. To circumvent the endogeneity of the loan currency to the granted loan 
amount and loan maturity we use the predetermined requested loan size and maturity. 
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wholesale funding measures the Bank’s funding sourced from financial institutions 
or capital markets denominated in EUR as a share of its total liabilities. EUR 
customer funding measures the Banks’ funding obtained from customer deposits 
denominated in EUR as a share of its total liabilities. Both indicators of the Bank’s 
funding structure are calculated using balance sheet information from the month 
prior to a loan disbursement. 
The Bank’s currency decision should further depend on the macroeconomic 
conditions at the time of loan disbursement. We therefore include the variable Spread 
differential which measures the difference between the intermediation spread in EUR 
and BGN to control for the mark-up it can earn by lending in either currency. The 
intermediation spreads are calculated as the short-term lending rates minus the 
household term deposit rates in EUR or BGN respectively. Finally, we include the 
variable Aggregate FX loans, which captures the share of foreign currency loans to 
corporate borrowers in the entire banking system as a measure of the competition the 
Bank faces in the foreign currency loan market. All variables are calculated with 
values from in the month of the loan disbursement 
 
3.3.5 Summary statistics 
Table 10 provides summary statistics for our explanatory variables. The table 
shows that firms in our sample are predominantly sole proprietorships with mean 
assets of less than 60,000 EUR and an average age of less than ten years. The loans 
they receive are on average smaller than 10,000 EUR, with no loan in the sample 
exceeding 1 million EUR. The average loan maturity is less than three years, while 
the maximum maturity is twenty years.  
The summary statistics for the macroeconomic conditions show that the Interest 
differential was positive throughout our observation period confirming that firms did 
have a cost-incentive to demand EUR loans. The Spread differential between EUR 
and BGN funds ranged from -2.4% to 2.1% during our observation period suggesting 
no clear pattern which currency was more profitable for banks. The variables EUR 
wholesale funding and EUR customer funding show that a substantial share of the 
Bank’s funding is in foreign currency. Not surprising for a bank with a strategic 
foreign investor, wholesale funding in EUR is twice as important as retail funding in 
EUR. 
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for all explanatory variables. See Table 8 for definitions and 
sources of the variables. For all log-transformed variables the statistics are calculated by using the 
original values. 
     
  N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Firm characteristics         
EUR account 105,589 0.01 0 1 
Disposable income 105,589 850 0 1,154,455 
Leverage 105,589 0.15 0 1 
Sole proprietorship 105,589 0.90 0 1 
Bank relationship 105,589 9.86 0 71 
Assets 105,589 57,528 2 12,835,983 
Age 105,589 8.45 0 107 
Loan characteristics     
Requested amount 105,589 8,671 51 1,700,000 
Requested maturity 105,589 32 1 240 
Mortgage loan 105,589 0.09 0 1 
Amount 105,589 7,727 61 1,000,000 
Maturity 105,589 27.77 1 240 
Annuity loan 105,589 0.74 0 1 
Interest rate  105,589 14.66 5.75 19.88 
Macroeconomic conditions     
Interest differential 54 1.36 0.36 3.22 
EU announcement 54 0.22 0 1 
Inflation volatility 54 0.98 0.45 1.71 
Spread differential 54 -0.36 -2.40 2.08 
Aggregate FX loans 54 0.63 0.54 0.68 
Bank funding     
EUR wholesale funding 54 0.26 0.12 0.35 
EUR customer funding 54 0.13 0.04 0.24 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Univariate tests 
The characteristics of those firms which request local currency loans differ 
strongly from those which request foreign currency loans. Columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 11 display sample means by requested currency, while column (3) displays 
results of difference tests between the two sub-samples for each variable. The table 
supports the hypothesis that firms which request foreign currency loans are more 
likely to have foreign currency income (EUR account) and face lower distress costs 
in case they default (not Sole proprietorship). We also find that firms which request 
EUR loans have higher income (Disposable income), are more transparent towards 
the bank (Bank relationship), and are larger (Assets) and older (Age). 
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Firms which request EUR loans also differ from firms requesting BGN loans 
concerning other loan terms. They request larger loans (Requested amount), longer-
term loans (Requested maturity) and are more likely to request a Mortgage loan. 
These findings suggest that absolute interest rate advantages (on large loans) and the 
anticipation of the Bank’s reluctance to provide long-term loans in local currency 
may be driving requested loan currency. 
 
Table 11. Univariate tests 
This table reports univariate tests for our explanatory variables. Columns (1,2,4,5,7,8) report 
subsample means fore each variable. For all log-transformed variables the statistics are calculated by 
using the original values. Columns (3,6,9) report the results of two-sided t-tests. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10-level. See Table 8 for definitions and sources of all 
variables.  
         
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Requested currency BGN EUR   BGN EUR 
Granted currency     BGN EUR   BGN EUR  
Observations 101,350 4,239   99,480 1,870   296 3,943   
Firm characteristics   
         
EUR account 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.02 0.02  
Disposable income 688 4,720 *** 647 2,854 *** 2,284 4,903 * 
Leverage 0.15 0.22 *** 0.14 0.22 *** 0.19 0.22 *** 
Sole proprietorship 0.91 0.46 *** 0.92 0.54 *** 0.65 0.44 *** 
Bank relationship 9.55 17.22 *** 9.47 14.20 *** 13.77 17.48 *** 
Assets 43,579 390,439 *** 40,196 223,398 *** 193,155 405,268 *** 
Age 8.41 9.19 *** 8.40 8.97 *** 8.80 9.21   
Loan application 
           
Requested amount 6,318 64,929 *** 5,699 39,261 *** 27,896 67,709 *** 
Requested maturity 31.08 50.94 *** 30.64 54.40 *** 39.96 51.76 *** 
Mortgage loan 0.07 0.68 *** 0.06 0.54 *** 0.27 0.71 *** 
Macroeconomic conditions           
Interest differential 1.25 1.28 *** 1.25 1.25   1.17 1.29 *** 
EU announcement 0.31 0.26 *** 0.31 0.59 *** 0.31 0.26 * 
Inflation volatility 0.93 0.94 ** 0.93 0.90 *** 0.93 0.94 
 
Spread differential -0.24 -0.28 *** -0.24 0.04 *** -0.24 -0.28  
Aggregate FX loans 0.63 0.63 *** 0.63 0.64 *** 0.64 0.63   
Bank funding            
EUR wholesale funding 0.25 0.26 *** 0.25 0.22 *** 0.25 0.26 * 
EUR customer funding 0.15 0.14 *** 0.15 0.17 *** 0.15 0.14 ** 
 
At the macroeconomic level we find that firms are more likely to request EUR 
loans when the Interest differential is higher. Surprisingly, we find that firms are less 
likely to request EUR loans after the EU announcement, suggesting that this 
announcement may have not only reduced expected exchange rate volatility, but also 
increased the credibility of future domestic monetary policy. Finally, we find that the 
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Bank’s liability structure (EUR wholesale funding, EUR customer funding) has very 
little impact on the firms’ currency requests. This supports our model building above 
where we include proxies for the Bank’s refinancing structure to explain the foreign 
currency choice only on the supply side.  
In Table 11 we also report univariate tests comparing those firms which were 
granted foreign currency loans to those which were granted BGN loans. Columns (4-
6) present statistics and tests for loans requested in BGN, while columns (7-9) 
present statistics and tests for loans requested in EUR. 
From columns (4-6) we see that the Bank’s decision to alter the loan currency 
from BGN to EUR seems to be correlated with lower observable credit risk and 
greater financial transparency of the firm (EUR account, Disposable income, Bank 
relationship, Assets, Age). However, we also see that in those instances where the 
Bank altered the currency from BGN to EUR, the requested loan amount and 
maturity are higher than in those cases where BGN was granted. While the first 
observation (larger requested amount) may be in line with the firms’ objective of 
achieving greater (absolute) interest savings, the longer maturity for loans switched 
to EUR suggests that the Bank may be shifting exchange rate risk to its clients. 
Comparing the macroeconomic conditions and bank-funding at the time when 
loans are disbursed, we find that the Bank is more likely to switch a loan from BGN 
to EUR after the EU announcement and when the Spread differential, i.e. its earnings 
on intermediating EUR funds, is higher. Moreover, we find that the Bank is more 
likely to switch a loan from BGN to EUR in periods where it has more funding in 
EUR from depositors (EUR customer funding) and less EUR financing from 
financial institutions or the capital market (EUR wholesale funding). 
For firms which request EUR, columns (7-9) of Table 11 show that firms which 
are switched to BGN can be characterized by higher credit risk and lower financial 
transparency. These firms are smaller, have less disposable income, are more often 
sole proprietorships and have shorter relationships with the Bank than firms who 
requested and received EUR. Confirming our findings above, in cases where the 
Bank alters loan currency from EUR to BGN the requested loan size is smaller and 
the requested maturity is shorter. 
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3.4.2 Multivariate regressions: The firms’ choice of loan currency 
Table 12 displays our regression results for firms’ decisions to request foreign 
currency (EUR) rather than local currency (BGN) loans based on estimations for 
both the full sample and the panel of repeat clients. All estimations include industry 
and branch dummies. Standard errors are presented in brackets and for regressions 
with the full sample are adjusted for clustering at the industry-branch level. 
Estimations for repeat clients include firm-level random effects to account for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity.31 
 
Full sample effects of firm-, loan- and macroeconomic variables 
Column (1) of Table 12 presents marginal effects from a logit estimation for the 
full sample. The results confirm our main hypotheses: firms are more likely to 
request EUR loans if the interest rate advantage on EUR loans is higher, if they have 
foreign income, and if they have lower distress costs. 
The request for a foreign currency loan is positively related to our indicator of 
foreign currency revenue, EUR account. Also, the impact of firm-level distress costs 
is in line with theoretical predictions. Firms with higher potential distress cost 
(higher Leverage, Sole proprietorship) are less likely to demand EUR loans. Further 
supporting this result we find that larger firms (higher Assets) are more likely to 
demand foreign currency loans.  
Contrary to our expectations, firms with higher debt-service to income ratios 
(lower Disposable income and higher Requested amount) are more likely to demand 
foreign currency loans. An explanation for this result could be that firms with lower 
disposable incomes are less able to afford the higher interest rates on local currency 
loans, and that the absolute interest rate savings from borrowing in foreign currency 
increases with loan size. 
Our results do not support the conjecture that opaqueness in the bank-firm 
relationship encourages (local currency earning) firms to request foreign currency 
loans. The significantly positive coefficient of Bank relationship suggests that more 
transparent firms (to the Bank) are more likely to request a foreign currency loan. 
This finding confirms the results of Brown, Ongena and Yesin (2009) and may be 
                                                 
31
 We use firm random effects rather than fixed effects so as not to exclude the firms which request 
the same currency for each of their loans. In our analysis of the subsample of repeat clients we drop 
Age as it increases parallel to Bank relationship over a sequence of several loans. 
 69 
explained by firms’ anticipation that banks may only offer foreign currency loans to 
firms they know well. 
Our Industry dummies show that firms operating in industries that are likely to 
have foreign currency earnings such as trade, transport and tourism display a larger 
likelihood to request EUR loans than borrowers from other industries like services or 
agriculture (not reported in the table). This provides further evidence that foreign 
currency income increases a firm’s likelihood to request a foreign currency loan. The 
Branch dummies (not reported in the table) confirm these findings showing that firms 
located in Sofia as well as in the touristic and industrial centers of the country (e.g. 
Varna, Burgas, Ruse) are more likely to request EUR loans than firms in other areas. 
We find that firms with a longer Requested maturity are more likely to request 
foreign currency loans. This result is surprising, given that the risk of adverse 
exchange-rate movements is likely to be higher in the long run. One explanation for 
this finding is that firms anticipate that the Bank may be reluctant to offer long-term 
loans in local currency. Also, longer-term loans may be particularly used for 
financing real estate, a market which is mainly transacting in EUR. This is confirmed 
by the finding that firms requesting a Mortgage loan are more likely to request EUR. 
At the macroeconomic level we find that firms are more likely to request EUR 
loans when the Interest rate differential is higher. However, we do not find that 
lower expected exchange rate volatility as measured by EU announcement increases 
foreign currency loan demand. This result may be driven by the fact that the 
announcement to join the EU also stabilized expectations about domestic monetary 
policy. While Inflation volatility does not influence currency requests, the possibility 
to get foreign currency loans from other financial institutions (Aggregate FX loans) 
reduces firms’ likelihood to request EUR loans at this Bank. 
 
Subsamples of loans with amount over 5,000 EUR, medium loans and non-mortgage 
loans 
Our descriptive statistics in Table 9 show that small loans (below 50,000 EUR) 
make up the overwhelming share (98%) of our observations. As discussed in section 
3.3.2, loans of this size are standardized products with fixed loan conditions (interest 
rate, collateral requirements). Thus, foreign currency demand among small loans 
may not only be driven by firm characteristics, but also by the expectations of 
entrepreneurs that they do not meet the Bank’s fixed criteria for such loans. As a 
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result, the full-sample results presented in column (1) may be dominated by the large 
number of small loans, for which firm characteristics, other loan terms and 
macroeconomic conditions may have less influence on requested currency. Column 
(2) of Table 12 therefore displays results for the subsample of medium loans (above 
50,000 EUR) only. The results in this column reveal that a firm’s foreign currency 
income (EUR account) and distress costs (Leverage, Sole proprietorship) as well as 
the macroeconomic environment (with the exception of the EU announcement) do 
not play a role in the currency decision of firms requesting medium loans. By 
contrast, the effects of firm transparency, size and income (Bank relationship, Assets, 
Disposable income) as well as other requested loan terms (Requested amount, 
Requested maturity) are stronger when only considering medium loans. We conclude 
that while our quantitative results vary for several explanatory variables, our 
qualitative results from the full-sample regressions seem to be robust for both loan 
types.  
Figure 5 shows that firms hardly request foreign currency when they want loans 
with a volume below 5,000 EUR. The full-sample results presented in column (1) of 
Table 12 may thus be weakened by the large share of such loans in our sample. 
Column (3) of Table 12 examines whether the determinants of requested loan 
currency differ for the subsample of loans with amounts over 5,000 EUR. The results 
displayed in this column confirm those of our full-sample qualitatively. However, the 
economic effect of all explanatory variables is stronger confirming our conjecture 
that the full sample results are somewhat weakened by the large number of very 
small loans. 
Figure 5 further shows that long-term loans (loans exceeding 5 years in maturity) 
have a high probability to be requested and granted in EUR. These long-term loans 
are to a large extent mortgage loans. Thus the observed relation between maturity 
and foreign currency denomination of loans may be driven by the fact that the 
Bulgarian housing market is denominated in EUR. Column (4) displays regression 
results for the subsample of non-mortgage loans and shows that the majority of 
previous findings also qualitatively holds in this subsample. However, as conjectured 
we find that Requested maturity does not seem to influence the firms’ currency 
request when we exclude mortgage loans. 
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Table 12. Foreign currency loan demand 
The dependent variable EUR requested equals one if the firm requested a EUR loan and equals zero 
otherwise, while all explanatory variables are defined in Table 8. Columns (1) to (4) report marginal 
effects from logit estimations and columns (5) and (6) report OLS estimates. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets and account for clustering at the branch-industry level. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All clients Repeat clients 
 Full sample 
Medium 
loans 
Amount > 
5.000 
EUR 
Without 
mortgages 
Including interaction 
terms with Later loan 
Coefficients Main effects 
Main 
effects 
Main 
effects 
Main 
effects Main effects Interactions 
EUR account 0.011*** 0.041 0.052*** 0.002 0.069*** -0.038* 
 [0.004] [0.100] [0.016] [0.002] [0.020] [0.020] 
Disposable income -0.001*** -0.082*** -0.006*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.013] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Leverage -0.002*** -0.099 -0.008** -0.002* -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.001] [0.064] [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.008] 
Sole proprietorship -0.002*** 0.040 -0.012*** -0.002*** -0.100*** 0.002 
 [0.000] [0.034] [0.002] [0.000] [0.005] [0.005] 
Bank relationship 0.000*** 0.002** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001** -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Assets 0.003*** 0.075*** 0.014*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 [0.000] [0.014] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
Age 0.000 -0.063** 0.000 0.000   
  [0.000] [0.031] [0.001] [0.000]     
Requested amount 0.006*** 0.228*** 0.030*** 0.003*** 0.029*** -0.003 
 [0.000] [0.024] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] 
Requested maturity 0.003*** 0.178*** 0.016*** 0.000 0.004 0.016*** 
 [0.000] [0.018] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.003] 
Mortgage loan 0.013*** 0.130 0.056***   0.103*** 0.093*** 
  [0.002] [0.080] [0.005]   [0.004] [0.005] 
Interest differential 0.001*** 0.027 0.004** 0.000* 0.004* -0.002 
 [0.000] [0.023] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.003] 
EU announcement -0.002*** -0.083*** -0.012*** -0.002*** 0.001 -0.006 
 [0.000] [0.032] [0.002] [0.000] [0.005] [0.005] 
Inflation volatility -0.000 0.054 -0.002 -0.000 -0.008 -0.006 
 [0.001] [0.085] [0.005] [0.001] [0.009] [0.010] 
Aggregate FX loans -0.023*** 0.219 -0.166*** -0.023*** -0.120* -0.096 
  [0.009] [0.889] [0.044] [0.006] [0.070] [0.084] 
Later loan      -0.043  
          [0.063]   
Observations 105,107 2,218 40,395 95,146  69,178 
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit  OLS 
R² ( pseudo/overall) 0.446 0.187 0.383 0.320  0.273 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes  yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes  yes 
Firm random effects no no no no   yes 
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First loans versus later loans of repeat clients 
Firms’ anticipations about the willingness of the Bank to provide foreign or local 
currency loans may influence their requested loan currency. This raises doubts about 
whether our data allows us really to analyze the firm’s “pure” demand for foreign 
currency loans at all. Our full sample results in column (1) actually suggest that the 
loan currency request by firms may be partly driven by their anticipation of the 
Bank’s behavior: This may explain why more transparent firms and firms with 
longer requested maturity are more likely to request foreign currency loans. 
We use our panel data of repeat clients to study whether “anticipation effects” 
may be driving the requested loan currency of firms. We conjecture that anticipation 
effects should be stronger if the firm is actually familiar with the Bank’s loan supply 
behavior. If this is the case we should see differences in the determinants of 
requested loan currency for the first loan of a firm compared to its later loans with 
the Bank. In columns (5) and (6) of Table 12 we examine whether the determinants 
of requested loan currency differ between first loans and later loans for our panel of 
repeat clients. The two columns present estimates from a single OLS estimation,32 
with the main effects of all explanatory variables reported in column (5) and 
interaction terms with Later loan reported in column (6). 
The interaction terms in column (6) suggest that the anticipation effect may affect 
our results for loan characteristics more than those for the firm characteristics and 
macroeconomic conditions. The interaction terms of Later loan with Requested 
maturity and Mortgage loan are significantly positive suggesting that firms learn 
over time that longer-term and mortgage loans are more likely to be granted in 
foreign currency. This learning effect is especially strong for the maturity request 
because Requested maturity does not at all influence a firm’s currency request at the 
first loan. In contrast, besides a weaker effect for our indicator of firms’ foreign 
currency earnings and a stronger effect for firm size, there are no significant 
differences in the firm-level and macroeconomic determinants of requested loan 
currency between first and later loans. 
 
                                                 
32
 We resort to OLS estimation because of the difficulties in interpreting marginal effects of 
interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton (2003)). 
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3.4.3 Multivariate regressions: The Bank’s choice of loan currency 
Table 13 and Table 14 report our results for the Bank’s currency decision. We 
observe the Bank’s currency decision both for those loans which were requested in 
foreign currency (EUR) and for those which were requested in local currency (BGN). 
We can therefore examine the Bank’s currency choice conditional on the firms’ 
requested currency. As Figure 4 shows, a substantial share of loans which firms 
request in BGN are switched by the Bank to EUR, while few loans requested in EUR 
are switched to BGN. Our attention is therefore focused on those loans which are 
requested in BGN. Here we want to identify the firm-, bank- and macro-level drivers 
behind the Bank’s switching of loans to foreign currency (EUR).  
Table 13 reports our analysis of the Bank’s currency choice for loans requested in 
BGN. Panel A reports baseline results for the full sample and the sample of repeat 
clients. The instrumental variable analysis presented in Panel B accounts for the 
possible endogeneity of the Bank’s refinancing structure. 
Column (1) of Panel A displays our results for the full sample of loans requested 
in local currency. We find that the Bank’s currency decision to offer EUR is related 
to indicators of observable credit risk. The Bank is more likely to grant a EUR loan 
to firms which have foreign currency income (EUR account), are not a Sole 
proprietorship and which are larger (Assets). 
The Requested amount, Requested maturity and purpose of the loan (Mortgage 
loan) strongly affect the Bank’s currency decision. The fact that mortgage loans are 
more likely to be granted in EUR may be related to lower credit risk, as the collateral 
of these loans (houses, which as mentioned above are transacted in EUR) is 
denominated in EUR. The fact that large loans and loans with longer maturity are 
more likely to be granted in EUR provides support for our conjecture that the Bank 
may not trust (future) domestic monetary policy. 
Our full sample results suggest, importantly, that the Bank is more likely to switch 
loans from BGN to EUR when its share of liabilities in foreign currency (EUR 
wholesale funding, EUR customer funding) is higher. We find that the economic 
magnitude and significance of customer funding in foreign currency is greater than 
that of wholesale funding in foreign currency. This finding contradicts common 
wisdom that foreign currency borrowing in Eastern Europe is strongly driven by 
EUR wholesale funding of subsidiaries by their parent banks and international 
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financial institution (e.g. the EBRD). Rather, our findings suggest that the 
“dollarization” of customer deposits is a key driver of foreign currency lending. 
Considering the actual macroeconomic conditions during our observation period 
we find that the Bank’s decision to switch loans from local currency to foreign 
currency is positively related to perceived exchange rate stability (EU 
announcement). By contrast, current domestic Inflation volatility does not lead the 
Bank to lend more in foreign currency. We further find that the Bank’s lending 
behavior is partly related to competitive conditions. While lending in EUR is 
unrelated to the intermediation spread on foreign versus local funds (Spread 
differential), the Bank does grant less loans in EUR when the share of loans in the 
entire banking sector is higher (Aggregate FX loans). 
Columns (2-4) of Panel A report results for the subsamples of Medium loans, 
loans exceeding 5,000 EUR and Non-mortgage loans. The results presented in these 
columns largely confirm our full-sample results. One notable difference for the 
subsample of Medium loans (column 2) is that the firm-level indicators of income, 
distress costs and transparency are not significant. This result seems to be driven by 
the substantially lower number of observations in this specification. One notable 
result from column (4) is that, even when we exclude the sample of mortgage loans, 
the Bank is more likely to switch large and long-term loans from local to foreign 
currency. 
Column (5) reports panel results for our sample of repeat clients, again confirming 
the qualitative results from our full sample. Most notably, we find that the effect of 
customer funding in EUR is still positive in our panel analysis. Thus if the same 
client approaches the Bank at different times, in both instances asking for a loan in 
local currency, the Bank is more likely to switch the loan to foreign currency if it has 
more foreign currency deposits. 
Could our finding that the Bank’s funding in foreign currency is positively 
correlated with its lending in foreign currency be driven by reverse causality? We 
believe that our findings are not subject to endogeneity bias because Panel A in 
Table 13 examines the probability of the Bank offering a foreign currency loan to 
clients who requested a loan in local currency. It is therefore unlikely that the 
correlation between funding and lending is driven by firms’ demand for foreign 
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To rule out potential endogeneity of foreign currency funding, we nevertheless 
conduct an instrumental variable analysis. We conjecture that wholesale funding in 
foreign currency is more likely to be endogenous to the demand for foreign currency 
loans than customer deposits, which were shown to be sluggish.33 We therefore 
instrument our variable EUR wholesale funding with the spread on sovereign debt of 
Bulgaria (denominated in EUR) over that of Germany. As shown by Durbin and Ng 
(2005) the sovereign spread affects the cost of international funding for domestic 
enterprises (including banks) and therefore should affect the incentives of our Bank 
to borrow wholesale in EUR. At the same time the sovereign spread of Bulgaria (on 
its EUR debt) should hardly be related to the demand for EUR loans by small firms 
in the country. The results presented in Panel B of Table 13 confirm our result that 
Bank funding in foreign currency has a positive impact on Bank lending in foreign 
currency, and that this effect is stronger for customer than for wholesale funding. 
Table 14 examines the Bank’s currency choice for those firms which request a 
loan in foreign currency (EUR). Confirming our results in Table 13 we find that the 
Bank is more likely to grant a EUR loan to those clients that display lower credit risk 
(more Assets, not Sole proprietorship) and want long-term (Requested maturity) or 
Mortgage loans. By contrast, we find little evidence that lending in foreign currency 
to clients that request foreign currency is driven by macroeconomic conditions or 
bank funding34. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 The "sluggishness" of retail deposits is a well-established stylized fact (Song and Thakor (2007)).  
34
 The maturity of the Bank’s refinancing may also determine its lending decisions. Unfortunately, we 
do not have sufficiently detailed information to control for this aspect. 
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Table 13. Foreign currency loan supply: Loans requested in BGN 
 
Panel A. Logit regressions 
This table reports marginal effects from logit estimations for the sample of loans requested in BGN 
only. The dependent variable EUR granted equals one if the firm received a EUR loan and equals zero 
otherwise, while all explanatory variables are defined in Table 8. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets and account for clustering at the industry-branch level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Full sample 
Medium 
loans 
Amount > 
5.000 EUR 
Without 
mortgages 
Repeat 
clients 
EUR account 0.004*** 0.028 0.018** 0.001* 0.006 
 [0.001] [0.121] [0.009] [0.001] [0.004] 
Disposable income 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.018] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Leverage -0.000 -0.056 -0.002 -0.000* 0.002 
 [0.000] [0.073] [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] 
Sole proprietorship -0.001** -0.005 -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.003*** 
 [0.000] [0.033] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] 
Bank relationship -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Assets 0.001*** 0.010 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 
 [0.000] [0.019] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age -0.000 -0.034 -0.000 0.000  
  [0.000] [0.035] [0.001] [0.000]   
Requested amount 0.002*** 0.033 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 
 [0.000] [0.028] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Requested maturity 0.002*** 0.247*** 0.013*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 
 [0.000] [0.021] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Mortgage loan 0.006*** 0.116*** 0.034***  0.015*** 
  [0.001] [0.030] [0.004]   [0.002] 
Spread differential -0.000 -0.012 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
EU announcement 0.003*** 0.111 0.017*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 
 [0.001] [0.088] [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] 
Inflation volatility -0.002*** 0.072 -0.013*** -0.001*** -0.005** 
 [0.000] [0.114] [0.004] [0.000] [0.002] 
Aggregate FX loans -0.040*** -1.119 -0.286*** -0.020*** -0.150*** 
  [0.006] [1.092] [0.037] [0.003] [0.025] 
EUR wholesale funding 0.003* 0.761** 0.023* 0.000 0.013 
 [0.002] [0.305] [0.014] [0.002] [0.008] 
EUR customer funding 0.019*** 0.622 0.136*** 0.006** 0.088*** 
  [0.004] [0.879] [0.028] [0.003] [0.019] 
Observations 101,049 1,017 36,505 93,981 66,003 
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
R² (pseudo) 0.418 0.221 0.323 0.368  
Wald Chi²-statistic for model goodness-of-fit   1,133.55*** 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm random effects no no no no yes 
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Panel B. Instrumental variable approach 
This table reports marginal effects from IV probit estimations in columns (1) to (4) and OLS estimates 
in column (5) for the sample of loans requested in BGN only. The dependent variable EUR granted 
equals one if the firm received a EUR loan and equals zero otherwise. We instrument the variable 
EUR wholesale funding with the spread between Bulgarian and German sovereign debt in EUR 
obtained on a monthly basis for our whole observation period from Bloomberg. All explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 8. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at 
the industry-branch level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Athrho is the 
estimate of the inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ, the correlation among the errors in the first and 
second-stage regression equations. The table also provides Wald Chi² statistics for the independence 
of the two equations and the model goodness-of-fit. 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Full sample 
Medium 
loans 
Amount > 
5.000 EUR 
Without 
mortgages 
Repeat 
clients 
EUR wholesale funding 0.026* 0.386 0.140** 0.008 0.100 
 [0.015] [2.551] [0.055] [0.008] [0.118] 
EUR customer funding 0.034*** 0.323 0.276*** 0.011 0.216*** 
  [0.013] [2.644] [0.060] [0.007] [0.071] 
athrho  -0.208** 0.049  -0.114** -0.162  
  [0.105] [0.298] [0.046] [0.146]   
Observations 101,049 1,017 36,505 93,981 66,003 
Method IV probit IV probit IV probit IV probit IV OLS 
Wald Chi²-test of exogeneity 3.91** 0.03 6.17** 1.23  
Wald Chi²-statistic for model 
goodness-of-fit 3,935.96*** 327.39*** 3,443.31*** 3,046.96***  
R² (overall)     0.117 
Firm characteristics, Loan 
application, Macroeconomic 
conditions yes yes yes yes yes 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm random effects no no no no no 
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Table 14. Foreign currency loan supply: Loans requested in EUR 
This table reports marginal effects from logit estimations for the subsample of loans requested in EUR 
only. The dependent variable EUR granted equals one if the firm received a EUR loan and equals zero 
otherwise, while all explanatory variables are defined in Table 8. Standard errors are reported in 
brackets and account for clustering at the industry-branch level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Full sample 
Medium 
loans 
Amount > 
5.000 EUR 
Without 
mortgages 
Repeat 
clients 
EUR account 0.007  -0.002 -0.052 0.016 
 [0.012]  [0.013] [0.082] [0.019] 
Disposable income -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.010] [0.004] 
Leverage -0.005 -0.010 -0.011 -0.041 -0.015 
 [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.039] [0.019] 
Sole proprietorship -0.010* 0.005 -0.009* -0.062*** -0.011 
 [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.017] [0.009] 
Bank relationship 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Assets 0.017*** 0.002 0.014*** 0.061*** 0.023*** 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.010] [0.005] 
Age -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009  
  [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.016]   
Requested amount 0.000 0.006 0.000 -0.022 -0.003 
 [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.015] [0.005] 
Requested maturity 0.005 0.010*** 0.008** -0.018 0.019*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.013] [0.006] 
Mortgage loan 0.085*** 0.027* 0.071***  0.064*** 
  [0.013] [0.016] [0.014]   [0.012] 
Spread differential 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.004 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.012] [0.004] 
EU announcement 0.010 -0.008 0.012 -0.034 0.004 
 [0.011] [0.017] [0.011] [0.047] [0.018] 
Inflation volatility -0.016 -0.024 -0.018 -0.085 -0.027 
 [0.014] [0.017] [0.013] [0.053] [0.026] 
Aggregate FX loans -0.161 -0.073 -0.193 -1.237** -0.442 
  [0.129] [0.199] [0.133] [0.534] [0.283] 
EUR wholesale funding 0.038 0.053 0.033 -0.101 0.204** 
 [0.051] [0.062] [0.059] [0.181] [0.092] 
EUR customer funding -0.092 -0.032 -0.127 0.393 0.226 
  [0.127] [0.145] [0.131] [0.380] [0.215] 
Observations 4,222 935 3,932 1,323 3,175 
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
R² (pseudo) 0.211 0.162 0.159 0.192  
Wald Chi²-statistic for model goodness-of-fit   104.08*** 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm random effects no no no no yes 
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3.4.4 Switching loan currency and credit risk 
Figure 4 shows that nearly one-third of the foreign currency loans of the Bank 
were initially requested in local currency. Our results from Table 13, column (4) 
suggest that this finding is partly driven by the Bank’s reluctance to lend large 
amounts for longer maturities in local currency and by matching of the currency 
structure of its assets to that of its liabilities. In Table 15 we examine what this 
implies for the quality of those loans which are switched from local to foreign 
currency. Comparing those EUR loans which were requested in BGN to those which 
were requested in EUR we examine whether the bank consciously takes on greater 
credit risk by switching the currency of loans. 
Unfortunately we do not have precise indicators of the ex-post performance of the 
loans in our sample. Moreover, given that the currency board of the BGN to the EUR 
held throughout our observation period, there can be no exchange-rate induced 
defaults on foreign currency loans. However, we can assess the ex-ante credit risk 
associated with each loan by examining the pricing behavior of the bank. If loans 
which are switched from BGN to EUR involve a higher default probability we 
should find that the Bank charges a higher risk premium and thus a higher interest 
rate on these loans than on otherwise identical loans, which were requested in EUR. 
Note that we can conduct this exercise for medium loans only, as small loans from 
the Bank are granted at standardized interest rates. 
Table 15 examines the pricing of medium loans denominated in EUR, relating the 
nominal interest rate to firm characteristics, actual loan terms (Amount, Maturity, 
Annuity loan, Mortgage loan) and the requested currency (BGN requested). In all 
specifications we control for macroeconomic conditions and bank-funding with year-
quarter fixed effects. The baseline results reported in column (1) for all clients 
confirm that the bank does practice risk adjusted pricing for the segment of medium 
loans. Firms which are more likely to have foreign income (EUR account), are more 
transparent (not Sole proprietorship, Bank relationship) and are larger (Assets) pay 
lower interest rates on EUR loans. Firms with larger loans and shorter maturities also 
pay lower interest rates, while mortgage loans carry higher interest rates. The 
repayment schedule (Annuity loan) does not seem to affect pricing. These findings 
are confirmed by panel results for our subsample of repeat clients in column (2). 
For the full sample and the panel of repeat clients, we find that firms with loans 
which were switched from BGN to EUR pay significantly higher interest rates than 
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firms with loans which were requested and granted in EUR. The results in columns 
(1) and (2) suggest that loans with switched currency have on average 12-18 basis 
points higher rates. At first sight, this effect appears small compared to the average 
interest rate of 10.2% for this sub-sample, as well as to the dispersion of interest rates 
for this sample which varied depending on year-quarter between 500 and 600 basis 
points. However, the difference is similar in magnitude to the effect on interest rates 
of other unfavorable firm characteristics such as being a Sole proprietorship or not 
having a foreign currency account (EUR account). 
The pricing of loans which were switched from BGN to EUR suggests that by 
offering these loans in foreign currency the Bank may be exposing the firm to higher 
default risk and itself to higher credit risk. However, higher interest rates for 
switched loans may also be explained by market power and bargaining by the Bank. 
During our observation period, interest rates on medium loans in BGN are on 
average 38 basis points higher than interest rates on medium loans in EUR. As firms 
which requested loans in BGN were prepared to pay the higher interest rate, the Bank 
may be simply reaping part of the “saved interest expenses” for the firm by charging 
higher interest on switched loans. 
In column (3) of Table 15 we examine whether the higher interest rate on 
switched loans may be explained by market power of the Bank rather than higher 
credit risk. To this end, we include not only the main term of BGN requested but also 
its interaction term with the variable Interest differential, which captures the (risk-
free) difference in local currency and foreign currency interest rates. If market power 
alone explains the higher pricing of switched loans we should find that the mark-up 
of the Bank on switched loans is higher in months when the interest differential 
between BGN and EUR funds is higher. Thus we would expect the interaction term 
of BGN requested * Interest differential to be significantly positive. The results in 
column (3) show, however, that the main effect of BGN requested remains 
significant and positive while the interaction term BGN requested * Interest 
differential is not significant. We conclude therefore that the higher relative pricing 
of loans which are switched from BGN to EUR reflects higher default and credit risk 
rather than bargaining by the Bank. 
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Table 15. Interest rate on medium loans in EUR 
This table reports estimations for the sample of medium loans in EUR only. The dependent variable 
Interest rate is the nominal interest rate charged on the loan at disbursement, while all explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 8. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at 
the branch-industry level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. 
    
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Full sample Repeat clients Full sample 
EUR account -0.512** -0.287 -0.509** 
 [0.201] [0.228] [0.197] 
Disposable income -0.091*** -0.068* -0.091*** 
 [0.031] [0.035] [0.031] 
Leverage -0.625*** -0.657*** -0.626*** 
 [0.164] [0.171] [0.164] 
Sole proprietorship 0.266*** 0.271*** 0.266*** 
 [0.054] [0.084] [0.054] 
Bank relationship -0.004* -0.005** -0.004* 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Assets -0.104* -0.133*** -0.104* 
 [0.053] [0.040] [0.053] 
Age 0.063  0.063 
  [0.056]   [0.055] 
Amount -0.339*** -0.278*** -0.340*** 
 [0.064] [0.057] [0.064] 
Maturity 0.180*** 0.155*** 0.180*** 
 [0.062] [0.056] [0.061] 
Annuity loan 0.042 0.014 0.044 
 [0.195] [0.139] [0.195] 
Mortgage loan 0.455*** 0.252** 0.455*** 
  [0.126] [0.127] [0.126] 
BGN requested 0.181*** 0.122* 0.318*** 
 [0.063] [0.073] [0.118] 
BGN requested* Interest differential   -0.112 
      [0.091] 
Constant 17.203*** 16.870*** 17.242*** 
  
[0.553] [0.702] [0.553] 
Observations 1,473 1,168 1,473 
Method OLS OLS OLS 
R² (adjusted  / overall) 0.450 0.463 0.450 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes 
Quarter fixed effects yes yes yes 
Firm random effects no yes no 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this paper we examine the currency denomination of loans extended to small 
firms by one retail bank in Bulgaria. Our analysis is based on credit file data for 
105,589 loans over the period 2003-2007. In contrast to existing studies, our data 
allows us to disentangle demand and supply side drivers of the currency 
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denomination of loans. We observe not only the actual currency denomination of the 
loan extended, but also the loan currency that was requested by the firms in their loan 
application. We can therefore identify how clients’ demand for foreign currency 
loans and the Bank’s supply of such loans are related to firm characteristics, other 
loan terms, macroeconomic conditions and the Bank’s liability structure. Our results 
suggest that foreign currency borrowing in Eastern Europe is at least partly supply-
driven, with banks hesitant to lend long-term in local currency and eager to match the 
currency structure of their assets and liabilities. 
Our results have implications for policy makers throughout Eastern Europe who 
have recently taken measures to discourage foreign currency borrowing in the retail 
sector (Rosenberg and Tirpak (2008)). In Hungary, Poland and Latvia, for example, 
banks are now forced to disclose the exchange rate risks involved in foreign currency 
borrowing and have had to tighten eligibility criteria for such loans. As we find that 
foreign currency borrowing in Emerging Europe seems to be driven not only by 
demand but also by supply factors, measures that address only more transparency to 
increase borrowers’ awareness of the inherent risks may not be enough to 
significantly curb the extent of foreign currency lending. When foreign currency 
lending is at least partly supply driven, measures like stronger provisioning 
requirements on foreign currency compared to local currency loans as they were 
taken in Romania and Croatia should be more effective. 
Our results suggest that wholesale foreign currency funding of banks in Eastern 
Europe is not the key driver of foreign currency lending in the region. We find that 
foreign currency deposits by customers have a much stronger impact on foreign 
currency lending of our Bank. This finding suggests that recent attempts to foster 
local currency wholesale funding in Eastern Europe may not be sufficient to reduce 
foreign currency lending.35 Instead, credible macroeconomic policies which 
encourage customers to save in local currency may be more promising. A credible 
macroeconomic environment would also make banks less hesitant to extend large 
and long-term loans in local currency.  
                                                 
35
 Some hedging and local lending facilities have already been established, e.g. the special purpose 
funds TCX, MFX Solutions and MICROFIX (see Abrams (2008)). The President of the EBRD, 
Thomas Mirow, highlighted several new proposals in a speech at the 2010 joint conference of the IIF 
and EBRD on Financial Systems in Emerging Europe in Zagreb 
(http://www.ebrd.com/pages/news/speeches/mirow_100513.shtml). 
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4 The dynamics in requested and granted loan terms when 
bank and borrower interact repeatedly 
4.1 Introduction 
The nature of a bank-borrower relationship may be characterized as a “mutual 
commitment” (Boot and Marinc (2008)). Yet, while the literature has shown that 
banks collect and process a variety of (proprietary) information and how this may 
reduce credit constraints, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the 
evolution of borrowers’ demand for credit and its interaction with banks’ supply of 
credit over bank relationships. This paper makes a first step to address this 
interaction by investigating how requested and granted loan amounts evolve over 
bank relationships and how they are influenced by previous contractual outcomes in 
a sequence of loans.  
We employ a unique dataset of matched loan applications and loan contracts that 
includes both requested and granted loan terms as well as borrower and relationship 
characteristics at the time of loan origination. The dataset consists of nearly 99,000 
loans to small enterprises extended by one bank in Bulgaria over the period April 
2003 to September 2007. As most of these small loans are of comparatively short 
maturities we are able to follow loan sequences with up to nine loans within the 
observation period. Analyzing chains of short-term repeat loans complements studies 
that focus on credit lines to assess how banks use the information they gather from 
multiple interactions with their borrowers (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995) and Norden 
and Weber (2010a)). 
Exploiting the structure of our dataset, we measure credit constraints as the ratio 
of requested to granted loan amounts and investigate not only how this ratio relates 
to firm characteristics but also how it evolves over sequential loan contracts. 
Previous papers point out that both demand and supply side factors determine credit 
availability and loan terms (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Qian and Strahan 
(2007)). In a second step, we therefore study requested and granted loan amounts 
separately to gain deeper insights into the dynamic processes on both the demand and 
supply side and to determine the borrower’s and the bank’s reactions to the degree of 
credit constraints at the previous loan. The dynamic patterns of requested and granted 
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loan amounts that arise when borrowers contract repeatedly with the same lender 
have not yet been comprehensively established.  
The results show that borrowers are considerably credit constrained in the outset 
of their bank relationships. The most important determinants of receiving smaller 
than requested loan amounts are being a young or small firm at the time of the first 
interaction between borrower and bank. This indicates that the extent of (publicly) 
available information matters for initial differences in credit constraints between 
borrowers. Apart from that, a reduction in information asymmetries resulting from 
repeated interactions crucially determines credit constraints. We find that observed 
credit constraints decrease over loan sequences with this effect being most distinct in 
the beginning of the relationship. This finding provides a first indication of the 
evolution of borrowers’ requests over multiple interactions with the same lender. It 
rules out that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to previous constraints 
because this would not induce the observed reduction in credit constraints. We also 
find that the decrease in observed credit constraints over time is especially 
pronounced for the initially young and small firms. This is a sign for the use of 
dynamic incentives at the bank side to overcome information problems when 
contracting repeatedly with small and opaque borrowers.  
Further disentangling demand from supply effects reveals that observed credit 
constraints decrease over a loan sequence due to a convergence of the demand and 
supply sides. While both borrowers’ requested and the bank’s granted loan amounts 
rise over time, they differ in their reaction to previous credit constraints. When the 
extent of previous credit constraints is large in the beginning of the relationship, 
requested amounts increase more moderately whereas granted amounts increase 
more strongly than in the case of no previous constraints. These findings imply that 
borrowers learn from previous experiences. If the feedback they get from an 
interaction is negative, i.e. if they receive a smaller than requested loan amount, they 
adjust their request at the subsequent interaction accordingly to avoid being highly 
constrained again. At the same time, the results confirm that the bank uses dynamic 
incentives to overcome information problems increasing loan sizes 
disproportionately after due repayment when contracting repeatedly. This is in line 
with arguments that bank relationships are valuable because banks are able to collect 
and assess information in due course and benefit borrowers by better loan terms over 
time.  
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Our approach differs from earlier papers on the credit availability of small firms 
in two important ways. First, in contrast to previous studies relying on indirect (e.g. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995)) or equilibrium outcome (e.g. Ioannidou and 
Ongena (2010)) proxies of credit availability it provides a more comprehensive 
measure of credit constraints because it incorporates loan demand. Secondly, while 
studies analyzing the influence of relationship and firm characteristics on the 
likelihood of being denied credit do consider loan applications they deal with 
borrower rationing (e.g. Cole (1998)). Our study, on the contrary, is concerned with 
loan size constraints for those borrowers who receive credit.36  
The main contribution of this paper consists in providing first evidence on the 
dynamic patterns that arise when bank and borrower interact repeatedly by 
disentangling demand and supply effects behind observed credit constraints. 
Thereby, it amends existing findings on the supply side (see Ioannidou and Ongena 
(2010)) and adds to the very recently emerging literature that aims at distinguishing 
between demand and supply effects in bank lending by using information from loan 
applications as well as loan contracts (Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2009), 
Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009), Cheng and Degryse (2010) and Jimenez, Ongena, 
Peydro and Saurina (2010)). 
Finally, the panel structure of the employed dataset makes it possible to add to the 
existing literature on bank relationships from a methodological point of view by 
addressing the fact that borrowers non-randomly drop out of the sample. We 
empirically model this attrition process in a two-stage procedure that accounts for 
sample selection at each interaction between borrowers and bank. Cross-sectional 
studies may not be fully able to control for potential changes in the composition of 
the pool of borrowers over time (see also Ioannidou and Ongena (2010). We find that 
the extent of credit constraints does not seem to matter for selection, i.e. the 
probability to take out another loan. While the analysis reveals that there is an 
attrition bias in the data, the main results are robust to explicitly accounting for the 
attrition process.  
                                                 
36
 Keeton (1979) distinguishes between these two forms of credit constraints. If information is 
distributed asymmetrically, banks may ration borrowers (type I constraints) to prevent adverse 
selection and moral hazard which would negatively impact their profit (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). 
Jaffee and Russell (1976) derive that granting lower than requested loan amounts (type II constraints) 
may serve as a sorting device because borrowers with a utility increase from defaulting are 
discouraged from borrowing as their benefits (i.e. larger loan sizes) decrease with rationing. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 4.3 provides institutional details 
on the loan granting process and describes the data while section 4.4 presents the 
findings from the empirical analyses. Section 4.5 concludes.    
 
4.2 Literature overview 
4.2.1 The evolution of requested and granted loan amounts over multiple 
interactions 
Theories of financial intermediation constitute that banks are able to accumulate 
extensive private information about their borrowers through screening and 
monitoring (Diamond (1984), Ramakrishan and Thakor (1984), Fama (1985) and 
Boyd and Prescott (1986)). Especially relationship lending, i.e. multiple interactions 
with the same borrower over time (Boot (2000)), seems well suited to provide banks 
with (proprietary) information on their customers. Multiple interactions with the 
same borrower leave room for the bank to set dynamic incentives to deal with agency 
problems in an environment with asymmetric information. In the model of Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1990) financial constraints arise endogenously as an enforcement 
device to ensure repayment because the credible threat to terminate funding 
discourages borrowers from diverting funds. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch 
(2005) extend this model and show that the effect of dynamic incentives may be 
reinforced by providing increased funding upon due repayment. Furthermore, the 
game-theoretic structure of the two-period model in Egli (2004) explains that 
reputation acquisition is essential for borrowers to sustain the relationship with the 
bank in order to obtain further funding in the future. Expanding on this argument, 
Egli, Ongena and Smith (2006) highlight that relationship financing allows 
borrowers to benefit from better loan terms if strategic default is easy, e.g. in 
countries with weak accounting and judicial standards. The reason is that lenders 
who finance several projects up-front have to charge very high interest rates to be 
compensated for the risk of strategic default. Finally, Martinelli (1997) provides a 
rationale for the specific value of dynamic incentives in bank lending to very young 
firms that have not yet established a credit history or reputation. 
Summarizing, dynamic incentives provide a way to test a borrower’s repayment 
ability and willingness with small loan amounts in the beginning of the relationship. 
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Loan amounts then gradually increase upon positive repayment behavior so that 
setting dynamic incentives serves as an enforcement device and enables the bank to 
closely monitor the borrower in early stages of the relationship.37 Therefore, we 
expect granted loan amounts to increase over repeated interactions between 
borrowers and banks. Besides, the increase is expected to be more pronounced for 
informationally opaque borrowers such as young firms. 
Models dealing with the borrower side in bank-borrower relationships mainly 
concentrate on the costs (Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (2004)) and 
benefits (Boot and Thakor (1994), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and von 
Thadden (1995)) borrowers incur from multiple interactions with the same lender. 
However, multiple interactions between borrower and bank may be interpreted as a 
strategic game in which both actors have to learn about the game and the other 
player. Requested (and granted) loan amounts therefore possibly depend on previous 
outcomes of loan contracting.  
Considering borrowers’ behavior, two scenarios seem possible when borrowers 
approach the bank for the first time, request a certain loan amount and are granted 
only a lower than requested amount after the financial analysis. On the one hand, 
borrowers may learn which projects the bank will possibly finance and which loan 
amounts to request when applying for further loans. Such an adaptation of requested 
loan amounts should reduce observed credit constraints over loan sequences. 
Besides, it implies that borrowers who were granted a considerably lower than 
requested amount at the previous interaction should place a more moderate request at 
the next interaction compared to borrowers who received the amount they requested. 
The literature on borrower behavior in the credit market is scarce. For instance, 
Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson (2008) model and test learning dynamics in a 
credit card market where clients seem to learn to avoid paying future fees through 
negative feedback, i.e. the experience of past fees.  
On the other hand, it seems plausible to assume that borrowers who received a 
lower than requested loan amount at the previous interaction may react by 
overstating the requested amount for the next loan accordingly. This implies that 
                                                 
37
 This concept of starting small is also established in the corporate finance literature (e.g. Tirole 
(2006)) to model so-called staged financing, in the industrial organization literature to explain the 
development of business partnerships in states of uncertainty (e.g. Rauch and Watson (2003)) and in 
the venture capital literature when venture projects are financed under uncertainty and the threat of 
moral hazard (e.g. Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Wang and Zhou (2004)).  
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observed credit constraints would persist, especially in the beginning of a bank 
relationship, although granted loan amounts per se may increase. A parallel argument 
can be found in papers that investigate overbidding in the fixed-interest repo auctions 
the European Central Bank (ECB) used to conduct.38 Based on the stylized repo 
game model of Nautz and Oechssler (2003), Ehrhart (2001) shows in an 
experimental study that bid sizes as well as the extent of overbidding increase over 
time when the planned allotment is smaller than bidders’ true demand. Bidders are 
found to follow a myopic best-reply behavior, i.e. for the current bid they take into 
account the ratio of their true demand to their individual allotment at their previous 
bid. Nautz and Oechssler (2006) confirm these experimental findings analyzing data 
from the ECB and the Bundesbank.39   
  
4.2.2 Related empirical studies 
This study contributes to three strands of the empirical banking and finance 
literature: relationship lending, demand and supply effects in bank lending and the 
determinants of credit availability for small firms. 
Empirical studies on relationship lending have used a variety of proxies such as 
the length, number, scale and scope of bank relationships to capture the intensity of 
the relationship and the extent of asymmetric information. Yet, it is not clear from 
this approach how exactly banks collect and process information. One possibility for 
banks to gather information over time is to observe their borrowers’ usage of credit 
lines (Berger and Udell (1995)). While Jimenez, Lopez and Saurina (2009) examine 
the determinants of credit line usage, Norden and Weber (2010a) find that banks 
indeed use the information gained from observing borrowers’ credit line usage and 
account activity in managing their relationships. For instance, if banks receive early 
warning signals from limit violations, they increase credit spreads on subsequent 
loans made to these borrowers. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010) confirm that 
observing the usage of credit lines provides banks with the most valuable private 
information. 
                                                 
38
 In these auctions, the ECB announces a repo rate and banks simply state which amount they would 
like to receive at this cost. If total bids exceed the planned allotment, banks are rationed proportionally 
to their bids.   
39
 The myopic best-reply behavior may be an argument for overstated requested loan amounts at the 
second interaction between borrower and bank in our setting. However, the bank is likely to react to 
such a behavior while the repo auction procedure is purely mechanical on the central bank’s side.   
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This study complements the literature on information production in bank 
relationships by analyzing a chain of short-term repeat loans as another possibility 
for banks to gather information from multiple interactions with the same customer. 
Following bank and borrowers from their first interaction over several loan contracts 
allows us to explore how banks make use of dynamic incentives to deal with risks 
arising from asymmetric information and how this learning process translates into 
granted loan terms. 
Very few recent papers examine demand and supply effects in bank lending. 
Cheng and Degryse (2010) find that the introduction of a public credit registry 
alleviates informational barriers and reduces credit rationing in the Chinese credit 
card market when studying demand and supply separately. Focusing on the impact of 
macroeconomic and financial shocks on bank lending, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and 
Saurina (2010) study how the balance-sheet strengths of Spanish banks and firms 
influence credit availability thus separating demand and supply effects on the 
probability that a loan request results in a loan granted. Concerning their relationship 
measures, they observe that longer and fewer bank relationships positively influence 
credit availability. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009) examine how the US financial 
crisis affected retail bank lending at German savings banks. They find that demand 
decreases at all savings banks while savings banks that were affected by the financial 
crisis reject substantially more loan applications than non-affected banks. They also 
find that loan applications of customers with previous relationships with an affected 
bank are less likely to be rejected than those of new customers.  
This paper extends the existing evidence on demand and supply effects in bank 
lending by explicitly exploiting a panel data structure and analyzing requested and 
granted loan amounts in a sequence of interactions between borrowers and a bank. It 
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to provide evidence of the dynamic 
patterns that arise on both the demand and the supply side when bank and borrowers 
contract repeatedly over time. In that respect, it is closest to Ioannidou and Ongena 
(2010). Using a panel dataset, they follow borrowers over several interactions with 
lenders and study contracted loan terms before and after borrowers switch banks. 
Thereby they are able to establish the dynamic patterns that arise on the supply side 
when firms start new relationships and interact repeatedly with one lender. This 
paper adds the demand side to the analysis. So far, the literature has been relatively 
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silent on how exactly loan negotiations work40 and how bank and borrower react to 
previous contractual outcomes. 
Finally, this study relates to the literature on the influence of bank relationships 
on credit availability of small firms. Existing empirical studies generally find a 
positive relation between various measures of relationship strength and credit 
availability. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) use an indirect measure of credit 
constraints, the percentage of trade credits paid late. They find that the length and 
scope of the relationship and borrowing from fewer lenders positively influence 
credit availability. While these papers have established the value of close bank 
relationships on the availability of credit for small firms, they have not been able to 
directly observe borrowers’ requests and relate them to the actual loan terms granted 
by the bank. Without this information, it is not clear whether the indirect proxy 
captures that borrowers received a smaller than requested amount or no loan at all. 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) also find a positive influence of borrowing from 
fewer lenders on credit availability. Cole (1998) and Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri 
(1998) establish that the valuable private information seems to be gathered very early 
in the relationship. Machauer and Weber (1998) confirm that close bank 
relationships are beneficial for firms since they obtain more finance when borrowing 
from their hausbanks, while Elsas and Krahnen (1998) find that especially risky 
borrowers benefit from bank relationships. Scott (2006) shows that loan officer 
turnover, which is connected with a loss of soft information, is positively related to 
the probability that banks deny credit. Finally, Bodenhorn (2007) and Ioannidou and 
Ongena (2010) find that bank relationships play a crucial role in obtaining larger 
contracted loan amounts.  
 This paper uses a more comprehensive measure of credit availability: the ratio of 
requested to granted loan amounts for those borrowers receiving credit. One caveat 
to this approach, however, is that it assumes requested and granted loan amounts to 
mirror ‘real’ demand and supply although both may be driven by strategic 
considerations. Whereas the dataset at hand does not allow us to fully resolve this 
issue, it takes the analysis of credit availability one step further by incorporating loan 
applications and shedding some first light on strategic processes.  
 
                                                 
40
 One exception are the papers studying borrower bargaining power (e.g. Uchida (2006), Santos and 
Winton (2009) and Grunert and Norden (2010)). 
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4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 The data and the Bank’s loan granting process  
The dataset used in this study comprises all annuity loans, credit lines and 
overdrafts to firms extended by one Bulgarian bank (henceforth called the “Bank”) 
between April 2003 and September 2007. 
 
Table 16. Variable definitions 
    
Variable Definition 
  
Dependent variables   
Requested-granted ratio Requested loan amount as a share of granted loan amount (Log) 
Requested amount Requested loan amount (Log EUR) 
Granted amount Loan amount as stated in loan contract (Log EUR) 
  
Loan characteristics   
Previous constraints Indicator for extent of credit constraint at previous loan  
Requested maturity Requested loan maturity (Log months) 
Granted maturity Loan maturity as stated in loan contract (Log months) 
Fixed capital loan Loan is for fixed capital financing (1=yes, 0=no) 
Annuity loan Loan is an annuity loan vs. credit line or overdraft (1=yes, 0=no) 
Branch Branch dummies which are one for the branch that granted the loan 
  
Asymmetric information indicators   
Times Number of times the client borrows from bank at current loan 
Bank relationship Months since first contact between bank and client at disbursement 
date 
Initially young Firm age was below or equal to two years when first borrowing 
from bank (1=yes, 0=no) 
Initially small  Firm size (total assets) was below median firm size when first borrowing from the bank (1=yes, 0=no) 
Loan officer change Firm experienced a loan officer change during duration of previous loan (1=yes, 0=no) 
 
 
Firm characteristics   
Age Firm age at disbursement date (Log years) 
Sole proprietorship Firm is sole proprietorship (1=yes, 0=no) 
Assets Total assets of firm at disbursement date (Log EUR) 
Asset growth Difference between total assets at current and last loan 
disbursement as a share of total assets at last loan disbursement 
Leverage Total debt as share of total assets of firm at disbursement date  
Disposable income Total disposable income per month at disbursement date (Log EUR) 
Industry 
Industry dummies which are one if firm belongs to one of the 
following sectors: Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing, Trade, 
Transport, Tourism, Other services 
 
The Bank is a nationwide full-service bank with a large branch network in both 
urban and rural areas. It provides credit and other financial products (e.g. savings 
 92 
products, payment services, credit cards, leasing) to private and business clients with 
a special focus on lending to small enterprises. For each loan the dataset includes 
information from the borrowers’ loan applications on the loan terms that were 
requested. We match this information with data on the actually granted loan terms as 
stated in the loan contracts as well as with borrower characteristics and relationship 
indicators at the time of loan origination. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table 16. 
All observations with missing loan or firm-level data are excluded. Since the 
following empirical analysis focuses on the evolution of requested and granted loan 
sizes and their relation over a loan sequence, all loans after the ninth are excluded 
due to very few observations in these categories. Based on the fact that interest rate 
and collateral requirements are fixed for small loans whereas they are individually 
negotiated in the loan granting process for medium loans (loans with amounts of 
more than 50,000 EUR), eventually all medium loans are excluded from the main 
analysis. This leads to the final sample of 98,987 loans to 58,642 firms comprising 
32,832 single loan clients and 25,810 repeat clients with loan sequences of up to nine 
loans. 
At the heart of the Bank’s lending technology is a thorough analysis of the 
borrower’s debt capacity. Approaching the Bank, a borrower first of all meets a 
Client Advisor who assesses whether the borrower meets the Bank’s basic 
requirements. If the borrower does so, she has to fill in a loan application form. To 
begin with and most importantly, she is asked to indicate her preferred loan amount, 
maturity and currency and the purpose of the loan. She also has to provide 
information about the firm, other bank relations and the amount she can spare 
monthly for the repayment of the loan. In a next step, the Bank’s credit 
administration prepares information on the borrower’s credit history with this Bank 
and other banks to check her repayment behavior and loyalty to the Bank. At the 
same time, the loan officer conducts the financial analysis which includes a personal 
visit to the borrower’s site. Eventually, the loan officer presents the customer’s 
request and the suggested loan terms together with the information gathered during 
the financial analysis to the Bank’s credit committee which makes the final decision 
on the granted loan terms. Collateral requirements and interest rates are fixed and 
consequently do not play a role in the individual loan contracting process for our 
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sample of small loans (loans with amounts of up to 50,000 EUR).41 Therefore, we 
will not explicitly consider these loan terms throughout the empirical analysis. 
Concentrating the analysis on small loans from one bank in an emerging market 
provides an ideal ground for studying the influence of bank relationships on 
requested and granted loan terms because informational asymmetries are presumably 
severe. The bank’s standardized loan contracts for small loans leave only loan 
amount (and maturity42) as means for the bank to deal with borrowers’ credit risks. 
The sample is therefore well suited to study the adjustment of these loan terms 
during the loan granting process. Finally, since the loan granting process is the same 
for all observed loans possible heterogeneity is reduced at this level. 
 
4.3.2 The ratio of requested to granted loan amounts 
Since we observe requested and granted loan amounts we are able to establish the 
extent to which borrowers receive a smaller loan amount than they requested. We 
denote this as observed credit constraints and measure it by the Requested-granted 
ratio (the higher the ratio the more constrained the borrower). Table 17 reveals that 
the Bank’s decision to grant smaller than requested amounts strongly depends on the 
extent of asymmetric information. To clearly capture the effect of different levels of 
asymmetric information between borrowers and to separate it from the effect of 
repeated interactions over time only first loans are included in the calculations. Two 
proxies for firm opaqueness widely used in the banking literature are firm age (e.g. 
Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001)) and firm size (e.g. Berger and Udell (1995) and 
Petersen and Rajan (1995)). We define Initially young firms as those with firm age of 
up to two years at their first loan because such firms have not had the time to 
establish a public track record (see Petersen and Rajan (1994)). To define Initially 
small firms, we follow Petersen and Rajan (1995) and split the sample at the median 
value of firm size at the first loan. Besides, results are presented for the two 
subsamples of single loan vs. repeat clients to assess whether the extent of observed 
credit constraints influences the borrower’s decision to request a further loan. 
                                                 
41
 With 85% of loans having an amount below 10,000 EUR, there should be only very few loan 
sequences that may have grown to loan sizes above 50,000 EUR. 
42
 Since amount and maturity are found to be complementary contract terms, the analysis mainly 
focuses on requested and granted loan amounts. 
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Table 17 shows that loan size constraints are significantly larger for the Initially 
young than for the initially old firms and that this result holds for the single loan and 
the repeat clients. Findings for the Initially small vs. initially large firms are very 
similar with differences between the two groups being even more pronounced. Thus, 
Table 17 clearly indicates that these measures of asymmetric information play an 
important role in the Bank’s decision to grant a lower than requested amount. 
Interestingly, the difference-in-difference estimates (in bold) show that these 
differences between the initially young vs. old and initially small vs. large firms are 
significantly larger for the single loan clients. However, taking a closer look at the 
single loan vs. repeat clients in the last column of the table reveals that differences in 
loan size constraints between these groups are economically very small. 
Furthermore, it is the group of repeat clients that experiences significantly larger 
constraints at their first loans if they are initially older or larger. Taken these results 
together, the extent of observed credit constraints does not seem to (negatively) 
influence the incidence of borrowing repeatedly from the Bank. Therefore, we will 
pool all borrowers in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 17. Asymmetric information and the Requested-granted ratio at first loans 
This table reports the average Requested-granted ratio for Single loan clients (borrowers with only 
one loan) and Repeat clients (borrowers taking out more than one loan during the observation period), 
for different subsamples based on the asymmetric information indicators. Initially young (old) firms 
have a firm age below or equal to (above) two years when first borrowing from the Bank. Initially 
small (large) firms are of firm size below (equal to or above) the median firm size based on total 
assets when first borrowing from the Bank. The table also provides t-tests for differences between 
groups (difference) and F-tests for differences between pairs of groups (difference-in-difference). ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. Only first loans are included to separate the 
effect of the asymmetric information indicators from the effect of repeated interactions between 
borrowers and the Bank.  
        
  Requested-granted ratio 
 Single loan clients    Repeat clients           Diff / Diff-in-Diff 
N 32,832 20,350 
  
Initially young firms, N = 11,334 1.33 1.32 0.01 
Initially old firms, N = 41,848 1.20 1.22  -0.02*** 
Diff / Diff-in-Diff 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.03** 
     
 
Initially small firms, N = 25,835 1.32 1.31 0.01 
Initially large firms, N = 27,347 1.15 1.16  -0.01** 
Diff / Diff-in-Diff 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.02** 
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Figure 6. The Requested-granted ratio by loan sequence 
This figure displays the evolution of the Requested-granted ratio, the indicator for the extent of 
observed credit constraints, over the loan sequence for the full sample and different subsamples based 
on the asymmetric information indicators. Initially young (old) firms have a firm age below or equal 
to (above) two years when first borrowing from the Bank. Initially small (large) firms are of firm size 
below (equal to or above) the median firm size based on total assets when first borrowing from the 
Bank.  
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The main measure of relationship strength is the loan number indicating how 
many interactions between the borrower and the Bank have taken place providing the 
Bank with the opportunity to monitor borrowers and to observe their repayment 
behavior. Figure 6 displays the Requested-granted ratio over the loan sequence for 
the subsample of repeat clients and its various subgroups based on the age and size 
indicators of asymmetric information.  
Figure 6 shows that observed loan size constraints decrease considerably over an 
average loan sequence. For the full sample, loan size constraints decrease 
significantly in the beginning of the loan sequence from 1.24 to 1.07 between the 
first and the fifth loan.43 Thus, using this more comprehensive measure of credit 
constraints confirms findings from previous studies that employ indirect or 
equilibrium outcome measures for credit availability (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)). The observed decrease in loan size constraints is 
a first indication of the dynamic patterns that may be at work. On the Bank side, the 
application of dynamic incentives, which include increasing loan amounts upon due 
repayment (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005)), lead to a reduction in 
observed constraints. Alternatively or simultaneously, learning from past experience 
on the borrower side may explain the observed pattern as well. An explanation which 
                                                 
43
 To rule out that the observed pattern is driven by changes in the bank policy over years, we also 
investigate loan sequences that start in different years and find similar patterns no matter when bank 
relationships begin.  
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can be ruled out from these results is that borrowers overstate their demand as a 
reaction to past constraints because such a behavior would not decrease the ratio 
between observed requested and granted amounts during the first few interactions. 
Furthermore, Figure 6 shows that all subgroups of firms experience considerable 
reductions in loan size constraints in the beginning of their bank relationships. This 
decrease is significant and particularly strong between the first two loans for the 
Initially young (from 1.32 to 1.15) and Initially small firms (from 1.31 to 1.16). 
Apart from that, the Initially young firms which have no or little proof of their 
viability available at that stage face significantly higher loan size constraints than the 
older firms in the beginning of their relationships which is consistent with the 
rationale provided by Martinelli (1997). Similarly, Initially small firms experience 
significantly higher credit constraints up to loan number five when comparing them 
to the initially larger firms. Note that all indicated differences are significant at the 
0.01-level using a Student’s t-test.  
Figure 6 suggests that the information which both Bank and borrowers may gather 
through repeated interactions reduce observed loan size constraints with this effect 
being most pronounced for the first few interactions. A crucial part of the following 
empirical analysis will be concerned with the determinants of loan size constraints 
and, most importantly, the underlying dynamics on the borrower and Bank side over 
the course of a bank relationship. 
  
4.3.3 Determinants of the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts 
As a basis for the analysis of dynamic processes on both the demand and supply 
side, we start with studying the factors that influence the degree of observed loan size 
constraints in the sample in two steps. First, we estimate an OLS model for the full 
sample with Requested-granted ratioi,k,t as the dependent variable. With larger values 
indicating higher credit constraints Requested-granted ratioi,k,t is the requested loan 
amount as a share of the granted loan amount of loan k firm i receives in period t:  
 
Requested-granted ratioi,k,t =  a + β1Ai,t + β2Fi,t + β3Lk + β4Bt + β5Tt + ei,k,t (5) 
  
Ai,t is a vector of indicators measuring the level of asymmetric information, Fi,t is 
a vector that includes firm characteristics controlling for firm risk and capturing 
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further aspects of firm opacity, while Lk is a vector of loan characteristics. Finally, Bt 
and Tt are vectors of branch and time dummies accounting for the branch-specific 
(such as local competition) and general (such as macroeconomic and monetary 
conditions, the Bank’s refinancing situation and the Bank’s prevailing interest rate 
and collateral requirements for small loans) environment at the time of loan 
disbursement.  
In a second step, we estimate outcome equation (5) as a panel model with firm 
fixed effects to control for any unobserved borrower heterogeneity that may have 
been ignored in the previous analysis and that may influence the Requested-granted 
ratio. In contrast to the OLS estimator, the fixed effects estimator only accounts for 
the within variation of all variables, i.e. their variation over a loan sequence for each 
borrower, and not for their variation between different borrowers. This concentrates 
the analysis on the factors that determine differences in credit constraints over the 
course of individual bank-borrower relationships. 
 
Indicators of asymmetric information 
The variable Times indicates the number of the current loan and measures the 
intensity of the bank-borrower relationship.44 Most importantly, it captures the 
dynamic patterns that arise along a chain of interactions between borrowers and the 
Bank. To allow for non-linear effects we include the dummy variables Times_2, …, 
Times_5 (which pools interactions number five to nine because of the fewer 
observations in these categories and because the descriptive analysis has displayed 
that most of the action happens in the beginning of the relationship) and use Times_1 
as the reference category.45 
Martinelli (1997) suggests that young firms without a credit history or reputation 
are initially loan size constrained to provide them with an incentive to repay and 
obtain larger loan amounts in the future. We include the dummy variable Initially 
young to capture whether a firm was young, i.e. its firm age was below or equal to 
two years, when borrowing the first time from the Bank. To study whether dynamic 
incentives are indeed particularly strong for initially young firms we assess the 
                                                 
44
 We do not include the duration of a Bank relationship to measure the level of asymmetric 
information because it is highly correlated with Times. However, rerunning all regressions with Bank 
relationship instead of Times reveals qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results. 
45
 We also test for the differences in adjacent time dummies and find that they are significant in all 
specifications.  
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interaction effects Times_2*Initially young, …, Times_5*Initially young. Similarly, 
the dummy variable Initially small indicates whether a firm was comparatively small, 
i.e. its size in terms of total assets was below the median firm size, when borrowing 
for the first time from the Bank. To assess whether there is indeed a differential 
effect of initial firm size on credit constraints over loan sequences the interaction 
effects Times_2*Initially small,…, Times_5*Initially small are included. 
When a borrower applies for a loan, it is the loan officer with whom interaction 
takes place and who collects all the borrower-specific data necessary for the 
subsequent decision on whether to grant a loan and under which conditions (see 
Berger and Udell (2002), Stein (2002) and for empirical papers using loan officer 
information e.g. Liberti (2005), Scott (2004, 2006), Uchida, Udell and Yamori 
(2006), Beck, Behr and Güttler (2009) and Liberti and Mian (2009)). If the 
information gathered by the loan officer cannot fully be transmitted within the bank, 
which is likely for qualitative soft information, part of it is lost in case a loan officer 
change takes place. This loss is most extreme when the loan officer leaves the bank 
but might even matter when responsibilities are rescheduled within the bank.46 The 
variable Loan officer change is included in the analysis indicating whether the loan 
officer has changed during the duration of the previous loan. If there was a previous 
change, some of the effects of a close bank-relationship on the reduction of loan size 
constraints may be tempered. 
  
Firm and loan characteristics 
The included firm characteristics are further indicators of asymmetric information 
and control for borrower risk. Sole proprietorships are more opaque than 
incorporated firms because they do not have to provide certified annual reports 
according to Bulgarian law, hence the dummy variable Sole proprietorship equals 
one if the firm is a sole proprietorship and zero otherwise. Borrowers that are highly 
indebted face a higher risk of default in case of external shocks to their income so 
that we introduce Leverage, the firm’s total debt as share of its total assets at the 
disbursement date of the loan. A firm with little financial scope (Disposable income 
                                                 
46
 The loan officer changes observed in the dataset mostly occur because loan officers are promoted 
within the Bank or because they leave the Bank. The Bank does not follow a policy to regularly rotate 
its loan officers internally to avoid too close relationships between clients and loan officers that might 
lead to decisions rather based upon personal considerations than objective judgements (see Hertzberg, 
Liberti and Paravisini (2010) for positive effects of loan officer rotation). 
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(measured in log euro)) to react to unforeseen cuts to its income is more vulnerable 
to external shocks and thus more risky because the repayment of the loan may be 
endangered more easily. To account for all remaining differences in firm 
characteristics the regressions contain seven Industry dummies. 
One loan characteristic which raises little concern to be endogenous to the 
determination of all other loan contract terms is the Fixed capital loan variable. It 
indicates whether a loan is for fixed capital financing or working capital otherwise, 
which is induced by the purpose of the loan and thus predetermined (exogenous) to 
the decision on other loan terms. If a loan is intended for fixed capital financing, the 
underlying asset may be sold in case of default lowering the risk associated with such 
loans. Similarly, an Annuity loan (dummy variable which is one if the loan is an 
annuity loan and zero if it is a credit line or overdraft) may be considered less risky 
because of its regular repayment schedule.  
Finally, loan maturity is possibly endogenous to the determination of loan amount 
and its inclusion in the regressions would bias the estimates. Studying requested and 
granted loan amounts and maturities reveals that both loan terms are complements 
because for 67% of all loans they are adjusted into the same direction, i.e. requests 
for both loan terms are either higher, lower or equal to both granted loan terms. The 
Spearman rank correlation between the Requested-granted ratio and the ratio of 
requested to granted maturity is 0.4324 and significant (p-value < 0.01) which means 
that the two variables are not independent. Therefore, we concentrate the main 
analysis on requested and granted loan amounts but will provide some further 
evidence on requested and granted maturities in the extensions.   
 
4.3.4 Requested and granted loan amounts and their development over time 
When borrowers and Bank interact repeatedly they both learn about the other 
party’s behavior and its reaction to the own behavior which, in turn, may influence 
the outcome of the following interaction. These aspects are studied in a panel model 
with firm fixed effects because the interest lies in the factors that affect changes in 
requested and granted loan amounts and their relation over borrowers’ loan 
sequences. Introducing previous experience into the regressions adds a dynamic 
component to the model. However, we have to refrain from estimating a dynamic 
panel model since in our setting the time intervals (between adjacent loan numbers) 
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differ between sequences of observations. To reduce the bias that would arise from 
the direct introduction of a lagged variable in a fixed effects regression, we use 
Previous constraints instead, a categorical variable based on the degree of credit 
constraints at the previous loan to account for the effect which the previous 
experience to receive a smaller than requested loan amount has on current behavior. 
The variable is 0 if the previous loan carries a higher granted than requested loan 
amount. It is 1 if requested amount equals granted amount at the previous loan, 2 if 
the borrower experienced high constraints at the previous loan (Requested-granted 
ratio between 1 and 1.67) and 3 if the borrower experienced very high constraints at 
the previous loan (Requested-granted ratio larger than 1.67).  
The dependent variables are Requested amounti,k,t and Granted amounti,k,t 
indicating requested and granted loan amounts (in log euro) for loan k that firm i 
receives in period t: 
 
Requested amounti,k,t =  ai + β1Previous constraintsk         
  + β2Ai,t + β3Fi,t + β4Lk + β5Tt + ei,k,t           (6) 
Granted amounti,k,t =  ai + β1Previous constraintsk         
  + β2Ai,t + β3Fi,t + β4Lk + β5Tt + ei,k,t         (7) 
 
In this model ai includes the firm fixed effects, Ai,t is a vector of indicators of 
asymmetric information, while Fi,t and Lk are vectors of firm and loan characteristics. 
The vector Tt contains time dummies accounting for the macroeconomic 
environment as well as the Bank’s prevailing fixed contract terms for small loans at 
the time of loan disbursement.  
To capture how requested and granted loan amounts evolve over a loan sequence 
the variable Times (measured by the dummy variables Times_3,…, Times_5 with 
Times_2 now serving as the reference category in this dynamic setting) is included. 
The interaction effects Times_3*Previous constraints,…, Times_5*Previous 
constraints are included to study whether the relation between the intensity of the 
bank relationship and the requested or granted loan amount differs by the extent of 
credit constraints experienced during previous interactions. Loan officer change is 
used as an additional measure for the extent of asymmetric information and 
relationship strength. It is not only expected to be negatively related to granted loan 
amounts due to a loss in private information but also to requested loan amounts 
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because borrowers often follow their loan officers resorting some of their financial 
activities to other banks. 
Requested and granted loan amounts will furthermore depend on firm and loan 
characteristics. Age, Assets and Disposable income control for credit risk, financial 
transparency as well as the investment opportunities of firms. Older and bigger firms 
are likely to plan larger investment projects thus requesting larger loan amounts. At 
the same time, they may also receive larger loan amounts because they are more 
financially experienced, less risky and more transparent. We further include Asset 
growth to control for the fact that previously loan size constrained firms may request 
smaller loan amounts than previously unconstrained borrowers simply because they 
are hampered in their growth options. Leverage is a measure of the firm’s already 
exhausted debt capacity and should be negatively related to requested and granted 
loan amounts. Finally, Fixed capital loan and Annuity loan are expected to be 
associated with larger granted loan amounts due to their relatively lower credit risk.  
Besides, investments in fixed assets may be more difficult to split. Again, Requested 
maturity and Granted maturity are not included because they are complements to 
requested and granted amount. 
  
4.3.5 Summary statistics 
Table 18 presents summary statistics for the indicators of asymmetric information 
and the loan and firm characteristics.47 Panel A displays sample means for these 
variables over the loan sequence and shows that Requested amount and Granted 
amount increase considerably over a bank-borrower relationship nearly doubling on 
average between the first and the ninth loan.  
Early loans in a loan sequence are more likely to be used for fixed capital 
financing whereas later loans are more often intended for working capital purposes. 
Apart from that, firms tend to start their bank relationship rather with loans than 
other financial products having been with the bank for only 1.15 months on average 
when receiving their first loan. These observations indicate that bank relationships 
regularly start with investment loans and only later comprise other financial products 
such as current accounts with overdraft facilities. 
                                                 
47
 The table displays the untransformed values for the variables Requested amount, Granted amount, 
Requested maturity, Granted maturity, Age, Assets and Disposable income.  
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Loan officer changes seem to be a frequent phenomenon so that between 23% and 
38% of loans are granted by loan officers different from those that granted the 
previous loan. While firms show relatively low levels of indebtedness with Leverage 
not exceeding 26%, the variables Sole proprietorship, Assets, Asset growth and 
Disposable income indicate that firms grow substantially over time. The variable 
Initially small supports this explanation. It reveals that the proportion of loans made 
to firms which were comparatively small when they started to borrow is stable up to 
the sixth loan, which means that the very small clients do not gradually drop out of 
the sample.  
Finally, the majority of firms take out up to four loans at this Bank. Since most of 
these loans have comparatively short maturities, there is nevertheless a sizeable 
number of borrowers with loan sequences of up to nine loans despite an observation 
period of only 4.5 years. This justifies the use of panel methods in the empirical 
analysis to account for the evolution of loan terms along these chains of interactions 
between Bank and borrowers. 
Panel B of Table 18 presents statistics for the two subsamples of unconstrained vs. 
constrained loans. Interestingly, column (1) shows that those firms which receive the 
same as or a larger than requested loan amount exhibit only a slight difference in 
requested and granted maturities. On the contrary, column (2) shows that firms 
which are credit constrained are granted equivalently shorter than requested 
maturities. This is a further indication that loan amount and maturity are 
complementary contract terms rather than substitutes.  
The credit constrained firms in column (2) borrow on average less often, are more 
likely to be young and small at their first loan, are younger in general and have 
shorter bank relationships than the unconstrained firms (column (1)) so that they 
seem to be the less experienced borrowers. They are also clearly smaller in terms of 
total assets and disposable income implying that the Bank may deal with their 
possibly greater risk by limiting granted loan sizes. A t-test confirms that these 
differences in firm characteristics are statistically significant at the 0.01-level when 
comparing the two groups. Interestingly, both groups do not significantly differ in 
their Asset growth. 
 
Table 18. Loan and firm characteristics: descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Sample means by loan sequence 
          
This table displays summary statistics for the loan, firm and asymmetric information variables. See Table 16 for definitions of all variables. Note that for all otherwise log-
transformed variables the statistics are calculated by using the original values. 
                  
Times 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
          
Loan characteristics                   
Requested-granted ratio 1.23 1.12 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.05 
Requested amount 5,318 5,397 5,985 6,515 7,347 7,990 9,223 8,949 9,344 
Granted amount 4,687 5,003 5,585 6,141 7,016 7,538 8,765 8,645 8,812 
Requested maturity 32.81 30.08 29.60 29.77 30.40 29.57 28.51 25.89 24.59 
Granted maturity 27.33 27.37 27.56 28.14 29.02 27.90 26.61 25.47 25.21 
Fixed capital loan 0.55 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.32 
Annuity loan 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.63 0.56 0.52 0.48 
Asymmetric information indicators                 
Bank relationship 1.15 12.01 21.79 29.65 35.98 40.07 43.52 44.54 45.67 
Initially young 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 
Initially small 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.32 0.33 
Loan officer change  0.23 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.32 
Firm characteristics                   
Age 7.49 8.77 9.73 10.41 11.11 11.41 11.75 11.81 11.92 
Sole proprietorship 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.76 
Assets 28,494 32,400 37,310 42,858 52,231 64,829 73,023 90,318 91,571 
Asset growth  0.62 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.16 0.13 0.15 
Leverage 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 
Disposable income 400 473 573 658 775 928 1,086 1,217 1,133 
N 53,182 24,150 11,628 5,450 2,503 1,185 544 234 111 
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Panel B. Sample means for subsamples of unconstrained vs. constrained loans 
***, **, * denote that variables are significantly different from each other at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-
level using a two-sided t-test.  
     
  Unconstrained Constrained 
 
 (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
  N = 73,742 N = 25,245 
  
   
 
Loan characteristics       
Requested-granted ratio 0.98 1.74  -0.76*** 
Requested amount 5,033 7,255  -2,222*** 
Granted amount 5,187 4,763 424*** 
Requested maturity 29.27 37.83  -8.57*** 
Granted maturity 27.63 26.91 0.73*** 
Fixed capital loan 0.52 0.50 0.02*** 
Annuity loan 0.76 0.73 0.03*** 
    
Asymmetric information indicators       
Times 1.94 1.64 0.30*** 
Bank relationship 10.44 6.86 3.58*** 
Initially young 0.17 0.22  -0.05*** 
Initially small 0.47 0.60  -0.13*** 
Loan officer change 0.25 0.27  -0.02*** 
    
Firm characteristics       
Age 8.61 7.79 0.82*** 
Sole proprietorship 0.92 0.91 0.01 
Assets 35,259 25,502 9,757*** 
Asset growth 0.51 0.47 0.04 
Leverage 0.14 0.15  -0.01*** 
Disposable income 505 387 118*** 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Determinants of the ratio of requested to granted loan amounts 
Table 19 displays the regression results on the determinants of the Requested-
granted ratio based on estimations for both the full sample and the panel of repeat 
clients. Regressions for the full sample include industry, branch and year-month 
dummies, but they do not include the variable Loan officer change because for all 
first loans this variable is zero by definition and thus its effect is diluted. The 
regression for the subsample of repeat clients includes firm fixed effects to account 
for unobserved firm heterogeneity and year-month dummies. The branch dummies as 
well as the variables Initially young, Initially small and Sole proprietorship are 
excluded from this regression due to (almost) no within-variation. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
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Table 19. Relationship effects on credit constraints 
Column (1) includes results for the full sample from an OLS regression and column (2) reports results 
from a fixed effects regression for the subsample of Repeat clients (loans disbursed to firms that take 
out more than one loan from the Bank during the observation period). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and account for clustering at the firm level. The dependent variable Requested-granted 
ratio is the requested loan amount as a share of the granted loan amount and indicates the extent of 
credit constraints. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 16. ***, **, * denote significance at 
the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
      
  
                             (1)                                 (2) 
               Full sample             Repeat clients 
      
Times_2 -0.032*** 
 
-0.065*** 
 
 (0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
Times_3 -0.040*** 
 
-0.090*** 
 
 (0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
Times_4 -0.043*** 
 
-0.107*** 
 
 (0.005) 
 
(0.010) 
 
Times_5 -0.055*** 
 
-0.141*** 
 
 (0.006) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Initially young 0.057*** 
 
 
 
 (0.004) 
 
 
 
Times_2*Initially young -0.043*** 
 
-0.026*** 
 
 (0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
Times_3*Initially young -0.049*** 
 
-0.020* 
 
 (0.008) 
 
(0.011) 
 
Times_4*Initially young -0.042*** 
 
-0.021 
 
 (0.013) 
 
(0.016) 
 
Times_5*Initially young -0.071*** 
 
-0.052*** 
 
 (0.014) 
 
(0.020) 
 
Initially small 0.051*** 
 
 
 
 (0.004) 
 
 
 
Times_2*Initially small -0.050*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
 (0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
Times_3*Initially small -0.058*** 
 
-0.053*** 
 
 (0.005) 
 
(0.007) 
 
Times_4*Initially small -0.079*** 
 
-0.073*** 
 
 (0.008) 
 
(0.010) 
 
Times_5*Initially small -0.071*** 
 
-0.058*** 
 
 (0.008) 
 
(0.011) 
 
Loan officer change  
 
0.027*** 
 
    
  
(0.004) 
  
Sole proprietorship -0.029*** 
 
 
 
 (0.004) 
 
 
 
Assets -0.026*** 
 
-0.016*** 
 
 (0.001) 
 
(0.004) 
 
Leverage 0.065*** 
 
0.043*** 
 
 (0.006) 
 
(0.011) 
 
Disposable income -0.004*** 
 
-0.013*** 
 
  (0.001) 
  
(0.003) 
  
Fixed capital loan -0.018*** 
 
-0.007** 
 
 (0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
Annuity loan -0.003 
 
0.000 
 
  (0.008) 
  
(0.011) 
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Table 19. Cont. 
    
  
  
  
Constant 0.448*** 
 
0.368*** 
 
  (0.019) 
  
(0.037) 
  
Observations 98,987 
 
64,075 
 
Method OLS 
 
Panel FE 
 
R² (adjusted / within) 0.069 
 
0.040 
 
Industry-fixed effects yes 
 
no 
 
Firm-fixed effects no 
 
yes 
 
Branch-fixed effects yes 
 
no 
 
Time-fixed effects yes 
  
yes 
  
 
Effects of asymmetric information indicators and firm and loan variables 
Column (1) of Table 19 presents OLS estimates for the full sample. The results 
confirm that firms with more intense bank relationships and more transparent and 
less risky firms experience lower observed credit constraints.  
The variables Times_2, …, Times_5 capture the effect which the intensity of the 
bank-borrower relationship has on observed loan size constraints for the initially 
older and larger firms. The more often such a firm borrows from the Bank, the less 
credit constrained it is with credit constraints decreasing most distinctly between the 
first two interactions (3.2%). Those firms that are Initially young or Initially small 
experience credit constraints that are higher than those for the initially older (5.7% 
on average) or initially larger (5.1% on average) firms. The significantly negative 
coefficients for the interaction effects of Times_2, …, Times_5 and Initially young 
and Initially small respectively indicate that the reduction of credit constraints over a 
loan sequence is more pronounced for initially younger and smaller firms. For 
instance, between the first two interactions Initially young firms experience on 
average an additional 4.3% decrease in loan size constraints compared to initially 
older firms. For Initially small firms this additional decrease is 5.0%.   
The additional firm and loan characteristics show that observed credit constraints 
also depend on the general financial transparency of the firm and the observable 
credit risk. Larger firms in terms of Disposable income and firms taking out a Fixed 
capital loan are less credit constrained. Since firms with more disposable income are 
less vulnerable in case of external shocks to their business and since fixed capital 
assets may be sold in case of default these loans may be considered as less risky. 
Besides, investments in fixed assets may be more difficult to be split which leaves 
less scope for loan size constraints. At the same time, firms that show a higher 
Leverage are more constrained further indicating that the Bank is concerned with 
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observable credit risk when constraining credit. Surprisingly, Sole proprietorships 
which are considered to be less transparent than incorporated firms face lower credit 
constraints. Nevertheless, the Bank may assess them to be less risky because of their 
owners’ unlimited liability and because the firm management does not easily change. 
These results provide information on the criterions that matter for observed credit 
constraints. While the economic impact of the additional firm characteristics is 
relatively small, being a young or small firm when starting the bank relationship are 
important factors of receiving smaller than requested loan amounts. The generally 
higher constraints for Initially young and Initially small firms indicate that the extent 
of (publicly) available information between borrowers matters for being credit 
constrained. Besides, the more pronounced reduction in observed credit constraints 
over time for the initially young and small firms implies that the positive information 
from due repayment is especially important for these borrower groups to reduce the 
Requested-granted ratio over multiple interactions. This complements the findings in 
Norden and Weber (2010a) that the negative information from abnormal credit line 
usage leads to tighter terms on subsequent loans. In that sense, the Requested-
granted ratio may also be interpreted as a measure of the firm’s credit worthiness. 
Finally, these results rule out that borrowers overstate their demand as a reaction to 
previous constraints. Such a dynamic process would not induce the observed 
reduction in the Requested-granted ratio, especially not its distinct decline between 
the first and second interactions. 
 
Repeat clients 
The results from the repeat client analysis presented in column (2) are very similar 
to those from the full sample in column (1). Thus, when focusing on borrowers’ loan 
sequences and controlling for unobserved borrower heterogeneity we also find that 
the intensity of the bank-borrower relationship and the initial firm age and size are 
important determinants of the extent of observed credit constraints. A Loan officer 
change leads to higher credit constraints, but the economic effect is relatively small 
(2.7%). This confirms the reasoning in Berger and Udell (2002) that not all of the 
soft information gathered by loan officers can be transformed into common 
knowledge within the Bank. An alternative explanation would be that the borrower 
and the loan officer were colluding leading to better loan terms than the borrower 
risk would justify. In this case, an increase in credit constraints after a loan officer 
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change would imply a stricter, more objective assessment of the borrower’s risk and 
repayment capacity by the new loan officer. Furthermore, we find confirmation for 
the earlier result that more transparent and less risky (Disposable income, Fixed 
capital loan) borrowers are less credit constrained. Not surprisingly, Leverage does 
not play any significant role in this fixed effects regression since it varies very little 
over time. 
 
4.4.2 Requested and granted loan amounts and their development over time 
Employing a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints that incorporates 
loan demand has confirmed the positive relation between close bank relationships 
and credit availability established by previous studies that use indirect or equilibrium 
outcome measures of credit constraints (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)). The approach so far has crucially relied on the 
assumption that the observed requested and granted loan amounts mirror ‘real’ 
demand and supply. Yet, they may also be mere strategic indications arising from 
previous experience with the same contract partner and the loan negotiation process. 
Therefore, we take the analysis one step further and shed light on the movements of 
requested and granted loan amounts over borrowers’ loan sequences. The structure of 
the dataset enables us to disentangle whether the observed reduction in credit 
constraints stems from the Bank’s willingness to provide more funds to more 
transparent borrowers as is generally assumed in the literature. Alternatively or 
simultaneously, the borrower might learn over time what is reasonable to request 
from the Bank, which would also lead to a decrease of credit constraints over loan 
sequences.48   
Table 20 reports results for the determinants of requested and granted loan 
amounts with special focus on the influence of relationship measures and the 
dynamics that may drive the borrowers’ and the Bank’s decisions when contracting 
repeatedly.  
 
 
                                                 
48
 This does not imply that the borrower may not be credit constrained at other banks. This does also 
not imply that the borrower would not prefer to realize a larger loan amount if it was possible. 
However, the structure of the dataset allows us to observe the evolution of borrowers’ requests over 
multiple interactions with the same lender and to draw conclusions on borrower learning from the 
results.  
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Table 20. Requested and granted loan amounts over loan sequences 
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions for the subsample of Repeat clients (loans 
disbursed to firms that take out more than one loan from the Bank during the observation period). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and account for clustering at the firm level. The dependent 
variables are Requested amount which is the requested loan amount in log EUR in columns (1) and (2) and 
Granted amount which is the granted loan amount in log EUR in columns (3) and (4). All explanatory 
variables are defined in Table 16. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Repeat clients Repeat clients Repeat clients Repeat clients 
Dependent variable Requested amount Requested amount Granted amount Granted amount 
Times_3 0.166***  0.360***  0.199***  0.151***  
 (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.025)  
Times_4 0.299***  0.454***  0.353***  0.325***  
 (0.025)  (0.037)  (0.024)  (0.036)  
Times_5 0.392***  0.509***  0.467***  0.443***  
 (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.045)  
Previous constraints -0.097***  -0.019  0.013  -0.004  
 (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.011)  
Times_3*Previous constraints   -0.149***    0.037**  
   (0.016)    (0.015)  
Times_4*Previous constraints   -0.119***    0.021  
   (0.022)    (0.021)  
Times_5*Previous constraints   -0.088***    0.018  
      (0.025)       (0.024)   
Loan officer change -0.178***  -0.179***  -0.197***  -0.197***  
  (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012)   
Age 0.131*  0.154**  0.117  0.113  
 (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.073)  (0.073)  
Assets 0.065***  0.068***  0.093***  0.092***  
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
Asset growth 0.054***  0.052***  0.044***  0.044***  
 (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Leverage -0.427***  -0.424***  -0.464***  -0.465***  
 (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.039)  
Disposable income 0.115***  0.115***  0.117***  0.117***  
  (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.011)   
Fixed capital loan 0.370***  0.372***  0.377***  0.377***  
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Annuity loan 0.529***  0.528***  0.506***  0.506***  
  (0.033)   (0.033)   (0.032)   (0.032)   
Constant 6.130***  5.937***  5.528***  5.570***  
  (0.285)   (0.282)   (0.276)   (0.277)   
Observations 40,345  40,345  40,345  40,345  
Method Panel FE  Panel FE  Panel FE  Panel FE  
R² (within) 0.222  0.226  0.242  0.243  
Industry fixed effects no  no  no  no  
Firm-fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Branch fixed effects no  no  no  no  
Time-fixed effects yes   yes   yes   yes   
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Columns (1) and (2) contain estimates for the determinants of Requested amount. 
The estimates in column (1) reveal several interesting findings. Generally, firms 
request larger loan amounts over the loan sequence (Times_3, …, Times_5). For 
instance, requested loan amounts for the third loan are by 16.6% higher than for the 
second loan. One reason may be that firms grow over time and therefore need to 
finance larger investments. This is supported by the positive relation between firm 
Age and the requested loan amount. Nevertheless, another explanation may be that 
especially the larger firms in the sample stay with the Bank for more interactions. We 
explicitly account for this possible drop-out problem in Table 21 by relating the 
number of loans a firm takes out to firm characteristics. The negative coefficient of 
Previous constraints indicates that the more credit constrained a borrower was at the 
previous loan, the lower the requested amount at the current loan. On average, the 
requested amount at the current loan decreases by 9.7% with each higher category of 
Previous constraints. 
To assess how the relation between the number of interactions between a firm and 
the Bank (Times_3, ..., Times_5) and the Requested amount is moderated by the 
experience to be credit constrained at the previous loan we introduce the interaction 
terms of both variables in column (2).  
 
Figure 7. Requested loan amounts and the extent of previous credit constraints 
This figure displays the effect of high vs. no previous credit constraints (Previous constraints = 2 vs. 
Previous constraints = 1) on the relation between Requested amount and the Times dummies. See 
Table 16 for definitions of all variables. 
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Figure 7 illustrates the results and shows that, in the beginning of the relationship, 
the increase in requested loan amounts is flatter for those borrowers that experienced 
high credit constraints in the past. Thus, while borrowers increase their loan requests 
over time they seem to learn from previous credit constraints how much to 
reasonably request from this Bank and adapt their requested loan amounts during the 
first few interactions accordingly. This result is similar to the learning through 
negative feedback which Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix and Laibson (2008) find when 
studying customers’ reactions to paying (penalty) fees in the credit card market. 
Importantly, this result is not driven by constrained firms requesting comparatively 
lower loan amounts because they experience lower growth rates. Comparing the 
growth rates of previously constrained vs. unconstrained borrowers shows that 
constrained borrowers even grow significantly more (0.56 vs. 0.49, p-val.<0.05) than 
unconstrained borrowers. 
The firm level variables suggest that borrowers value the relationships with their 
loan officers. After a Loan officer change has occurred borrowers request 
considerably lower (17.8%) loan amounts. Often borrowers follow their loan officers 
to other banks doing some of their banking business with the new bank but not fully 
leaving this Bank because they already have an account there and value the services 
this Bank offers. The additional firm and loan controls show that larger (Assets) and 
faster growing (Asset growth) borrowers with a higher monthly repayment capability 
(Disposable income) request larger loan amounts while firms with a higher Leverage 
ask for smaller loans. Finally, since they presumably finance larger investments, 
loans intended for fixed capital financing and loans with a regular repayment 
schedule (Annuity loan) are requested with larger amounts than working capital loans 
and credit lines or overdrafts. 
Turning to the determinants of the Bank’s granted loan amounts, columns (3) and 
(4) reveal that all variables show the same signs as in the regressions for the firms’ 
requested loan amounts with the interesting exception of the variable Previous 
constraints and its interactions with Times_3, ..., Times_5. However, these effects are 
much smaller and less precisely measured than on the borrower side. The results in 
column (3) show that, in accordance with borrowers requesting larger loan amounts 
over time, the Bank also grants larger loan amounts over a loan sequence. For 
instance, granted loan amounts for the third loan are by 19.9% higher than for second 
loans. Although the effect of the previous experience with credit constraints is not 
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statistically significant, the significantly positive interaction term Times_3*Previous 
constraints indicates that the Bank grants relatively more to borrowers facing high in 
contrast to no constraints at their previous loans in early stages of the relationship. 
Figure 8 illustrates that the slope of the regression line for those borrowers that were 
highly constrained at their previous loan is steeper up to loan number three than the 
slope of the regression line for those borrowers that did not face any credit 
constraints at their previous loan with the effect leveling off afterwards. 
The firm level variables reveal that granted loan amounts are considerably smaller 
after a Loan officer change with this effect being economically stronger (19.7%) than 
on the demand side. This may imply that indeed some proprietary information is lost 
when loan officers are assigned new portfolios or leave the Bank. Alternatively this 
finding may be a sign of previous collusion between the borrower and the loan 
officer leading to excessively large loan amounts. After a loan officer change, the 
new loan officer conducts a thorough financial analysis on which the decision about 
the granted loan terms are solely based. To investigate this issue more deeply, we 
replace the variable Loan officer change in all the regressions with an indicator 
measuring the number of loans a borrower has been with the same loan officer when 
taking out the current loan (results not reported here).  
It turns out that each additional interaction with the same loan officer increases 
requested loan amounts by 9% (p-val.<0.01) and granted loan amounts by 11% (p-
val.<0.01) with this effect being stronger than the average effect of the Times 
dummies. Although there are a few relationships between borrowers and loan 
officers for which collusion might be a possible explanation because they last up to 
nine interactions, the average number of interactions with a loan officer is 1.7 for 
repeat clients leaving little room for collusion. Therefore, it seems as if the reduction 
in informational asymmetries especially in the beginning of a relationship and the 
partial loss of the acquired information during a loan officer change is the main 
driver of the observed decrease in loan amounts after a loan officer change.   
The other firm and loan level variables show that Granted amount is mainly 
determined by the firm’s financial transparency and credit risk. Older and larger 
firms (Age, Assets) and firms with more Disposable income are granted larger 
amounts while more indebted firms (Leverage) are granted smaller amounts. Also, 
loans that finance a fixed asset (Fixed capital loan) which may be difficult to be split 
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and may be sold in case of default and Annuity loans with regular repayment 
schedules and thus lower risk show higher granted amounts.   
 
Figure 8. Granted loan amounts and the extent of previous credit constraints 
This figure displays the effect of high vs. no previous credit constraints (Previous constraints = 2 vs. 
Previous constraints = 1) on the relation between Granted amount and the Times dummies. See Table 
16 for definitions of all variables. 
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Summarizing, being able to disentangle the dynamic patterns that arise when 
borrower and bank start a relationship and interact repeatedly reveals several 
interesting results. First, we find that both requested and granted loan amounts 
increase considerably over time. Second, the gap between requested and granted loan 
amounts decreases especially in the beginning of the relationship due to a 
convergence of both sides with requested amounts increasing more moderately and 
granted amounts increasing more strongly when borrowers experience high vs. no 
previous credit constraints. And third, we observe the effects on the borrowers’ side 
not to be driven by reduced firm growth of the credit constrained firms. These 
findings imply that borrowers react to the experience of receiving smaller than 
requested loan amounts by more moderate requests at their next loan application, 
thus avoiding being highly constrained again. Therefore, they seem to learn from the 
feedback they get from previous experiences.   
This learning process is possibly accompanied by the firms’ entering into other 
bank relationships. Although the data does not include a direct measure of the 
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number of banks a firm deals with, comparing information on firms’ total liabilities 
and the amounts they receive at this Bank justifies the conclusion that a large fraction 
of firms has more than one source of credit, especially after the first few interactions 
with this Bank. Therefore, it may be unproblematic for many firms to adjust their 
requests at this Bank obtaining funds from other lenders at the same time.49 
Nevertheless, their repayment capacity should have increased over time according to 
the increased granted loan amounts at this Bank because Bulgaria has had a public 
credit register during the whole observation period and a private credit bureau since 
2005 from which the Bank can gather information on a borrower’s various loans.  
At the same time, the Bank seems to make use of initial loan size constraints to 
overcome information and incentive problems increasing loan sizes 
disproportionately after due repayment when contracting repeatedly (e.g. Armendariz 
de Aghion and Murdoch (2005) and Martinelli (1997)). This is in line with 
arguments that bank relationships are valuable because banks are able to collect and 
assess information in due course and benefit borrowers by better loan terms over 
time (see e.g. Boot (2000) for an overview).    
 
4.4.3 Extensions 
The previous analysis did not explicitly take into account that the number of loans 
a borrower stays with the Bank may depend on firm characteristics or previous 
experience with the Bank. Moreover, it did not deal with possible loan maturity 
constraints which may be prevalent besides loan size constraints. The following 
sections report results from extensions to the previous regressions accounting for 
these two issues. 
 
Sample attrition 
In the dataset, there is substantial attrition meaning that borrowers do not return to 
the Bank for another loan after repaying the current one or, at least, wait relatively 
long to take out another loan so that we cannot observe their coming back. It is 
                                                 
49
 We calculate an indicator for other bank relationships from the information we have and include it 
into the regressions specified in Table 20. It is significantly and positively related to both requested 
and granted amount while the effects of all other variables remain qualitatively unchanged. Similarly, 
Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2010) find for their sample of large firms that borrowing 
from a prior lender leads to better granted loan terms even if borrowers have multiple sources of 
external financing.  
 116 
plausible to assume that this process is not random but depends on borrower 
characteristics (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2010)). On the one hand, 
borrowers may not come back to the Bank for another loan because they have 
generated enough internal revenues to finance future projects. Alternatively, 
borrowers may turn to another bank because they were highly credit constrained at 
this Bank or because other banks offer lower interest rates. Furthermore, borrowers 
may follow their loan officers to other banks because they feel that the relationship is 
more with the loan officer than with the Bank as a whole. On the other hand, the 
Bank may have reasons to deny another loan to borrowers who have defaulted on 
their previous loan or whose repayment behavior has been inadequate. The Bank 
may not extend another loan if the firm’s financial situation has deteriorated or if the 
firm has proven not to be viable. 
Unfortunately, we can neither directly observe a borrower’s decision whether to 
ask for another loan nor do we have information on the Bank’s decision to deny a 
loan application. However, the dataset’s information on previous credit constraints, 
loan officer changes, firm and loan characteristics as well as borrowers’ repayment 
behavior based on arrears allows us to deal with the attrition problem nevertheless. 
To account for the attrition process we follow the approach in Wooldridge (1995).50 
Firstly, we estimate probit regressions for each period (loan number) to obtain the 
probability of observing loan k+1 based on the credit constraint and the firm and 
loan characteristics for loan k as well as the borrower’s risk category (four categories 
depending on the days of arrears) at the time of repayment of loan k. Apart from that, 
we include two dummy variables indicating whether loan k is an add-on loan which 
should decrease the probability to take out even another loan and whether it is a 
short-term loan which should increase the probability of a further loan. Interestingly, 
the extent of previous credit constraints does not seem to have a major impact on the 
decision to apply for a further loan. The other explanatory variables display the signs 
as expected by the above reasoning. 
 
 
                                                 
50
 This approach is similar to the Heckman (1979) selection model which is widely used to account for 
non-random sample selection in cross-sectional studies (examples in the finance literature are Brown, 
Ongena, Popov and Yesin (2010), Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010), Cerqueiro (2008) and 
Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2008)). Modelling non-random attrition in a panel dataset extends to 
estimating a selection equation for each period. In our case this means to estimate for each loan 
number the probability that borrowers take out a subsequent loan.   
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Table 21. Sample attrition 
This table reports results from fixed effects regressions for the subsample of Repeat clients (loans 
disbursed to firms that take out more than one loan during the observation period). Standard errors 
(reported in parentheses) are bootstrapped to derive their correct values in the two-step procedure. In the 
first step (not reported) inverse Mills ratios are estimated to account for sample attrition which are 
included as regressors in the reported second-stage regressions. Chi²-statistics from a Wald test of the 
joint significance of the inverse Mills ratios are reported as well. The dependent variables are Requested 
amount which is the requested loan amount in log EUR in columns (1) and (2) and Granted amount which 
is the granted loan amount in log EUR in columns (3) and (4). All explanatory variables are defined in 
Table 16. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Repeat clients Repeat clients Repeat clients Repeat clients 
Dependent variable Requested amount Requested amount Granted amount Granted amount 
Times_3 0.308***  0.497***  0.330***  0.279***  
 (0.040)  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.044)  
Times_4 0.457***  0.609***  0.509***  0.482***  
 (0.047)  (0.054)  (0.046)  (0.053)  
Times_5 0.593***  0.717***  0.671***  0.648***  
 (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.059)  (0.064)  
Previous constraints -0.097***  -0.018  0.014*  -0.004  
 (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.012)  
Times_3*Previous constraints   -0.147***    0.040**  
   (0.016)    (0.016)  
Times_4*Previous constraints   -0.119***    0.021  
   (0.021)    (0.019)  
Times_5*Previous constraints   -0.096***    0.018  
      (0.025)       (0.025)   
Loan officer change -0.154***  -0.155***  -0.174***  -0.173***  
  (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.013)   
Age 0.201**  0.225***  0.178**  0.173**  
 (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.083)  (0.083)  
Assets 0.063***  0.067***  0.090***  0.089***  
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  
Asset growth 0.053***  0.051***  0.045***  0.045***  
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  
Leverage -0.412***  -0.408***  -0.452***  -0.453***  
 (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  
Disposable income 0.115***  0.115***  0.117***  0.117***  
  (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.011)   
Fixed capital loan 0.362***  0.364***  0.370***  0.369***  
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  
Annuity loan 0.554***  0.553***  0.531***  0.532***  
  (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.031)   (0.031)   
Constant 6.488***  6.279***  6.045***  6.090***  
  (0.279)   (0.283)   (0.284)   (0.283)   
Chi²-statistic: test of joint 
significance of Mills ratios 52.12***   50.59***   50.36***   51.09***   
Observations 40,234  40,234  40,234  40,234  
R² (within) 0.225  0.228  0.245  0.246  
Industry fixed effects no  no  no  no  
Firm-fixed effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Branch fixed effects no  no  no  no  
Time-fixed effects yes   yes   yes   yes   
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Secondly, we calculate the respective inverse Mills ratios from these regressions 
and include them in the fixed effects regressions for the Requested amount and the 
Granted amount. A test of attrition bias is then a Wald test of the coefficients of the 
inverse Mills ratios being jointly equal to zero. Since the second-stage regressions 
include the inverse Mills ratios as additional regressors which depend on the first-
stage probit parameter estimates we bootstrap the standard errors performing 300 
replications to derive their correct values. 
Table 21 reports the estimates for the determinants of Requested amount in 
columns (1) and (2) and of Granted amount in columns (3) and (4) after correcting 
for a possible attrition bias. The significant Chi²-statistics in all columns show that 
the null hypothesis of all Mills ratios being jointly zero can be rejected implying that 
there is attrition bias in the data. Nevertheless, all results from the basic regressions 
in Table 20 are qualitatively confirmed even after controlling for the attrition bias 
while the bootstrapped standard errors are somewhat larger than those adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level in Table 20. 
 
Loan maturity constraints 
The importance of the loan maturity as a monitoring device and in dealing with 
borrower risk has been established by theoretical (e.g. Flannery (1986), Diamond 
(1991) and Diamond (2004)) as well as empirical papers (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, 
Frame and Miller (2005), Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant (2008), Ortiz-Molina 
and Penas (2008) and Kirschenmann and Norden (2010)). The descriptive statistics 
in Table 18 suggest that amount and maturity are complementary loan terms for the 
majority of loans. The following analysis therefore concentrates on those loans for 
which the Bank only adjusts one of the two loan terms to assess whether and in 
which cases the Bank uses maturity constraints rather than loan size constraints to 
deal with borrower risk and agency problems. Table 22 reports descriptive statistics 
for the two groups of loans for which the Bank either adjusted maturity or amount. 
Columns (1) and (2) include loans for which the granted amount equals the 
requested amount. These loans were either granted with a shorter than requested 
maturity (column (1)) or a longer than requested maturity (column (2)). They show 
that loans with a shorter than requested maturity carry comparatively small amounts 
but were requested with relatively long maturities. The asymmetric information 
indicators display that these are loans made early in a relationship. Interestingly, the 
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firm characteristics, especially size (Assets) and repayment capacity (Disposable 
income), do not differ considerably for the two groups. In contrast, columns (3) and 
(4) show that the adjustment of the loan size crucially depends on firm characteristics 
and the extent of asymmetric information in the beginning of the relationship 
(Initially young, Initially small). This is in line with the results from the previous 
regression analysis. We conclude from these findings that the incidence of receiving 
a shorter than requested maturity mainly occurs if borrowers apply for a maturity that 
is obviously too long in comparison to their requested (and granted) amount. As this 
seems to mostly happen in early stages of the relationship, it is another indication for 
learning at the borrower side.   
 
Table 22. Maturity constraints 
This table displays summary statistics for the loan, firm and asymmetric information variables for the 
two subsamples of loans for which either only maturity or only amount is adjusted in the loan granting 
process. See Table 16 for definitions of all variables. Note that for all otherwise log-transformed 
variables the statistics are calculated by using the original values. 
          
  Requested amount = Granted amount Requested maturity = Granted maturity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Requested 
maturity > 
Granted maturity 
Requested 
maturity < 
Granted maturity 
Requested amount 
> Granted amount 
Requested amount 
< Granted amount 
Loan characteristics         
Requested amount 4,866 5,417 8,323 6,643 
Granted amount 4,866 5,417 6,075 8,652 
Requested maturity 37.27 20.67 30.61 34.13 
Granted maturity 25.48 28.42 30.61 34.13 
Fixed capital loan 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.59 
Annuity loan 0.76 0.77 0.72 0.67 
      
Asymmetric information indicators       
Times 1.65 2.02 1.83 2.08 
Bank relationship 7.37 10.79 8.90 12.28 
Initially young 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.15 
Initially small 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.38 
Loan officer change 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 
      
Firm characteristics         
Age 8.25 8.60 8.20 8.92 
Sole proprietorship 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.86 
Assets 33,963 36,509 33,796 49,201 
Asset growth 0.68 0.46 0.43 0.50 
Leverage 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.18 
Disposable income 491 499 484 619 
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In a next step, we assess the determinants of maturity constraints more formally.51 
We re-estimate the regressions displayed in Table 19 with the dependent variable 
now being the ratio of requested to granted loan maturity. We restrict the estimation 
sample to those loans for which requested amount equals granted amount to assess 
whether the Bank uses maturity constraints instead. Except for the Times dummies 
the economic relevance of all explanatory variables is very small. Furthermore, 
Initially Young, Initially small and their interaction terms with the Times dummies 
are insignificant which confirms the descriptive findings in Table 22.  
Finally, we re-estimate all specifications displayed in Table 19 and Table 20 with 
the dependent variables being Requested maturity, Granted maturity or their ratio for 
the full sample. For the determinants of maturity constraints, it again turns out that 
the economic impact of the explanatory variables is relatively small with the 
exception of the Times dummies. The dynamic patterns for requested and granted 
maturity are qualitatively the same as in the amount regressions corroborating that 
amount and maturity are complementary loan terms.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This paper studies requested and granted loan amounts and their relation over a 
loan sequence for nearly 99,000 small loans granted by one bank in Bulgaria 
between April 2003 and September 2007. Unlike previous studies we observe the 
firm’s requested loan terms from loan applications and the Bank’s granted loan terms 
as stated in the loan contract. This allows us to disentangle demand and supply 
effects behind observed credit constraints and to establish the dynamic patterns that 
arise on both sides when bank and borrower interact repeatedly.  
Analyzing a more comprehensive measure of credit constraints which 
incorporates requested loan amounts shows that such observed credit constraints 
decrease significantly over loan sequences with this effect being particularly 
pronounced for firms that are comparatively young or small when starting to borrow 
from the Bank. Loan officer changes lead to higher observed credit constraints, 
which seems to be driven rather by the loss of private information than by a possible 
collusion between borrowers and their long-time loan officers. Finally, more 
transparent and less risky firms are less credit constrained.  
                                                 
51
 Detailed regression results are available from the author upon request. 
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Taking the analysis one step further and studying the dynamics behind the 
observed reduction of credit constraints over a bank-borrower relationship we find 
that both requested and granted loan amounts increase over time. Interestingly, the 
results suggest that the gap between requested and granted loan amounts decreases 
especially in the first periods of the relationship because both sides converge. When 
previous credit constraints were large, requested amounts increase more moderately 
and granted amounts increase more strongly than in the case of no previous 
constraints. The Bank seems to make use of dynamic incentives to overcome 
information and agency problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after due 
repayment when contracting repeatedly. While the Bank increases granted loan 
amounts when learning about borrowers’ risk and repayment behavior, borrowers 
seem to learn from the (negative) feedback they get from previous experiences with 
credit constraints at the Bank. 
One question that arises concerns the transferability of these results to other 
environments. On the one hand, concentrating the analysis on small loans from one 
bank in an emerging market provides an ideal ground for studying the influence of 
bank relationships on requested and granted loan terms because informational 
asymmetries are presumably severe. Furthermore, the loan granting process is the 
same for all observed loans reducing possible heterogeneity at this level. On the 
other hand, the bank and its loan contracts that are standardized with respect to 
interest rates and collateral requirements may seem special. Nevertheless, it provides 
a natural setting that allows gaining insights into the dynamics of requested and 
granted loan amounts in multiple interactions between borrowers and banks. 
Moreover, standardizing interest rates is not uncommon in other loan categories like 
overdrafts, for instance. Finally, our empirical procedure is applicable in many other 
lending contexts and should thereby contribute to a better understanding of the 
processes behind observed loan contracting outcomes. 
The dynamic patterns found in this study complement and connect key elements 
of the literatures on relationship lending, demand and supply effects in bank lending 
and credit availability of small firms. However, the ratio of requested to granted loan 
amounts which we denote as observed credit constraints may as well be a measure of 
borrower bargaining power or capture the borrower’s financial literacy. In addition, 
increased competition in lending to small businesses especially in transition countries 
which has led to increased multi-source borrowing by small firms is an important 
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aspect to understand whether borrowers are actually credit constrained when taking 
into account their different sources of external finance. Disentangling these various 
aspects with more comprehensive data (e.g. on borrowers’ different sources of credit 
- in markets with and without information sharing among lenders) and gaining 
deeper insights into the dynamics of bank and borrower behavior in bank lending 
seems to be a fruitful area of future research. 
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5 The impact of the US financial crisis on credit availability 
for small firms in Central Asia 
5.1 Introduction 
“Our present crisis is like no other,” says CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poor) CEO Elizabeth Littlefield. “Microfinance is far more connected now. 
While it still has deeply shock-resistant roots, and many places seem unaffected 
today, there is little doubt that there will be impact.” Whereas microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) and their customers have been found to be considerably resilient 
to the effects of previous financial crises, they are more likely to be affected by the 
current crisis because they have become more globally integrated in the past decade 
(e.g. Rhyne and Reddy (2006) and Galema, Lensink and Spierdijk (2008)). The 
global integration of financial markets contributed to worldwide liquidity and 
solvency problems of banks and the banking panic in the aftermath of the Lehman 
collapse in September 2008 which, in turn, is reported to have globally affected 
credit availability for firms and households (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) and 
Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009)). At the same time, firms around the world have 
been hit by a decline in demand due to the concurrent economic downturn. 
The goal of this paper is to understand, on a micro-level, how the current financial 
crisis, which has its roots in the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market, has 
globally impacted on bank lending to micro, small and medium enterprises in Central 
Asia. Does the financial crisis affect MFIs’ lending business? Is an observed 
reduction in credit availability driven by the bank offering less credit or by the 
borrowers demanding fewer loans? And which types of loans are affected most 
severely? These questions are of particular interest in the context of microfinance 
since one of its goals is to generally foster the availability of financial services to 
small enterprises and poor households. 
Among the emerging markets, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) seem to be 
hit hardest by the current financial crisis (CGAP (2009)). The region has some of the 
most elaborated and leveraged microfinance markets and therefore has felt the 
impacts of liquidity shortages and increased borrower risks very severely (Reille, 
Kneiding and Martinez (2009)). A survey among 44 MFIs in the ECA region (more 
than 400 worldwide) conducted by CGAP in early 2009 finds that clients in these 
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countries seem to be more affected by the crisis than clients in other regions. While 
urban clients of MFIs are found to be more affected by the crisis than rural ones 
(CGAP (2009)), there is by now only anecdotal evidence on how exactly MFIs’ 
clients are hit by the crisis. In general, a larger proportion of microenterprises is 
engaged in the supply of essential goods and services, for which demand fluctuates 
less even in times of crisis (Littlefield and Kneiding (2009)). SME businesses, in 
contrast, rather tend to provide non-essential goods and services (such as the sale of 
furniture and household appliances), for which demand typically decreases in 
economic downturns. However, it is also possible that micro borrowers are more 
severely hit by the effects of the crisis since these borrowers have often been the 
target of (aggressive) consumer lending. Especially in the well developed 
microfinance markets in Latin America and Eastern Europe the boundaries between 
micro loans and consumer finance have more and more blurred because often both 
products are offered by the same staff through the same technologies (e.g. Christen 
(2001) and Littlefield and Rosenberg (2004)). Thus, many micro entrepreneurs have 
borrowed from multiple sources and accumulated high levels of debt which makes 
them vulnerable to even small changes in their income positions. Therefore, the 
question whether the risks from lending to small and medium borrowers or those 
arising from microenterprise loans will be more worrisome to lenders remains to be 
answered empirically.  
We analyze a unique dataset including information from all business loan 
applications and loan contracts of AccessBank Azerbaijan between 2002 and 2009. 
AccessBank Azerbaijan provides an interesting object of study. While Azerbaijan’s 
banking sector as a whole is still comparatively small and not yet much globally 
integrated, providing some immunity to the spillovers of a global financial crisis, 
AccessBank itself is foreign-owned and largely refinanced in foreign currency as are 
many micro banks in the region. Due to the distortions in international capital 
markets, which, for instance, made the placement of a microfinance CDO 
impossible, the bank was hit by unforeseen delays in its refinancing pipeline in the 
second and third quarters of 2008 although its financial performance remained 
strong. This provides us with a natural experiment to study the effects of an external 
refinancing shock on bank lending. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s economy is weakly 
diversified and highly dependent on the development of the oil price making it 
vulnerable to the economic crisis that is brought about by the financial crisis. We 
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therefore explicitly distinguish between refinancing problems and increased 
borrower risk as the two possible causes for reduced credit availability which arise 
from the effects of the financial and economic crisis. This distinction is particularly 
important for policy makers and development practitioners when designing adequate 
measures to overcome periods of tight credit.   
Since we observe loan applications and the bank’s decision whether to approve 
the application as well as the requested and granted loan amounts, we study credit 
availability in two ways. First, we analyze the determinants of the probability that the 
bank approves a loan application. Second, we estimate a Heckman selection model to 
account for the bank’s two-stage decision process on whether and to what extent to 
constrain credit. We therefore analyze the determinants of the ratio of the granted to 
the requested loan amount given that the loan was approved in the first stage. 
Furthermore, we assess which loan types (agro, micro and SME) are affected most 
by the crisis and whether previous bank-borrower relationships help to mitigate 
credit constraints.  
Our empirical strategy allows us to identify three channels through which the 
financial and economic crisis affects credit availability for microfinance clients. On 
an individual loan level, we separate two channels of credit constraints by our 
distinction between loan approval rates and loan volume constraints. Our findings for 
those borrowers who actually apply for a loan suggest that credit availability for agro 
loan borrowers is merely affected by the crisis. This is surprising on first sight since 
agro loans are regularly classified as particularly risky because of their highly 
correlated risks in case of natural disasters or commodity price fluctuations (e.g. 
Wenner, Navajas, Trivelli and Tarazona (2007)). In an economic crisis like the 
current one, however, agro businesses in a country like Azerbaijan remain 
comparatively unaffected because they mostly produce crops and subsistence goods 
for local markets. Thus, such loans may offer some stability to a bank’s loan 
portfolio in times of a global financial and economic crisis. The same seems to apply 
to the diversification into different loan sizes as the micro loans in our sample show a 
considerably smaller reduction in approval rates due to the crisis than the SME loans 
which may be explained by their lower risk. SME borrowers whose firms are more 
likely to be internationally connected therefore have to face the greatest cuts to their 
credit availability. Overall, we find that credit constraints during the crisis mainly 
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work via the loan approval channel while volume constraints are of minor 
importance. 
We derive the third channel of credit constraints by analyzing aggregate numbers 
of loan requests and approvals. Our results suggest that the bank discourages 
potential borrowers from applying for new loans and existing customers from 
requesting additional loans during the period of refinancing delays and cancellations 
in the second and third quarters of 2008. The bank’s temporary liquidity squeeze 
therefore resulted in a slowdown of portfolio growth because lending had to be 
limited. Lending restrictions were implemented by tighter risk management as in the 
business loan portfolio mainly SME and high-risk micro loans were restricted. Thus, 
both the refinancing delays as well as borrowers’ increased credit risk seem to 
mainly reduce credit availability of SME and high-risk micro loans due to the bank’s 
tighter risk management during the crisis. Finally, we find that bank-borrower 
relationships are an important determinant for increasing credit availability for micro 
and SME borrowers in times of crises. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 embeds the paper into 
the literature. Section 5.3 provides information on Azerbaijan’s economy and how it 
is affected by the financial crisis. Section 5.4 describes the data and methodology 
while section 5.5 reports the empirical results. Section 5.6 concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
Our paper contributes to three strands of the banking and finance literature: the 
determinants of access to finance in developing and transition economies, the impact 
of financial crises on microfinance, and the effects of the current financial crisis on 
bank lending and the real economy. 
The access to finance literature examines factors that affect firms’ access to 
financial services. Determinants vary from factors external to a firm such as the 
institutional environment to internal firm characteristics. Among those internal 
factors, not only are the firms’ financial means important, but also qualitative 
information on the firms and their owners, particularly in the case of relationship 
lending (Boot (2000)). Two determinants of financing constraints which relate to the 
context of our study are financial development and firm size. Laeven (2003) and 
Love (2003) find that financial liberalization positively affects credit availability in 
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developing countries. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic (2006) show 
that larger, older, and foreign-owned firms have better access to finance. Similarly, 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008) report that stronger property rights 
protection benefits small firms disproportionately in their access to finance. While 
these studies have established differences in the levels of financial constraints faced 
by large vs. small firms, there has been relatively little research on the factors that 
determine credit availability for different firms within the universe of relatively small 
firms. We add to this literature by studying relatively small firms of various sizes 
(micro and SME) and different industries (agro vs. non-agro). We also extend the 
access to finance literature by providing first insights on the micro-level effects of a 
global financial and economic crisis on the lending activities of a foreign-owned 
microfinance bank. Global financial connections which are part of the financial 
development process may have adverse effects on credit availability in times of 
crises because it facilitates contagion among banks and countries (see e.g. Prasad, 
Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003)).    
The effects of the current financial and economic crisis on microfinance 
institutions and their clients can probably best be compared to the performance of 
MFIs and their portfolios during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998. One of 
the countries which was most affected by the Asian crisis was Indonesia52. McGuire 
and Conroy (1998) note that default rates in the microfinance sector increased 
strongly during the crisis. In this context, it is interesting that Patten, Rosengard and 
Johnston (2001) find differential effects with respect to repayment rates of 
microfinance compared to SME loans by analyzing the effects of the crisis on Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), one of the largest MFIs in the world. While in the 
microfinance portfolio nearly no effects on repayment behavior could be observed, 
nonperformance rates increased tremendously in the SME portfolio, especially for 
the loans denominated in USD as the rupiah underwent a strong devaluation during 
the crisis. Their findings imply that micro loans appear to be less risky in times of 
crises compared to SME loans. Since higher default rates and reduced credit 
availability may both be outcomes of higher credit risk, we complement these results 
                                                 
52
 Other countries which were strongly affected were Korea and Thailand while Bangladesh and the 
Philippines felt less impacts of the crisis (Radelet and Sachs (1998a, (1998b)). See also Borensztein 
and Lee (2002) for an analysis of the credit crunch following the financial crisis in Korea.  
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by showing that credit availability is similarly less affected for micro loans than for 
SME loans during the current financial crisis. 
Finally, our study adds to the growing literature on the effects of the current 
financial crisis on bank lending and the question whether these effects are mainly 
demand or supply driven. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) report that new lending in 
the US syndicated loan market dropped significantly during the crisis with this effect 
being considerably stronger for banks with less refinancing from deposits and higher 
risk of credit line drawdowns (e.g. if a bank co-syndicated more credit lines with 
Lehman). Huang (2009) studies the impact of bank performance on credit supply in 
terms of takedown volumes of credit lines in the US. The results suggest that mostly 
higher risk borrowers, borrowers with short relationships and smaller borrowers are 
affected by their bank’s financial situation, i.e. they show lower takedowns when 
their bank performs badly. Interestingly, these results suggest that credit lines are not 
perfect substitutes for cash because banks may have the power to influence takedown 
volumes due to their discretion over whether to waive borrowers’ compliance with 
financial covenants or collateral requirements. In a cross-country study of syndicated 
loans, De Haas and van Hooren (2009) analyze how banks adjust their lending 
behavior during a financial crisis. They find that banks increase their monitoring and 
screening efforts instead of simply cutting lending across the board. They also find 
that establishing a track-record with the bank through repeated interactions as a 
means to avoid tightened lending standards seems to be more important in emerging 
than in developed countries.  
While these papers are not able to distinguish between demand and supply effects, 
Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2009) and Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009) 
match information from loan applications and loan contracts to disentangle whether 
reduced credit availability is the result of demand or supply determinants. On the one 
hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the demand for loans will decrease during a 
financial and economic crisis due to fewer investment opportunities, especially if the 
economic downturn in the respective country is severe. On the other hand, Berg and 
Schrader (2009) find a positive credit demand response after natural disasters such as 
volcanic eruptions which are aggregate and unpredictable shocks as well. In addition, 
a slight positive demand effect for a given bank might be possible due to rejections 
of borrowers at other financial institutions. With respect to the evidence, Jimenez, 
Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2009) analyze the effec
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conditions on the availability of credit dependent on firm and bank balance sheet 
strength for their sample of Spanish firms. They find that tight monetary and 
economic conditions reduce the likelihood that a loan is granted and that effects seem 
to work strongly through the bank balance-sheet channel. Puri, Rocholl and Steffen 
(2009) study the effects of the financial crisis on retail lending at German savings 
banks and find a general decrease of loan demand after the beginning of the crisis. 
On the supply side, it turns out that affected banks are less likely to grant loans but 
that bank relationships help to mitigate this effect. Our paper is most closely related 
to the latter two studies since we are also able to distinguish between loan 
applications and loans granted. However, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first to provide loan-level evidence on the impacts of the current crisis on credit 
availability for micro, small and medium firms in an emerging market economy. 
 
5.3 Azerbaijan’s economy and the financial crisis 
Azerbaijan’s economy is highly dependent on the oil and gas sector. The high real 
growth rates of 12 percent on average since 1998 with a peak in 2007 of 25 percent 
would not have been possible without the oil sector which accounts for about 60 
percent of GDP and 95 percent of all exports (Economist Intelligence Unit (2009)). 
Furthermore, even though growth was strong, it is concentrated in urban areas and in 
the extractive sectors leading to high disparities within the country. Thus, while the 
average per capita income (in PPP) was at 11,413 USD in 2008 – corresponding de 
facto to a middle income country –an estimated 20 percent of the whole population 
still lives in poverty (Economist Intelligence Unit (2009), Hübner and Jainzik 
(2009)). Furthermore, the omnipresent corruption and state interventions in the 
economy are hindering the future development of the country.53 
The banking sector in Azerbaijan has shown high growth rates over the last years, 
starting from a relatively low level. Total sector assets grew by 78 percent to 8 
billion USD in 2007 while the total loan portfolio increased by 102 percent to 5.4 
billion USD (Central Bank Azerbaijan (2008)). Yet, financial intermediation 
measured as total banking assets over GDP is with 27 percent at year end 2007 still 
                                                 
53
 In 2008, Azerbaijan has ranked 158th out of 180 countries on the list of Transparency International 
(Transparency International (2008)).  
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low.54 The sector remains highly concentrated with the only state-owned bank 
(International Bank of Azerbaijan) accounting for 39 percent of total banking assets 
in April 2009. Besides of the private and state-owned banks, there exist 96 non-bank 
financial institutions. The microfinance sector is targeted by 12 banks and 20 non-
banks. Yet, even though the high number of banks may lead to the impression that 
the country is over-banked, access to credit especially for micro and small enterprises 
(MSEs) remains one of the main impediments for further growth especially in rural 
areas.  
Deposits are an important source of refinancing for the banking sector, but the 
limited trust of the population in the banking sector leads to a considerable number 
of households still keeping their savings under the mattress. Yet, deposits have been 
growing over the last years (44.7% in 2008). Nevertheless, access to long-term 
refinancing sources remains a challenge for the sector even more during the financial 
crisis.  
The global financial and economic crisis has affected Azerbaijan’s economy with 
growth being expected to slow down in 2009 to no more than 3% (Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2009)) from a growth rate of 25% in 2007. Compared to other CIS 
countries such as Georgia, the Ukraine or Russia the overall macroeconomic and 
financial situation seems rather comfortable due to the high growth rates and the 
constant inflow of hard currency during the years before the crisis. While other CIS 
countries suffered from high currency devaluation, Azerbaijan’s local currency, the 
Manat, remained stable. This stability can be associated with interventions of the 
Central Bank which, among other measures, spent 1.2 billion USD to keep the 
currency stable (Hübner and Jainzik (2009)). These interventions were important to 
maintain confidence in the currency. Yet, without the underlying economic 
fundamentals being at least more promising than in the rest of the region, these short-
term supporting measures would not have kept the Manat stable in more than the 
short run.  
 However, what was felt in the economy and in particular in sectors such as trade 
and construction was the drop in oil prices. Sectors that remained more or less 
unaffected were those which are mainly independent from international markets such 
                                                 
54
 For means of comparison, Georgia and Russia have financial intermediation ratios of 42 and 52 
percent, respectively. 
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as agriculture. Thus, the vulnerability of the Azerbaijani economy mainly stems from 
the lacking diversification which will remain a challenge for the future. 
With respect to the banking sector, indeed most banks had to stop lending at some 
point and the quality of the loan portfolio deteriorated from 2.2 to 3.2 percent of 
loans being delinquent by more than 90 days in the first quarter of 2009 (Central 
Bank Azerbaijan (2009)). Furthermore, those official figures reported by the Central 
Bank of Azerbaijan are most likely underestimating the actual figures as restructured 
loans, for instance, are not included. With respect to deposits, crisis-effects were 
visible as business clients increasingly withdrew their savings to keep their 
businesses going and households attempted to convert their savings from Manat to 
USD due to their fear that the Manat would devaluate. However, as the liquidity and 
funding situation of the Azerbaijani banks tightened in the third quarter of 2008, the 
Central Bank provided comprehensive stabilization measures which included, among 
others, an emergency facility for liquidity support and a decrease in the refinancing 
interest rate from 12 to 3 percent (Hübner and Jainzik (2009)). And while the low 
financial intermediation would otherwise be considered unsatisfactory, it helped the 
banking sector to remain somewhat immune against the effects of the crisis as the 
sector as a whole is only integrated into global financial markets in a limited way. 
Nevertheless, those few banks which are globally connected directly felt the effects 
of the turmoil in financial markets. Apart from that, all Azeri banks have had to deal 
with a possible increase in their customers’ risks.     
 
5.4 Data and methodology 
5.4.1 The dataset 
The data we use for the empirical analysis was generated using the Management 
Information System of AccessBank Azerbaijan. The data ranges from the first month 
of operation in November 2002 to August 2009 and therewith covers a period of 
close to seven years of operation and also a sufficient period for analyzing the effects 
of the financial and economic crisis.  
The mission of AccessBank is to provide financial services at European standards 
to micro and small businesses and low and medium income families while also 
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offering products for larger enterprises.55 AccessBank was founded by international 
financial institutions in October 2002 under the name Micro Finance Bank of 
Azerbaijan (MFBA). The bank has a full banking license and is a closed stock 
company under Azerbaijani law. Until today, AccessBank is the only fully-fledged 
bank targeting the micro and small business sector in Azerbaijan. The shareholders 
of the bank are with 20 percent each the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the German 
Development Bank KfW and the Black Sea Trade & Development Bank (BSTDB) 
as well as the Access Microfinance Holding AG (16.53%) and the consultant LFS 
(3.47%).  
With respect to debt refinancing, the bank has attracted refinancing funds from 
various international financial institutions (not only the shareholders) and has 
received two funds denominated in Manat from private capital sources. AccessBank 
has been rated BB+ by Fitch Ratings – the highest rating in Azerbaijan – which has 
helped the bank to complete the first bond issue on international capital markets by 
an Azeri issuer in 2008. The deposit portfolio of the bank is growing and its overall 
strong performance during the financial crisis has helped to attract various 
refinancing loans from the international (private) capital market so that the 
refinancing pipeline of the bank is strong.  
Nevertheless, the bank’s refinancing position was temporarily affected by the 
financial crisis in the second and third quarters of 2008 so that it did not have as 
much capital as would have been needed to meet total credit demand. This was not 
caused by a change in the investors’ perception of the institution but by the turmoil in 
capital markets which induced the cancellation of and delay in international 
refinancing. International capital markets were unable to provide the necessary 
liquidity because, for instance, a planned microfinance CDO could not be placed in 
the prevailing environment.  
Besides of the central branch in Baku, AccessBank has 22 branches located all 
over the country both in rural and urban areas. As of July 2009, the loan portfolio is 
concentrated in the trade sector (60% of outstanding loan amount, 40% of 
outstanding number of loans) and in the Baku area (62% of outstanding loan amount, 
46% of outstanding number of loans). However, services and agriculture have 
                                                 
55
 See http://www.accessbank.az/en/index.html or AccessBank (2008) for detailed information on the 
bank and its business activity.  
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increased in importance as have other regions of Azerbaijan. With respect to the total 
number of clients, AccessBank is with 63,432 business loan clients in July 2009 the 
leading bank in Azerbaijan. The market share of AccessBank was at 2.7% measured 
by the bank’s share of total banking assets while in the microfinance sector, the bank 
has a total market share of 38%. In particular due to the fact that AccessBank did not 
face serious long-lasting shortages of funds during the crisis and had to limit its 
lending business only for a short period of time, the bank was able to gain in market 
share and is now one of the ten biggest banks in Azerbaijan in terms of total loan 
portfolio. The bank has been profitable since 2004 and in 2008 the return on equity 
was at 44.4 percent. The portfolio quality is very good with a portfolio at risk 
(PAR>30 days) of below 1 percent in mid 2009.  
The total business loan portfolio at the end of July 2009 was at 235 million USD. 
The total number of business loans was at 65,238 of which 95 percent can be 
characterized as micro loans as they have a value of up to 10,000 USD. Besides of 
business loans, the bank offers retail and staff loans, yet business lending is the focus 
of the bank. Within the business portfolio, micro, small, and medium loans are 
offered. The various products not only differ by their loan sizes but also with respect 
to the loan granting process. While a personal visit of the loan officer is part of the 
rigorous financial analysis of all business clients, the analysis is more structured for 
SME loans including the consideration of longer time-periods and financial 
projections. Therefore, the loan terms of SME loans (loans with amounts of more 
than 10,000 USD and up to 500,000 USD) capture a broader range of individual risk 
factors, whereas loan terms for micro loans are more standardized due to their small 
amounts. Finally, an agro loan product was developed in 2007 which explicitly 
targets farmers and the agricultural sector by offering flexible disbursement and 
repayment schemes tied to the agricultural cycles and the respective cash-flows of 
agro-businesses.  
Given the differences between the various loan types and the clients they target, 
we treat agro, micro and SME loans separately throughout our analysis. In total, the 
bank disbursed 251,211 loans to 151,533 clients during the observation period. For 
each loan the dataset includes information on the loan amount requested by the 
borrower as stated in the loan application form as well as the granted loan terms 
(amount, maturity, currency and collateral) as stated in the loan contract. 
Furthermore, the data not only contains detailed information on the actual clients, but 
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also on those who applied for a loan, but were rejected. Table 23 provides definitions 
of all variables. 
We exclude all observations with missing loan or firm characteristics. Since we 
are interested in the effect of the US financial crisis on the availability of credit for 
firms that need loans to finance their business operations, we focus our analysis on 
investment loans and exclude all retail loans to private households and loans to bank 
staff. This leaves us with our final sample of 184,881 loans to 97,252 firms. 
 
Table 23. Variable definitions 
 Variable  Definition 
  
Dependent variables   
Approved Borrower's loan request was approved (1=yes, 0=no) 
Granted-requested ratio Share of the requested loan amount that was granted by the bank 
  
Loan characteristics   
Crisis Loan was granted after the collapse of Lehman (1=yes, 0=no) 
Agro Loan is an agro loan (1=yes, 0=no) 
Micro Loan is a micro loan with an amount up to 10,000 USD (1=yes, 0=no) 
SME 
Loan is an SME loan with an amount between 10,000 and 500,000 USD 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Requested amount Requested loan amount (USD) 
Collateral Value of collateral (USD) 
Repeat loan Loan is a repeat loan vs. first loan (1=yes, 0=no) 
Manat Loan is denominated in AZN (local currency) vs. USD (1=yes, 0=no) 
Branch 
Branch dummies which are one if loan was granted at one of the following 
branches: Baku, Gyanja, Jalilabad, Khachmaz, Lenkoran, Mingachevir, 
Qazax, Salyan, Sheki, Sumqayit and Zagatala   
  
Firm characteristics   
Age Age of firm owner at date of disbursement (years) 
Male Firm owner is male vs. female (1=yes, 0=no) 
Married Firm owner is married at date of disbursement (1=yes, 0=no) 
 
5.4.2 The bank’s business loan portfolio 
Table 24 provides a detailed overview of the bank’s business loan portfolio during 
the observation period. While Panel A shows the number of disbursed loans by year 
for our three loan categories of agro, micro and SME loans and the number of 
rejected loans, Panel B displays the respective total volumes of the loans disbursed. 
The majority of loans in our sample are micro loans (75% in terms of numbers and 
56% in terms of volume) with a loan size of up to 10,000 USD. However, when 
considering total loan volumes, it becomes clear that SME loans make up a sizable 
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part of the bank’s business loan portfolio with a share of 35%. Agro loans, which 
were introduced only quite recently, seem to play an increasingly important role in 
the bank’s lending business. Rejection rates were substantial in the beginning of the 
bank’s operations but have come down to less than 6% in 2009. One explanation is 
that the bank deals with more and more repeat clients over time so that it can assess 
their credit risk better due to reduced informational asymmetries. At the same time, 
(potential) borrowers might have become acquainted to the bank’s loan granting 
standards and have learnt to better self-assess whether their loan application will be 
successful or turned down (see Kirschenmann (2010) for borrower learning in 
repeated interactions with the same lender).  
 
Table 24. Lending by year and loan type 
This table reports statistics on the bank's loan portfolio for the full sample and the following 
subsamples: Agro: Loans intended for agricultural investments. Micro: Loans with loan amounts up to 
10,000 USD (from 2008: also with amounts up to 20,000 USD). SME: Loans with loan amounts of 
more than 10,000 USD and up to 500,000 USD. Rejected: Loan applications that were turned down 
by the bank. 
     
 
Panel A. Number of loans disbursed and rejected 
            
  Rejected Agro Micro SME Total 
2002 80  104  184 
2003 503  2,888 66 3,457 
2004 860  3,583 154 4,597 
2005 1,010  6,789 369 8,168 
2006 1,363  16,561 739 18,663 
2007 2,408 2,163 32,661 1,202 38,434 
2008 3,086 10,105 41,349 1,523 56,063 
2009 3,144 15,635 35,589 947 55,315 
Total 12,454 27,903 139,524 5,000 184,881 
      
     
Panel B. Volume of loans disbursed (USD) 
          
  Agro Micro SME Total 
2002  115,535  115,535 
2003  5,788,970 1,292,500 7,081,470 
2004  6,597,272 3,828,095 10,425,367 
2005  13,754,232 11,831,532 25,585,765 
2006  32,239,557 28,260,126 60,499,683 
2007 3,655,380 69,632,677 50,910,208 124,198,266 
2008 22,266,514 125,173,771 81,594,199 229,014,584 
2009 33,719,686 112,488,057 49,922,596 196,130,338 
Total 59,641,579 365,770,172 227,639,257 653,051,008 
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Since we observe both loan applications and actually granted loans we are able to 
establish the impact of the financial crisis on borrowers’ requests and the bank’s 
decision to approve or reject the loan application and to assess whether the three 
subgroups of loans are affected differently.  
 
Figure 9. Loan applications and approvals for new vs. repeat borrowers 
 
Figure 9A. Agro loans 
  
 
Figure 9B. Micro loans 
  
 
Figure 9C. SME loans 
  
 
Figure 9 displays the number of loan applications and loan approvals during the 
period 2007 to 2009 for new vs. repeat borrowers in our three subsamples 
respectively. We focus the analysis on this time period because two major events that 
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may influence loan demand and supply decisions occurred in the meanwhile. Firstly, 
the financial crisis reached its peak with the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Inc. in September 2008. This led not only to worldwide turmoil in financial markets 
but also attributed to the sharp decline in oil prices and therefore affected both the 
Azerbaijani economy and its banking sector. Secondly, although AccessBank’s 
financial performance was strong, it experienced delays in its refinancing pipeline 
especially during the second and third quarters of 2008 because the capital markets 
were not able to provide the necessary liquidity. Together with the strong portfolio 
growth, these unexpected refinancing difficulties forced the bank to introduce limits 
on lending and portfolio growth which was done in accordance with risk 
considerations. 
Generally, while the first event may decrease loan applications as well as 
approvals, the second event should mainly influence the bank’s ability to meet given 
loan requests. However, the refinancing problems may also mirror themselves in the 
number of loan applications because of the particular marketing strategy of 
AccessBank (and similar micro banks). To attract new borrowers, the bank’s loan 
officers visit the surrounding potential clients and call their attention to the bank’s 
business. Otherwise, many potential borrowers would never learn that they are 
eligible for credit and how much they are actually able to take and repay. During the 
time of tight refinancing, the bank curtailed this active marketing of its products (e.g. 
loan officers were encouraged to take vacation) and therefore the number of loan 
applications may also decline due to the squeeze in the bank’s liquidity. 
Figure 9 shows that loan applications and approvals develop differently for the 
three subgroups. Agro loan applications drop considerably between March and June 
2008, especially for new agro borrowers. This is due to a combination of seasonal 
effects as agro clients’ income streams peak in spring and summer and stricter risk 
management due to the tightened refinancing situation which induced the bank to 
limit marginal (very small) lending that was often found not to be used for business 
enhancement in the past. Interestingly, loan applications of repeat borrowers 
decrease much less while they steadily increase for both new and repeat borrowers 
after this short period of retrenchment (Figure 9A). This is a first indication that the 
agricultural sector remained mostly unaffected by the financial crisis. Nevertheless, 
the bank’s refinancing difficulties and the subsequent introduction of tighter 
eligibility criteria during the second and third quarters of 2008 clearly affect agro 
 138 
lending because clients were obviously deterred from applying for loans. Loan 
approval rates (approved loans as a share of applied loans)56 slightly decrease during 
that period for the new borrowers but remain at a high level of more than 95% 
afterwards. Thus, while the bank obviously refrains from attracting new borrowers 
during the time of refinancing difficulties, it is still willing and able to meet most of 
the demand of those agro clients who actually request a loan.  
For micro loans, we similarly observe a considerable decrease in loan applications 
in the second quarter of 2008 and another decrease following the failure of Lehman 
in autumn 2008 (Figure 9B). These findings suggest that both the bank’s liquidity 
squeeze, again via tighter risk management, as well as the general economic impacts 
of the Lehman failure affected micro borrowers’ credit availability. This is also 
confirmed by the clear downward trend in approval rates for micro loans after mid 
2008. While approval rates for new micro loans are on average about 4 percentage 
points lower than for repeat micro loans, they particularly decrease during 2008, 
which may reflect that borrowers who were rejected at other banks turned to 
AccessBank and were denied a loan because they were the higher-risk borrowers.  
Figure 9C reveals that the demand for new and repeat SME loans is more volatile; 
however there is also a clear decline in the number of loan applications after March 
2008. For the repeat SME loans this decline is longer-lasting in comparison to the 
agro and micro loans indicating that the comparatively bigger firms in our sample are 
more seriously hit by the crisis. Since these firms are more likely to be 
internationally connected, they may have to cope with a larger and more persistent 
decrease in demand for their products. Agro and micro businesses, on the contrary, 
mostly produce subsistence goods and therefore remain better insulated from the 
effects of the financial and economic crisis. Furthermore, SME clients are more 
likely to finance fixed assets which are first to be postponed in times of crises while 
micro clients often take out working capital loans. Finally, with a decrease in housing 
prices in Azerbaijan, borrowing to finance real estate became less attractive. 
Considering the approval rates of SME loans, we observe a negative trend starting 
during the third quarter of 2008. Approval rates for SME loans decrease much more 
than for agro and micro loans from around 90% to 50% for new SME loans and from 
above 95% to 75% for repeat SME loans which seems to reflect the increased risk 
                                                 
56
 Separate graphs for the approval rates are available from the authors upon request. 
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associated with SME loans. A further explanation may be that it is easier and cheaper 
for the bank to “save” a certain amount of liquidity by denying some SME loans in 
contrast to a large number of micro loans.    
To sum up, Figure 9 suggests that both external events have an impact on the 
lending operations of AccessBank but that these effects vary for the three different 
types of loans. While credit availability for agro and micro borrowers decreases for a 
very short period due to the stricter risk management induced by the bank’s 
refinancing difficulties, credit availability for SME borrowers is tightened more 
persistently. For the latter not only reduced supply possibilities due to missing 
refinancing funds but also factors such as increased firm risk, especially after the 
Lehman failure, seem to play an important role.57 Thus, we do not find support for 
the conjecture that micro clients may be mostly affected by the crisis due to their 
high indebtedness from multiple (consumer) lenders. Moreover, the analysis of 
approval rates shows that previous bank relationships benefit borrowers by better 
credit availability and help to mitigate the negative crisis effects which is in line with 
the findings of Berg and Schrader (2009). 
Additionally and importantly, Figure 9 establishes the different mechanisms by 
which the refinancing and the Lehman effect influence credit availability. The 
refinancing delays seem to mainly affect the number of loan applications and much 
less the probability of receiving a loan, whereas the Lehman effect is especially 
important for SME loans and to a lower extent for micro loans, driving down both 
loan applications and approval rates after September 2008. Therefore, the refinancing 
effect reveals itself on an aggregate level but the Lehman effect may also be 
observed on an individual level. As the structure of our dataset allows us to measure 
credit availability on an individual level, a crucial part of the following analysis will 
be concerned with the impact of the crisis (measured by the Lehman failure) on 
credit availability in the three subgroups of loans.  
  
5.4.3 Determinants of credit availability 
We analyze the effects of the current financial crisis on the availability of credit 
for our sample of agro, micro and SME loans in two steps. First, we estimate a linear 
                                                 
57
 Analyzing total loan volumes and volume constraints also reveal that SME borrowers are most 
affected by the crisis. 
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probability model (LPM)58 in which the dependent variable Pr(Approved)i, k, t is the 
probability of firm i to receive loan k in period t: 
 
 Pr(Approved)i,k,t = αi + β1Ck,t + β2Lk,t + β3Fi,t + β4Tt + εi,k,t     (8) 
 
Ck,t is a dummy variable that indicates whether loan k was disbursed during the 
crisis while Lk,t and Fi,t are vectors of loan and firm characteristics including 11 bank 
branch dummies that control for the location of loan origination. Finally, Tt is a time 
trend accounting for the general macroeconomic conditions at the time of loan 
origination. 
Credit availability not only refers to the incidence whether a loan application is 
turned into a loan granted but also to the wedge between the granted amount and the 
requested amount for those loans that were approved. In a second step we therefore 
estimate a Heckman selection model. Since the extent of loan amount constraints is 
only observed for those loans which are actually approved and since approval is 
likely to be non-random, estimates of a simple OLS model would suffer from 
selection bias. A Heckman selection model incorporates the possible dependence in 
the two stages of the model and produces estimates that allow for predictions for the 
population and not only for the subsample of approved loans. We estimate equation 
(8) as the selection equation to obtain inverse Mill’s ratios which we then include in 
the outcome equation to account for the selection. To estimate unbiased second-stage 
standard errors in the presence of a regressor that depends on the first-stage 
parameter estimates, we bootstrap the standard errors using 50 replications. The 
dependent variable of the outcome equation is Granted-requested ratioi, k, t which is 
the share of the requested loan amount that was finally granted by the bank and 
therefore higher values of the variable indicate higher credit availability (or 
equivalently, lower credit constraints): 
 
Granted-requested ratioi, k, t = αi + β1Ck,t + β2Lk,t + β3Fi,t + β4Tt + εi,k,t   (9)    
 
                                                 
58
 We re-estimate all our regressions using probit and logit models. Since the estimates remain 
qualitatively the same, we restrict the presentation of results to the LPM models since they are easier 
to interpret.    
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All variables and vectors are defined as above. However, we exclude the branch 
dummies from the outcome equation and use them to identify the first stage 
regression. Branch specific effects such as the number and experience of loan 
officers should determine a branch’s capacity to make loans (approval decision). The 
actual degree of constraint, in turn, should essentially be determined by the 
individual relationship, firm, and loan characteristics (loan amount decision). 
 
Crisis indicator and loan characteristics 
To measure the impact of the financial crisis, we include the dummy variable 
Crisis which is equal to one for those loans disbursed after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 2008 and zero otherwise. We account for the 
structure of the bank’s loan portfolio by introducing the dummy variables Agro, 
Micro and SME which are one if the loan is an agro, micro or SME loan, 
respectively.  
If a firm requests a very high loan amount, the bank may be more likely to reject 
the loan application or to grant a considerably lower loan amount. Therefore, we 
include the variable Requested amount which is the requested loan amount in USD. 
The bank’s decision to grant a loan and its willingness to grant the requested amount 
should critically depend on the perceived risk of the loan. One means to make a loan 
safer is to pledge collateral. We include the variable Collateral which is the value of 
the pledged collateral in USD. Additionally, we include Repeat loan as a relationship 
indicator since close bank-borrower relationships have been found to increase credit 
availability (e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1994)).59 It is a dummy variable indicating 
whether a loan is a firm’s later vs. first loan. We expect the bank to be able to gather 
valuable private information when interacting repeatedly with the same borrower, 
which, in turn, may benefit the borrower (see Allen and Gale (1999), Boot (2000) 
and Ongena and Smith (2000)). The dummy variable Manat indicates whether a loan 
is denominated in local currency (AZN) vs. USD.  
 
 
 
                                                 
59
 We repeat all estimations with two other relationship measures, the length of the bank-borrower 
relationship and the number of times a borrower has taken out a loan before the current loan, and find 
that results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 142 
Firm characteristics 
We include several firm characteristics that may influence the bank’s decision to 
grant a loan and, if it does so, which amount to grant. Since most of the firms in the 
sample are run by their owners, owner characteristics are of particular importance. 
First of all, we include the borrower’s Age (in years). On the one hand, it may be 
negatively related to credit availability because older firm owners who are close to 
retirement have a lower incentive to keep a good credit record in order to receive 
future loans if their reputation cannot be transferred to their successor (see Ortiz-
Molina and Penas (2008)). On the other hand, older firm owners may be more 
experienced and therefore less risky borrowers, which would mean a positive relation 
between borrower’s age and credit availability.  
In microfinance, often the argument is made that women are better borrowers 
because they are more reliable in repaying their loans (e.g. Armendariz de Aghion 
and Murdoch (2005)). To capture a possible gender effect, we include the dummy 
variable Male which is one if the borrower is male and zero if she is female. A 
similar reasoning might be true for a Married (dummy variable that is one if the 
borrower is married and zero otherwise) borrower who has responsibility towards a 
family. 
 
5.4.4 Summary statistics  
Table 25 presents summary statistics of our loan and firm variables for the 
approved loans. Panel A provides statistics for the full sample, whereas Panel B 
displays sample means by loan category for the periods before and during the crisis. 
Panel A shows that most of the loan applications in our sample are successful 
(Approved), but that the bank makes use of loan size constraints. Borrowers who 
receive a loan are, on average, granted only 83% of their requested amounts. The 
statistics confirm that the majority of approved loans in our sample are micro loans 
with an average Requested amount of 4,698 USD. Interestingly, loans are regularly 
collateralized at clearly more than 100% with the value of Collateral having an 
average value of more than 14,000 USD. Considering firm characteristics, the 
majority of borrowers are Male (83%) and Married (73%). 
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Table 25. Descriptive statistics 
This table displays summary statistics for our loan and firm variables. See Table 23 for definitions of 
all variables. Note that only approved loans are included in the calculations. 
     
Panel A: Loan and firm characteristics (of approved loans) 
          
 N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Loan characteristics         
Approved 184,881 0.93 0 1 
Granted-requested ratio 172,427 0.83 0.04 2 
Crisis 172,427 0.38 0 1 
Agro 172,427 0.16 0 1 
Micro 172,427 0.81 0 1 
SME 172,427 0.03 0 1 
Requested amount 172,427 4,698 100 1,000,000 
Collateral 172,427 14,494 0 3,717,322 
Repeat loan 172,427 0.47 0 1 
Manat 172,427 0.57 0 1 
     
Firm characteristics         
Age 172,427 42.11 19 87 
Male 172,427 0.83 0 1 
Married 172,427 0.73 0 1 
     
 Panel B. Sample means by loan type and crisis 
This table reports sample means of our loan and firm variables for the periods before and after the Lehman failure (Crisis) for the following subsamples: Agro: Loans intended 
for agricultural investments. Micro: Loans with loan amounts up to 10,000 USD (from 2008: also with amounts up to 20,000 USD). SME: Loans with loan amounts of more 
than 10,000 USD and up to 500,000 USD. ***, **, * denote that variables are significantly different from each other at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level using a two-sided t-test. 
Note that summary statistics for the variable Approved are calculated including all loans while for all other variables only those loans that were approved by the bank are 
included in the calculations. 
                          
 Agro loans Micro loans SME loans 
 Crisis = 0 Crisis = 1 Diff Crisis = 0 Crisis = 1 Diff Crisis = 0 Crisis = 1 Diff 
 N = 9,956 N = 19,059    N = 101,239 N = 48,867    N = 4,195 N = 1,565   
               
Loan characteristics                         
Approved 0.958 0.964 -0.006 ** 0.925 0.938 -0.013 *** 0.883 0.829 0.054 *** 
Granted-requested ratio 0.851 0.835 0.017 *** 0.824 0.823 0.001   0.842 0.831 0.011 * 
Requested amount 2,447 2,709 -262 *** 2,871 3,878 -1,006 *** 55,076 66,525 -11,450 *** 
Collateral 6,293 5,993 300 *** 9,570 8,385 1,185 *** 198,975 240,033 -41,058 *** 
Repeat loan 0.37 0.34 0.04 *** 0.46 0.56 -0.10 *** 0.66 0.71 -0.05 *** 
Manat 0.78 0.90 -0.12 *** 0.45 0.69 -0.24 *** 0.02 0.01 0.01  
               
Firm characteristics                         
Age 44.18 43.68 0.50 *** 42.09 40.98 1.12 *** 43.3 42.57 0.73 *** 
Male 0.89 0.90 -0.01 ** 0.83 0.80 0.03 *** 0.91 0.91 0.01  
Married 0.79 0.79 -0.00   0.72 0.70 0.02 *** 0.84 0.81 0.03 * 
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Panel B of Table 25 presents statistics for the three loan categories of agro, micro 
and SME loans. To assess changes in loan terms and the borrower pool along the 
crisis, it compares loan and firm characteristics of approved loans for the time before 
and after the Lehman failure. The statistics confirm that the availability of agro loans 
was only little affected by the crisis. Approval rates slightly increase while the 
Granted-requested ratio decreases by less than 2 percentage points. For micro loans, 
the impact of the crisis on the credit availability is relatively small as well. For SME 
loans, however, the probability that a loan application is Approved decreases by 5 
percentage points after the Lehman failure. In addition, the Granted-requested ratio 
also drops, but only to a small extent. The average Requested amount for agro and 
micro loans increases regardless of the distortions in international financial markets 
in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse. This is similar to Berg and Schrader (2009) 
who find increased demand of micro borrowers after unexpected external shocks 
such as volcanic eruptions. SME loans show a larger average Requested amount after 
Lehman as well, but in contrast to the other loan groups they also turn out to be more 
collateralized after Lehman which may be due to the increased risk associated with 
SME loans.  
Establishing good bank-borrower relationships seems to be especially important 
for micro and SME clients as the share of repeat loans increases for both loan groups 
during the crisis. This confirms the graphical analysis in Figure 9 that relationship 
lending helps to enhance credit availability in times of crises. Interestingly, the 
financial crisis influences the denomination of agro and micro loans considerably. 
After the Lehman failure 90% of agro loans and 69% of micro loans are denominated 
in local currency (Manat) compared to 78% and 45% before. This finding can be 
explained by the fear of a depreciation of the local currency towards the USD after 
the currencies of neighboring countries such as Russia and Kazakhstan plunged 
considerably due to the financial and economic crisis. Even though the Manat did in 
fact only depreciate little, especially small borrowers nevertheless demanded more 
loans in local compared to foreign currency as their income is mostly in local 
currency as well. The statistics on firm characteristics imply that the pool of 
borrowers is little affected by the crisis.  
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5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Determinants of the likelihood that a loan application is approved 
Table 26 displays regression results for the determinants of the bank’s decision to 
approve a loan application for the full sample and for the three subsamples based on 
our loan type categories. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted 
for clustering at the borrower level. 
 
Effects of loan and firm characteristics on loan approval 
Columns (1) and (2) present estimates of the LPM regressions for the full sample. 
The results confirm the main hypothesis: the crisis has a negative impact on credit 
approval rates, but the likelihood that a loan application is approved varies 
significantly for agro, micro and SME loans.  
The estimates in Column (1) reveal several interesting findings. The variable 
Crisis, which captures the effect of the Lehman failure and the subsequent turmoil in 
capital markets, shows that loan applications made after September 2008 have, on 
average, a 3.8% lower chance to be approved. Agro and Micro loan applications are 
significantly more likely to be successful than SME loan applications (the base 
category). On average, agro (micro) loan applications have a 12.5% (9.4%) higher 
probability to be finally granted compared to SME loan applications. To study how 
the relation between our loan groups and the probability of loan approval is 
influenced by the crisis, we introduce the interaction terms Agro*Crisis and 
Micro*Crisis in column (2). Both interaction terms and both main effects are 
significantly positive. This means that the probability to be granted a loan is not only 
higher for agro and micro loans compared to SME loans before the failure of 
Lehman but that this effect is even more pronounced after Lehman. For instance, 
before Lehman Agro loans have a 9.7% higher probability to be approved than SME 
loans. After Lehman, this difference in probabilities increases by another 8.3%. The 
effects are qualitatively the same for Micro loans, yet they are economically smaller. 
These results relate to the specific structure of Azerbaijan’s economy with its 
larger firms being more dependent on oil price fluctuations and international 
economic developments and therefore being more affected by the crisis. Micro firms, 
on the contrary, rather produce subsistence goods or deliver essential services and 
agro borrowers mostly grow fruit and vegetables or raise sheep for the local market 
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so that both are considerably less affected by the crisis. These varying levels of 
affectedness seem to influence the bank’s risk assessment of firms and to finally 
translate into accordingly varying levels of credit availability. Apart from that, it is 
plausible to assume that it is easier for the bank to “save” refinancing funds by 
cutting SME in contrast to micro lending which additionally explains that credit 
availability is mostly affected for SME borrowers.  
The economic relevance of the effects of the other loan characteristics Requested 
amount and Collateral is very low, but the estimates are statistically significant and 
their signs are in line with economic reasoning. All else equal, borrowers who 
request larger loan amounts are less likely to receive a loan indicating that they may 
be comparatively risky. Providing Collateral, by contrast, increases the probability to 
be granted a loan, all else equal, because such loans are safer in the sense that the 
pledged asset may be sold in case of default. Furthermore, we find that bank 
relationships are valuable because being a repeat borrower strongly increases the 
likelihood to receive a loan by 5.7%. This result is in line with findings from the US 
and Europe (see e.g. Cole (1998) and Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) and for a 
comprehensive overview Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009)). Loans that are 
denominated in the local currency Manat have a higher probability to be approved. 
The reason is that most of the agro and micro loans are denominated in local 
currency which at the same time reduces their inherent credit risk as agro and micro 
enterprises are likely to earn the majority of their income in local currency. Besides, 
the missing refinancing funds during the second and third quarters of 2008 were to 
be denominated in USD which may also have impacted on the preferred lending 
currency. 
Turning to the firm characteristics, the estimates reveal that Married borrowers 
indeed have a 1.2% higher probability to receive a loan than unmarried borrowers.  
 
Effects of loan and firm characteristics for agro, micro and SME loans respectively  
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 26 report estimates of LPM regressions for agro, 
micro and SME loans respectively to further disentangle differences in the factors 
determining loan approval rates for these three categories. The separate regressions 
confirm our findings from the full sample specifications. They reveal that our Crisis 
indicator does not have any impact on loan approvals for agro loans. For both micro 
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and SME loans, the probability to receive a loan decreases after the Lehman failure 
with the effect being considerably stronger for SME loans (8.2% vs. 4.3%).  
Being a repeat borrower is crucial for increasing credit availability for all three 
loan groups. Nevertheless, it seems to play the most important role when applying 
for an SME loan. Since SME loans involve considerably larger loan amounts, the 
information gathered from previous interactions with borrowers may be most 
valuable in this segment. Interestingly, the denomination of the loan influences credit 
availability adversely for the three loan groups. While agro and micro loans are more 
likely to be approved when they are denominated in Manat, SME loans in manat are 
less likely to be granted. One explanation for this result lies in the bank’s refinancing 
structure. Since it receives most of its funding in USD, it has an incentive to lend on 
in foreign currency to prevent currency mismatches on its own balance sheet. At the 
same time, the bank seems to channel its funds according to the borrowers’ abilities 
to deal with foreign currency risks. Agro and micro loans which are granted to very 
small businesses that probably do not earn foreign currency have a higher probability 
to be approved in local currency. SMEs, on the contrary, are likely to be more 
capable to handle USD loans or even earn (some of) their income in USD. Thus, for 
the larger SME loans the bank insists on lending in USD to hedge at least part of its 
currency risk (Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2009) provide similar evidence 
for micro and SME lending in Bulgaria).  
Turning to the impact of the firm characteristics, we find that only the variable 
Married has a uniform, significantly positive impact on loan approval rates for all 
three loan categories. Of all our firm characteristics it seems to provide the strongest 
signal to the bank. The borrower’s gender has only a small economic effect on credit 
approvals, but it works in the opposite direction for agro vs. micro loans. For agro 
loans, being Male decreases the probability to receive a loan which is line with the 
notion that women are the more reliable borrowers (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Murdoch (2005)). Yet, male borrowers who request micro loans have a higher 
probability to succeed in applying for a loan in comparison to female borrowers. 
Finally, a borrower’s Age plays a minor role in determining credit availability and is 
only significant for SME loans with a one standard deviation increase in borrowers’ 
age (10 years) decreasing the loan approval rate by only 1%. 
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Table 26. Loan approvals: loan and firm determinants 
This table reports results from LPM regressions for the full sample and the following subsamples: 
Agro: Loans intended for agricultural investments. Micro: Loans with loan amounts up to 10,000 USD 
(from 2008: also with amounts up to 20,000 USD). SME: Loans with loan amounts of more than 
10,000 USD and up to 500,000 USD. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and account for 
clustering at the borrower level. The dependent variable is Approved which is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a loan application was approved by the bank or rejected. All explanatory variables 
are defined in Table 23. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- and 0.1-level. 
            
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full sample Full sample Agro loans Micro loans SME loans 
            
Crisis -0.038*** -0.105*** 0.004 -0.043*** -0.082*** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.013) 
Agro 0.125*** 0.097***    
 (0.008) (0.008)    
Micro 0.094*** 0.078***    
 (0.007) (0.007)    
Agro*Crisis  0.083***    
  (0.011)    
Micro*Crisis  0.064***    
    (0.011)       
Requested amount -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Collateral 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Repeat loan 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.024*** 0.059*** 0.087*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) 
Manat 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.020*** -0.140*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.044) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Male 0.003* 0.003 -0.008** 0.004** -0.012 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) 
Married 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.008** 0.012*** 0.036*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013) 
Constant 0.698*** 0.712*** 0.916*** 0.775*** 0.801*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.006) (0.038) 
Observations 184,881 184,881 29,015 150,106 5,760 
R² adjusted 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.060 
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes 
Branch fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Summarizing, we find that the impact of the financial crisis on credit availability 
strongly depends on firm size and on the industry a firm operates in. Although agro 
loans are often considered to be very risky due to their highly correlated risks in case 
of natural disasters, bad weather conditions or commodity price volatility (e.g. 
Wenner, Navajas, Trivelli and Tarazona (2007)), our results imply that the 
diversification of a bank’s portfolio into different industries and firm size categories 
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may provide stability in case of a financial and economic crisis that mainly hits those 
firms that are internationally connected. Additionally, in contrast to anecdotal 
evidence from Eastern Europe (e.g. ProCredit Holding (2009)) which suggests that 
banks currently worry especially about their lending to micro clients and have 
limited their exposure in that segment because many of these clients carry high levels 
of (consumer) debt, we find that credit availability is mostly affected for SME 
customers. This may be explained by the comparatively small and underdeveloped 
banking sector in Azerbaijan which has prevented micro clients from accumulating 
debt.  
 
5.5.2 Determinants of the extent of volume constraints  
Table 27 reports results from a Heckman selection model to assess our second 
dimension of credit availability for the full sample and for the three subsamples 
based on the different loan categories. The bank may not only deal with risks arising 
from the crisis or from firms’ characteristics by denying credit to certain borrowers 
but also by constraining the loan amount it is willing to grant to those borrowers 
whose loan applications are approved. The Heckman selection model explicitly 
accounts for these two decisions about constraining credit which the bank can make. 
Thus, columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) include estimates from the selection stage, i.e. 
they show the impact of our loan and firm variables on the likelihood that a loan is 
approved.  
Since this step replicates the results from Table 26, we mainly concentrate our 
discussion on the second stage results displayed in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Note 
that the Mills’ ratios which we derive from the first stage regressions and which are 
included in the second stage to account for the dependence in the two equations are 
statistically significant in all our specifications. This means that the selection 
procedure is needed to derive unbiased estimates in the outcome equation. The Mills’ 
ratios indicate whether the unobserved factors that influence selection (loan 
approval) and the unobserved factors that influence the outcome (Requested-granted 
ratio) are positively or negatively correlated. 
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Table 27. Share of requested loan amount that was granted by the bank: loan 
and firm determinants 
This table reports results from Heckman sample selection regressions for the full sample and the following subsamples: Agro: 
Loans intended for agricultural investments. Micro: Loans with loan amounts up to 10,000 USD (from 2008: also with amounts 
up to 20,000 USD). SME: Loans with loan amounts of more than 10,000 USD and up to 500,000 USD. Standard errors 
(reported in parentheses) are bootstrapped to derive their correct values in the two-step procedure. The dependent variables are 
Approved, which is a dummy variable indicating whether a loan application was approved by the bank or rejected, in columns 
(1), (3), (5) and (7) and Granted-requested ratio, which is the share of the requested amount that is granted by the bank, in 
columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). All explanatory variables are defined in Table 23. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01-, 0.05- 
and 0.1-level. 
                  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Full sample Agro loans Micro loans SME loans 
Dependent variable Approved 
Granted-
requested 
ratio Approved 
Granted-
requested 
ratio Approved 
Granted-
requested 
ratio Approved  
Granted-
requested 
ratio 
                  
Crisis -0.556*** -0.041*** 0.011 0.002 -0.258*** 0.001 -0.395*** -0.010 
 (0.054) (0.010) (0.073) (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.069) (0.014) 
Agro 0.541*** -0.001       
 (0.047) (0.007)       
Micro 0.349*** -0.028***       
 (0.045) (0.007)       
Agro*Crisis 0.441*** 0.016*       
 (0.058) (0.009)       
Micro*Crisis 0.278*** 0.017**       
  (0.051) (0.008)             
Requested amount -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Collateral 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Repeat loan 0.467*** 0.064*** 0.227*** 0.043*** 0.517*** 0.035*** 0.388*** -0.016 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.038) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.049) (0.016) 
Manat 0.124*** -0.008*** 0.246*** -0.036*** 0.049*** -0.021*** -0.518*** 0.042 
  (0.011) (0.002) (0.045) (0.005) (0.015) (0.001) (0.139) (0.034) 
Age 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** -0.005* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Male 0.019 0.039*** -0.106** 0.027*** 0.042** 0.042*** -0.089 0.011 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.049) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002) (0.076) (0.011) 
Married 0.092*** 0.012*** 0.098** -0.001 0.086*** 0.005*** 0.176*** -0.006 
  (0.012) (0.002) (0.047) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.062) (0.009) 
Constant 0.251*** 0.698*** 0.925** 0.965*** 0.537*** 0.787*** 0.875*** 0.860*** 
  (0.058) (0.025) (0.378) (0.041) (0.032) (0.021) (0.175) (0.041) 
Mills ratio  0.144***   -0.603***   -0.209***   -0.267*** 
    (0.055)   (0.083)   (0.055)   (0.102) 
Observations 184,881 184,881 29,015 29,015 150,106 150,106 5,760 5,760 
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Branch fixed effects yes no yes no yes no yes no 
 
Column (2) presents the results on the determinants of the wedge between granted 
and requested loan amounts (Granted-requested ratio) for the full sample. Note that 
Granted-requested ratio is an inverse measure of volume constraints which indicates 
fewer constraints the larger its value is (it indicates larger credit availability the 
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larger its value is). The variable Crisis captures the effect of the Lehman failure on 
volume constraints for SME loans (the base category). We find that SME loans 
which are made during the Crisis are significantly more constrained than those made 
before the Lehman failure. As SME loans are regularly collateralized by mortgages 
and real estate prizes were falling, borrowers received smaller amounts against their 
collateral. To study how the relation between Agro (Micro) loans and volume 
constraints is influenced by the crisis we introduce the interaction terms Agro*Crisis 
and Micro*Crisis. For Agro loans, the statistically insignificant main effect together 
with the positive and statistically significant interaction effect implies that volume 
constraints for agro loans are not different from those for SME loans before the crisis 
but that they are lower during the crisis. This result shows again that agro loans are 
less affected by the financial crisis than SME loans. For Micro loans, on the contrary, 
volume constraints are significantly higher before the crisis but this difference is cut 
by more than half during the crisis. Interestingly, while micro loans have a higher 
probability to be approved than SME loans, they are generally more volume 
constrained once they are approved but not during the crisis. Thus, the bank seems to 
apply its different constraint possibilities in different ways to the three loan 
categories.  
Turning to the further loan and firm characteristics, we find that taking out a 
Repeat loan decreases volume constraints considerably. There are two 
complementary explanations for this result (see Kirschenmann (2010)). The bank 
may make use of dynamic incentives in environments with asymmetric information 
by increasing granted loan amounts after due repayment. Simultaneously, borrowers 
may learn what is reasonable to request from previous constraints and adjust their 
following requests accordingly. Thus, the observed reduction in volume constraints 
may stem from both the demand and the supply side. Although Manat loans have a 
higher probability to be granted, they are slightly more volume constrained. One 
explanation may be that borrowers requesting manat loans are less familiar with 
financial operations and therefore are more prone to miscalculate their financial 
needs and abilities. Finally, Male and Married borrowers turn out to be less volume 
constrained than female and unmarried borrowers.    
Studying the three loan categories independently and not in relation to each other 
reveals that the crisis does not at all affect credit availability of agro loans for those 
borrowers that request such loans (columns (3-4)). Yet, micro loans (columns (5-6)) 
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and SME loans (columns (7-8)) face a significantly lower probability to receive a 
loan after applying for one during the crisis compared to before the crisis, while 
volume constraints are not significantly influenced by the crisis. Therefore, our 
results show that credit availability in the sense of the availability of the requested 
loan volume does not significantly change due to the crisis when we analyze the 
three loan categories independently. Pooling all loans in one regression and assessing 
relative impacts of the crisis between the three subgroups by interaction effects, 
however, reveals that again agro and micro loans are hit less than SME loans. 
For our loan and firm characteristics, we find that they have little impact on 
volume constraints for SME loans. As for the full sample, we observe for agro and 
micro loans that taking out a Repeat loan significantly decreases volume constraints 
while the loan’s denomination in local currency (Manat) increases volume 
constraints. Although being Married turned out to be an important borrower 
characteristic in increasing loan approval probabilities, it plays a minor role in 
reducing volume constraints as the variable is only statistically significant for micro 
loans.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This paper studies the impact of the financial crisis on the credit availability for 
micro, small and medium enterprises in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan provides an 
interesting object of study because, on the one hand, its economy is weakly 
diversified and highly dependent on the development of the oil price making it 
vulnerable to the economic crisis that is brought about by the financial crisis. On the 
other hand, its banking sector is still comparatively small and not yet much globally 
integrated, providing some immunity to the spillovers of a global financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, there are a few banks that may be expected to be affected by the crisis 
because they are foreign owned. One of these banks is AccessBank Azerbaijan 
whose credit file data for 184,881 loans made between November 2002 and August 
2009 we use for our empirical analysis. The structure of the dataset allows us to 
analyze credit availability on an aggregate level as well as on an individual loan 
level, thereby identifying three channels of credit constraints. 
By analyzing aggregate summary statistics, we derive the first channel of credit 
constraints. We observe that its refinancing delays in the second and third quarters of 
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2008 seem to lead the bank to discourage (potential) borrowers from applying for 
new or additional loans. The bank’s temporary liquidity squeeze therefore resulted in 
a slowdown of its credit portfolio so that not all the demand could be met during this 
limited period of time. However, the restrictions on business lending were 
implemented in line with a conscious tighter risk management, i.e. that in the 
business loan portfolio mainly SME and high-risk micro lending was limited.      
As we observe borrowers’ loan applications and their requested loan amounts as 
well as the bank’s decision whether to grant a loan and which loan amount to grant if 
the application is approved, we are able to separate two further channels of credit 
constraints at the individual loan level: loan approval rates and loan volume 
constraints.  
Our findings for those borrowers who actually apply for a loan suggest that credit 
availability for agro loan borrowers is merely affected by the crisis. This is surprising 
on first sight since agro loans are regularly classified as particularly risky because of 
their highly correlated risks in case of natural disasters or commodity price 
fluctuations. In an economic crisis like the current one, however, the agro businesses 
in Azerbaijan are comparatively unaffected because they mostly produce subsistence 
goods. Thus, such loans may offer some stability to a bank’s loan portfolio in times 
of a global financial and economic crisis. The same seems to apply to the 
diversification into different loan sizes as the micro loans in our sample show a 
considerably smaller reduction in approval rates compared to the SME loans as well 
which may be explained by their lower risk. SME borrowers whose business 
activities may be more severely hit by the crisis therefore have to face the greatest 
cuts to their credit availability. Apart from that, our results show that bank 
relationships are valuable in times of crises as being a repeat borrower considerably 
increases credit availability especially for micro and SME borrowers. 
Finally, our results suggest that credit constraints mainly work via the aggregate 
channel by the bank discouraging loan applications and via the approval decision 
channel once a loan application is made. Loan volume constraints only slightly 
increase during the crisis. This may be explained by the fact that we study loans for 
specific investments which may not leave much room for amount adjustments.  
One caveat has to be made concerning the interpretation of our results. To 
comprehensively assess the effects of the crisis on credit availability for the various 
types of enterprises one would actually have to take into account how many 
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borrowers have been deterred from applying for a loan by their loan officers. While 
we can provide some evidence on this aspect in our aggregate analysis, it is possible 
that the active marketing strategy which the bank uses to attract new customers is 
more intensively employed in the segment of micro loans compared to SME loans. 
This would imply that a decrease in these marketing activities would have a larger 
impact on the micro loan portfolio than on the SME loan portfolio. Thus, it may well 
be that we underestimate the negative effect of the crisis on micro credit availability 
because we do not have information on (potential) borrowers’ intentions to apply for 
a loan. This opens up room for future empirical research to broaden the evidence on 
the effects of the financial crisis on credit availability for micro vs. SME borrowers 
in Central Asia and other emerging markets.      
Our results have implications for development practitioners aiming at sustainably 
fostering credit access for micro, small and medium businesses in developing and 
transition economies. First, supporting MFIs in building up diversified credit 
portfolios that include various loan categories with respect to size and industry may 
increase a banks’ stability in times of a global financial and economic crisis as the 
current one. However, further research on how different banks’ portfolio quality is 
affected by such a crisis would be needed to shed more light on this aspect. Second, 
broadening MFIs’ refinancing basis to achieve greater resilience against external 
shocks remains an important topic. Recent attempts to create adequate refinancing 
instruments in local currency therefore seem to be a crucial step to help MFIs to 
overcome refinancing problems. 
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6 Conclusions 
This thesis has analyzed demand and supply effects on loan contract terms in bank 
lending to micro, small and medium enterprises in developed as well as in transition 
countries. Bank relationships of MSMEs represent a particularly interesting object of 
study because they are plagued by informational asymmetries and banks need to find 
ways to deal with the arising risks. For instance, they may use relationship lending 
techniques which imply that they do not only evaluate single transactions but 
multiple interactions with the same borrower over time and/or across products (Boot 
(2000)). This allows lenders to gain often proprietary information which facilitates 
implicit long-term contracting and intertemporal smoothing of loan contract terms. 
At the same time, informational asymmetries may also influence borrower behavior 
when requesting certain loan terms and borrowers may learn from previous loan 
negotiations when interacting repeatedly with the same lender. Incorporating these 
demand aspects into the analysis contributes to a better understanding of the 
processes that lead to the observed outcomes of loan negotiations.   
The theoretical literature provides various arguments for the impact of asymmetric 
information on borrower and bank behavior when requesting / granting loan terms. 
Due to an asymmetric distribution of information between lenders and borrowers 
banks may, for instance, deny credit even to borrowers with profitable projects 
(Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Aghion and Bolton (1992)). 
Borrowers, in turn, may first have to signal their good quality to lenders by 
requesting short-term loans before they can receive long-term financing (Flannery 
(1986)). Apart from that, when lenders are imperfectly informed about the currency 
of firm revenue, local currency borrowers may be more likely to choose foreign 
currency loans. The reason is that in a pooling “equilibrium” these borrowers are not 
fully charged for the credit risk involved in taking these unhedged loans (Brown, 
Ongena and Yesin (2009)). 
The aim of this thesis was to disentangle demand from supply determinants of 
loan contract terms. Thereby, it wanted to broaden the understanding of how 
observed contractual outcomes arise and how requested and granted loan terms 
evolve over bank relationships in a sequence of interactions between borrowers and 
lenders. Analyzing various loan contract terms such as amount, maturity and 
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currency as well as credit availability (i.e. the probability to receive a loan) reveals 
that taking into account information from both loan applications and loan contracts 
offers new insights into the factors that drive contractual outcomes in MSME bank 
lending. Importantly, incorporating the demand side into the analysis does not render 
previous empirical results obsolete but enriches the picture of bank relationships and 
loan negotiations that may be gained from studying bank portfolio data. 
Chapter 2 finds that the relation between borrower risk and loan maturity is 
determined by the interplay of various demand and supply side factors. The positive 
and monotonic risk-maturity relation may be explained by good borrowers choosing 
short maturities to signal their low risk to the bank when informational asymmetries 
are high. In case of low asymmetric information, relationship lenders’ willingness to 
assist risky borrowers by offering them long-term loans provides an explanation. 
Adding borrower bargaining power to the analysis reveals that borrowers would 
actually like to borrow at longer maturities (if informational asymmetries were 
absent) and do so when they have bargaining power. Finally, cost considerations (i.e. 
the term structure of the interest rate curve) seem to play a role. 
Chapter 3 offers insights into the demand and supply factors that drive foreign 
currency lending in Eastern Europe. The results show that foreign currency lending is 
not only driven by borrowers who try to benefit from lower interest rates. They also 
show that a substantial share of foreign currency retail loans is supply-driven with 
banks hesitant to lend long-term in local currency and eager to match the currency 
structure of their assets and liabilities. This implies that recent policy measures to 
curb the extent of foreign currency lending which address only the demand side to 
increase borrowers’ awareness of the inherent risks may not be sufficient. 
Chapter 4 provides a new and more comprehensive measure of observed credit 
constraints that incorporates requested and granted loan amounts. The results indicate 
that the extent of (publicly) available information matters for initial differences in 
credit constraints between borrowers. Analyzing the evolution of requested and 
granted loan amounts over multiple interactions between borrowers and one bank 
reveals that observed credit constraints decrease over a loan sequence due to a 
convergence of the demand and supply sides. On the demand side, this finding 
implies that borrowers learn from the negative feedback they receive from previous 
credit constraints and adjust their requests accordingly. On the supply side, the 
results indicate that the bank uses dynamic incentives to overcome information 
 158 
problems increasing loan sizes disproportionately after due repayment when 
contracting repeatedly. 
Finally, Chapter 5 deals with the impact of the 2007-2008 financial and economic 
crisis on the demand and approval of MSME loans in Azerbaijan, a country whose 
heavily oil-dependent economy is vulnerable to external shocks. The data comes 
from AccessBank Azerbaijan which was affected by the financial crisis by temporary 
delays in its refinancing pipeline. On an aggregate level the results indicate that the 
delays in the bank’s refinancing resulted in a temporary slowdown of portfolio 
growth, especially in the SME segment. On an individual loan level the findings 
show that the availability of agro loans is merely affected by the crisis while micro 
loans face a moderate and SME loans a considerable reduction in approval rates. The 
results suggest that the real effects of the crisis critically depend on firms’ industry 
and size. Finally, bank relationships are found to mitigate the effects of the crisis on 
credit availability. 
In summary, the results not only amend the existing academic literature but may 
also be interesting for policy makers who aim to foster access to credit for small 
firms. The studies hint at certain peculiarities that determine MSME lending in 
transition (and developing) countries such as missing long-term refinancing in local 
currency, instable macroeconomic policies or borrowers’ inexperience in dealing 
with formal banks resulting in a pronounced learning process. At the same time, the 
studies indicate that informational asymmetries are an important factor in MSME 
lending whether studying the US and Western Europe or the transition countries in 
South-eastern Europe and Central Asia. Accordingly, close bank relationships are 
valuable in the various settings increasing credit availability and leading to more 
favorable loan terms. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to quantify 
whether bank relationships are more valuable in one region or the other. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 clearly illustrates that having only information on 
contracted loan terms allows no more than collecting indications of the various 
demand and supply factors being at work. While this does provide interesting 
insights, adding information from loan applications helps disentangling the two sides 
more clearly and improves the understanding of how loan contracting works. For 
future research, studying more comprehensive panel datasets with information on 
borrowers’ different sources of external funds should be fruitful. This would allow 
testing the impact of bank competition and multi-source borrowing on requested and 
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granted loan terms and would provide a more distinct picture about the actual extent 
of credit constraints which borrowers face in different countries.  
On the demand side, measuring borrower bargaining power is challenging. This 
thesis offers one approach but there may be various other ways how to capture 
bargaining power and future research could address this issue in more detail. In 
addition, this thesis entails implications for research in (behavioral) corporate 
finance. For instance, there are studies indicating that managers choose a particular 
debt maturity structure or try to time the market with debt issues to manage the 
financing costs (e.g. Graham and Harvey (2001)). Further research may analyze if 
and how behavioral issues can be observed in bank-borrower relationships, 
particularly in small business lending, as well. Moreover, the finding that borrowers 
obviously learn from the feedback they get from previous outcomes of loan 
negotiations highlights that financial literacy plays a role in loan contracting. While 
financial literacy has been shown to be a widespread phenomenon there is little 
evidence on how this influences debt decisions in general and requested and granted 
loan terms in particular (see Jappelli (2009) for a recent overview).  
On the bank side, future research may address the question how the bank’s 
refinancing (kind, maturity, currency as well as their changes over time) influences 
its lending decisions. So far, there is only little known about the interplay of the two 
sides of a bank’s balance sheet. This is a particularly difficult issue because of the 
inherent endogeneity problem concerning the question whether the refinancing side 
drives the bank’s lending decisions or whether the bank’s anticipated lending 
operations drive its refinancing decisions. 
To conclude, while the four studies which compose this thesis point out several 
important aspects, they simultaneously open up a wide scope for future research on 
demand and supply effects in bank lending.  
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